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Language has been long recognised as a powerful marker of national identity, as 
has its role in transforming multi-ethnic societies into unified nations. Such is the 
case of multi-ethnic and multilingual Georgia, where language has today become a 
crucial factor in interethnic relations and in the Georgian nation-building process. 
This thesis sheds light on the nature of kartveloba (Georgianness) by examining 
Georgian language policy over the entire history of the nation. 
Despite the country’s long-standing civilisation and its established culture, 
Georgian statehood began to decline from the second half of the thirteenth century, 
until the country was eventually incorporated into the Russian empire at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Since then, there have been several attempts 
to instigate a ‘national revival’: 1) the cultural/linguistic movement of the 
nineteenth century, 2) the struggle to build a nation-state in 1918-1921, 3) the 
national liberation movement during the Soviet period (1921-1991), and 4) nation-
state building in the post-Soviet period. All of these periods display common 
features with regard to language policy. 
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After investigating language policy and identity developments in the pre-
modern period, this thesis examines Georgia under Russian rule (both Tsarist and 
Soviet), which made the country vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, and tries to explain 
the violent outcomes. The thesis goes on to examine public debate of language and 
minority issues, as well as efforts to elaborate inclusive language and ethnic 
policies in contemporary Georgia. 
The main body of the thesis consists of six chapters. The first sets out the 
nature of the problem, the practical importance of this study, and its methods and 
structure. The second discusses the main concepts and theoretical considerations. 
The third traces the development of kartveloba before modern times. The fourth 
chapter examines the origin of modern national identity, whose main marker was 
the Georgian language. Chapter five analyses Soviet language policy in the wider 
context of the ethnic policy and analyses the nationalist aspirations of the 
Georgians in the twentieth century. Chapter six deals with official policies in the 
post-Soviet period, but also looks at language practice and attitudes among 
minority groups. Drawing on primary sources (such as government decrees, laws 
and other documents, media publications, social surveys and interviews), as well 
as secondary sources, it seeks to explain how Georgia has dealt with and reflected 
its multicultural character under different governments. It also investigates the role 
of language policy in the process of nation-building and makes proposals regarding 
ways that formulating language policy might help form civic society in Georgia. 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
 
1.1 Outlining the problem and the current situation 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the construction of a new national identity 
for a multiethnic and multilingual population proved to be the most challenging 
task facing newly independent Georgia. The reason for this lies, on the one hand, 
in the Soviet legacy of institutionalised ethno-nationalism and ethnic animosities, 
and, on the other hand, in a strong sense of cultural identity, of kartveloba 
(Georgianness), deeply rooted in the pre-Soviet past. 
The process of transforming Georgian society into a political nation and 
creating a sovereign state is still incomplete. Ethnic minorities in Georgia are 
largely excluded from the symbolic constitution of nationhood, although all civic 
duties (such as taxation or military service) fall on them as heavily as on ethnic 
Georgians, who constitute the majority of the population and who regard the state 
as exclusively theirs, especially in symbolic areas. In today’s Georgia, ethnic 
minorities are tolerated, but no effort is made to understand their concerns and 
cultures.  Much of the analysis in this work points out that ethnic Georgians regard 
all ethnic groups other than Georgian as inferior, and perceive ethnic diversity as a 
threat to Georgia’s territorial integrity. This can be explained by recent historical 
experience, when conflicts between different groups in the aftermath of the Soviet 
collapse developed along ethnic lines in the post-Soviet space.  
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Narratives of disloyal ethnicities were created under the colonial regime, 
when ethnic minorities were alienated from the majority. These narratives were 
extensively used by ethnocentric nationalists when the communist regime 
weakened and ethnic nationalism manifested itself as the most powerful ideology. 
Ethnic outsiders were regarded as a threat to the state. This is especially true for 
the Azeri and Armenian communities living compactly in areas bordering their 
kin-states, with which they have closer ties than with the rest of Georgia, largely 
because of the so-called ‘language barrier’. The ‘language barrier’ is a serious 
problem between Georgian-speaking and non-Georgian-speaking populations and 
is one of the fundamental reasons for the low participation of ethnic minorities in 
Georgia’s socio-political life. It also raises the danger of potential contradictions 
between loyalty to a given ethnic group and to a wider national identity.  
The violent political outcomes of ethno-linguistic tensions accompanying 
Georgia’s independence, namely the de facto loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
generated fear of Azeri and Armenian irredentism amongst politicians and the 
majority of the Georgian-speaking population. The politicisation of ethnicity and 
language in Georgia, a country still vulnerable to ethnic conflicts, is a fundamental 
reason for the delay in ratifying the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages, which Georgia undertook to sign when it was admitted to the Council 
of Europe in 1999. The Charter is based on the notion of a civic, rather than ethnic, 
understanding of citizenship and views linguistic diversity as an enrichment of, 
rather than threat, to the state. However, it is hard to win round to this view a 
country where ethno-linguistic nationalism has been a powerful political ideology 
dominated by historical and cultural claims, and where the language issue has been 
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inextricably linked to violent ethnic conflicts. Language policy is a key aspect of 
Georgia’s decolonisation.  
1.2 The scope of the study 
Language has been long recognised as a powerful marker of national identity. 
When attempting to form a nation from an old cultural entity or from groups who 
share recent history, a state gains power through language policy, by ensuring that 
a standard national language is used in all governmental and educational domains. 
Language policy can serve both to unify and to divide people. Policy makers are 
often motivated by state ideology, which may perceive linguistic diversity as a 
threat to national unity, or may support multilingualism. However, language policy 
is not only a top-down, but also a bottom-up process. De facto policy and language 
practice can differ from declared policy. While top-down policy emanates from 
government ideology, bottom-up policy stems from beliefs, attitudes and 
perceptions of different groups who are trying to negotiate in their own interests. 
Language policy not only concerns what languages people speak, but also how 
they use language in constructing their identities, and how they relate it to other 
symbols and markers of identity. Therefore language policy functions as a complex 
of linguistic as well as non-linguistic elements of identity. 
Social influencers operating within ethnic groups in Georgia reinforce this 
sense of insecurity: they evoke legacies of domination and further polarise society. 
Political memories, myths and emotions also magnify fears, driving groups further 
apart. For that reason, if steps are not taken to integrate ethnic minorities into 
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Georgian society, then the absence of civic nationhood will threaten political 
stability, and ethnic groups may be influenced from outside. 
This study is an analysis of the history and current state of language policy 
and national identity in Georgia. It sheds light on the nature of kartveloba 
(Georgianness) by examining Georgian language policy through different periods 
in time. It evaluates contemporary language-related government efforts, from the 
point of view of officially formulated goals, to build a political nation and create a 
common civic identity for the whole population. It should be noted, however, that 
nation-building is a very broad and complex subject, and no attempt is made to 
explore every aspect and dimension of it. This thesis focuses specifically on the 
role of cultural markers, especially language, in the development of kartveloba 
(Georgianness).  
Despite the country’s longstanding civilisation and its established culture, 
Georgian statehood began to decline from the second half of the thirteenth century, 
until the country was eventually incorporated into the Russian empire at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Since then, there have been several attempts 
to instigate a ‘national revival’: 1) the cultural/linguistic movement of the 
nineteenth century, 2) the struggle to build a nation-state in 1918-21, 3) the 
national liberation movement during the Soviet period (1921-91), and 4) nation-
state building in the post-Soviet period. All of these periods reveal common 
features in language policy. The first steps towards becoming a modern nation 
were made in the nineteenth century when, influenced by European nationalist 
ideas, a secularisation of public life in Georgia took place. In Western Europe, 
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however, nationalism was a product of the Enlightenment, whereas in Georgia it 
was a response to colonialism. If in Europe language served as a tool for 
assimilating ethnic minorities into dominant ethnicities and to create national 
identities, in Georgia language was used as part of differentialist policies, focusing 
on the ethnic core of kartveloba.  
1.3 The objectives, novelty and practical importance of the study 
The thesis seeks to address and provide answers to the five main research 
questions: 1) how has pre-modern experience shaped contemporary understanding 
of kartveloba? 2) Could the community of Georgians in the Middle Ages be 
considered a nation?  3) To what extent have colonial language policies determined 
post-colonial nationalism and conflicts in Georgia? 4) Which language policy 
might be the best for a multi-ethnic and multilingual Georgia, and what political 
consequences can be expected to ensue? 5) Why and how can Georgia become a 
civic nation with the help of language policy? 
Georgia presents a fascinating case study for investigating the relationship 
between language policy and political ideology; it shows how political and 
intellectual changes affect language policy, and vice versa. In order to avoid 
further complications between ethnic groups and to build a new national identity, 
we must scrutinise the effects of elaborating inclusive language and ethnic policies. 
But in order to understand and analyse the public debate on language and minority 
issues in contemporary Georgia, as well as the conflict and violence that arose, we 
must also explore the historical circumstances which have given rise to modern 
national identification.  While nationalism is a modern phenomenon, it is rooted in 
15 
 
preceding historical ideas, practices, symbols and myths. Therefore, this study 
takes a historical approach, focusing on political, cultural and linguistic dimensions 
of nation formation. Building on the insight of the ethnosymbolist paradigm, it 
presents a view of the Georgian nation as a historical collectivity over the longue 
durée and identifies the key role of language in defining membership. 
While considerable research has been undertaken in the West on national 
identity and language policy in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, especially in 
Slavic and Central Asian nations of both these empires, relatively little has been 
written about Transcaucasian groups, including Georgians, in the pre-Soviet, 
Soviet and post-Soviet periods.
1
 Even when Western scholars touch on issues of 
Georgian nationalism and the role of language in Georgian national identity, they 
are mostly concerned with recent history. In general, Georgian ethnic, national and 
linguistic identity studies in the West lack historical depth.  Although there have 
been several important studies of the development of the national question in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century (Parsons 1987; J. Smith 1998; Jones 2005), 
the Soviet and post-Soviet periods are mostly concerned with ethnoconflicts and 
ethnonationalisms (Parsons 1987; Gachechiladze 1995; Coppieters 2002; Broers 
2004; Goltz 2006) and major contributions to the knowledge of old Georgian 
history and literature outside Georgia (Allen 1932,; Braund 1994;  Thomson 1996; 
Suny 1998; Rapp 2000; Rayfield 2000; Soltes 2003; Pelkmans 2006), these works 
do not look at the development of kartveloba (Georgianness) as such. In this study, 
                                                          
1
 Armenians were more fortunate than Georgians in this respect, thanks to their substantial 
diasporas in Western countries who have contributed to the knowledge of Armenian history and 
literature outside the former Soviet Union. 
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Georgian and foreign historical sources and academic literature will be examined 
in the light of recent academic studies in ethnic and national identity. Primary 
sources for this work have been studied elsewhere from different points of view. 
The novelty of this work, however, is that the material is re-examined with an 
ethnosymbolist approach. The Georgian case is especially interesting for exploring 
the interplay of the ethnic and civic elements of nationhood. The analysis of the 
historical background of identity construction offered in this work explains why it 
is so difficult for civic nationhood to emerge in Georgia. At the same time, it 
shows how a civic understanding of Georgianness can gather strength from old 
values and symbols, myths and memories of kartveloba. Such an analysis has a 
practical importance and appears particularly useful in the current situation, when 
policy makers face questions of accommodating the needs of linguistically diverse 
communities and, at the same time, facilitating their integration into Georgian 
society. 
This thesis contributes also to the general study of top-down and bottom-up 
language policies in colonial and post-colonial periods. Many academics, such as 
Laitin (1998), Martin (2001), Grenoble (2003) and Hirsch (2005), have examined 
top-down colonial policies in the Soviet Union: the general accuracy of their work 
is not in question. However, it is important not only to acknowledge varying top-
down processes involving different groups, but also to distinguish them from 
bottom-up policies. The historical experiences of Soviet ethnic groups were varied, 
and language policy concerning them was correspondingly different. 
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As shown throughout this thesis, language is the most important marker of 
kartveloba (Georgianness) in all contexts – ethnic, national and state/political. The 
Georgian language was a distinctive characteristic of kartveloba, which at all 
periods of documented history united and, at the same time, distinguished 
Georgians from others. Unlike Western Europe, where language had little political 
significance in the Middle Ages, in Georgia, language was a symbol and a tool of 
political, cultural and territorial inclusion and exclusion as early as the twelfth 
century. The ideology of political rulers of the time may be the first example of 
linguistic culture manifested for political purposes. It certainly contributed to the 
development of the modern Georgian nation. Examining the history of Georgian 
language policy through an ethnosymbolist approach challenges the modernist 
understanding of nations and nationalism, according to which nationalism is a 
political ideology which ‘emerged in early modern Europe’ (see A. D. Smith 
1996c: 447-8). The Georgian case supports the argument about the pre-modern 
existence of the nation and national identity at the élite level. While one case study 
will not put an end to debates on the issue of pre-modern nations, it can certainly 
move forward the debate on the question of ‘when is the nation?’ (Ichijo & Uzelac 
2005). 
1.4 Methodology 
This work is based on a large corpus of primary sources: archival materials, old 
Georgian chronicles, official documents, and interviews conducted over several 
field work visits in Georgia (in total 10 months). It also uses secondary sources in 
Georgian, Soviet and Western academic literature. The main part of research was 
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conducted in libraries and archives. The purpose of the field trips to Georgia was 
to use local archives and other sources, and to conduct interviews with government 
officials, NGO representatives and Western experts on the subject, so as to 
understand better the situation on the ground from different perspectives, and to 
undertake a context-sensitive reading of the data. Some material is cited in the 
thesis with the permission of the interviewees. 
The following people were interviewed in January 2007: Ms Lali 
Papiashvili, member of the Ethnic Integration Committee of Parliament; Mr Ghia 
Nodia of the Caucasus Institute for Peace and War; Dr Alex Rondeli, Mr Temur 
Kancheli, Dr Jonathan Kulik, and Ms Eka Metreveli of the Georgian Foundation 
for Strategic and International Studies; Mr Kakha Lomaia, then Minister of 
Education; Ms Nino Bolkvadze, representative of the OSCE High Commissioner 
for Minority Issues; Mr Tom Trier of the European Committee for Minority Issues; 
and Mr Levan Tarkhnishvili, Head of the Programme of Ethnic Integration in the 
Eurasia Foundation. In August 2008, I interviewed Mr Hans Gutbrot of the Eurasia 
Foundation in Georgia; Ms Ana Zhvania of the Security Council; Ms Bela 
Tsipuria, Deputy Minister of Education; Ms Nino Nakudashvili, Head of the 
Department of Minority Schools and Bilingual Education at the Ministry of 
Education; Mr Robert Wilson, Head of USAID in Georgia; and Ms Lali Meskhi, 
who deals with minority integration at the British embassy in Georgia. In March 
2010, I interviewed Mr Temur Iakobashvili, State Minister of Integration; Ms 
Yana Fremer, producer of Italian Courtyard, a weekly TV show focusing on 
multicultural issues and the histories of ethnic groups in Georgia; Dr Simon 
Janashia, Head of the Department of Educational Policy at Ilia Chavchavadze State 
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University; Mr Beka Mindiashvili of the Office of Public Defender; Mr Kakha 
Gabunia of the Centre for Civic Integration and Inter-ethnic Relations; and Mr 
Levan Ramishvili of the Liberty Institute. In September 2010, the executive 
director of Pervyi Kavkazskii TV, Dr Robert Parsons was interviewed. I had also 
personal communications about the current situation regarding the integration of 
ethnic minorities with the following people: Gail Lapidus, Senior Fellow at the 
Centre for International Security and Cooperation; Tabib Huseynov of the 
International Crisis Group; Tom de Waal of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace; and Laurence Broers of Conciliation Resources.  
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of the introduction (which is the first chapter), five further 
chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter two introduces and discusses the main 
concepts related to language policy and planning, ethnicity and nationalism, 
including the Marxist-Leninist approach to disputed concepts. It reviews the most 
common paradigms and interpretations of nationalism (primordialism, 
perennialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism) and highlights a theoretical 
approach for this study — the ethnosymbolist approach. Using this approach, the 
chapter tries to set out the link between ethnic and national identity and language. 
The chapter then tries to engage critically with various attempts to develop 
typologies of nationalism. Finally, this chapter concentrates on the framework, 
stages and dimensions of language planning, and the political consequences of 
different types of language policy. 
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Chapter three discusses the history of language policy and planning in pre-
modern Georgia and identifies key components of kartveloba (Georgianness).  It 
also examines other ethno-national resources (such as religion, homeland, and the 
choice of myths and symbols) in relation to language, and touches on a 
fundamental question of nationalism: the debate about pre-modern nations. The 
chapter argues that a pre-modern nationalist ideology emerged in Georgia in the 
tenth-thirteenth centuries at the zenith of the country’s political, military, cultural 
and economic strength. One of the questions addressed in this chapter is whether in 
the tenth-thirteenth centuries Georgians constituted a pre-modern nation.  
Chapter four examines the origin of modern Georgian nationalism, the 
keystone of which was the Georgian language. After briefly reviewing Georgia’s 
history before Russian annexation, it looks at the formation of Russian colonial 
language policy, which aimed to assimilate Georgians into the Russian empire, and 
shows how language policy became an important part, first of Georgia’s resistance 
to russification and then of the nation-building process. The chapter demonstrates 
the ways in which language was conceptualised by nationalist thought as 
nationalists attempted to mobilise the masses and create a common national 
identity. The chapter ends with a short review of the years of Georgia’s 
independence in 1918-1921, when Georgia tried to implement a pluralistic 
language policy towards its multi-ethnic population. 
Chapter five gives an overview of Soviet language policy and its impact in 
Georgia. It examines the nationalist aspirations of the Georgians under Soviet rule 
and shows how the Georgian language gradually became a key element in the 
struggle for independence. It concludes that Soviet nationalities policy and 
21 
 
language policy, which excluded ethnic minorities from the titular nationalities of 
the union republics, were the main contributing factors in re-defining kartveloba 
(Georgianness), and Georgia as an ethnic nation in the twentieth century. 
  Chapter six discusses language policy and national identity in post-Soviet 
Georgia. It examines official policies under different political leadership using 
primary sources (such as governmental acts, laws and other documents, media 
publications, social surveys and interviews) and looks at language practices and 
attitudes among minority groups. This chapter investigates two competing projects 
of nation-building in today’s Georgia (secular and ethno-religious) and argues that 
the Georgian language, with its symbolic role as identity marker, used for centuries 
to differentiate insiders and outsiders, could become a common basis for a new 
national identity, while kartveloba could shift its basis from ethnic identity to 
citizenship. The chapter concludes with a number of recommendations to improve 
language policy, so as to help the process of the integration of ethnic minorities 






This chapter introduces and discusses the main concepts related to ethnicity, 
nationalism and language policy and planning. It aims to set out the link between 
ethnic and national identity and language. The Marxist-Leninist approach to 
disputed concepts is also examined. 
Section 2.1 looks at key terms in the study of ethnic phenomena and 
discusses different conceptualisations of these terms in contemporary scholarship. 
Particular note is made of the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ characteristics of ethnic 
identity used in nation-formation and the construction of national identity in the 
modern world. Different viewpoints on the role ethnicity plays in nationalism are 
discussed. 
Rather than present a full survey of the literature of nationalism, section 2.2 
provides a brief review of the most common paradigms and interpretations of 
nationalism (primordialism, perennialism, modernism and ethnosymbolism) and 
highlights a theoretical approach for this study – the ethnosymbolist approach – 
which offers a well-grounded analysis and explanation of national movements, 
past and present. Engaging critically with various attempts to develop typologies of 
nationalism forms another area for discussion.  This section also looks at different 
meanings and connotations attributed to understandings of nationalism, at 
interpretations of various terms in academic works written in Georgian or Russian 
during the Soviet period, and at the confusion they have caused and continue to 
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cause amongst Georgian scholars, politicians and the general public. 
Understanding the reasons and consequences of such confusion is relevant to the 
Georgian question examined here. 
Section 2.3 introduces Marxism–Leninism, which condemned nationalism 
as a bourgeois class-based ideology. Particular attention is paid to the reversal over 
the years in Bolshevik and Stalinist attitudes to nationalism in the Soviet and post-
Soviet space, which led to the emergence of multiple ethnic nationalisms among 
many ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. 
Finally, section 2.4 concentrates on the framework, stages and dimensions 
of language planning and the political consequences of different types of language 
policy. Language has long been recognised as a powerful marker of national 
identity and plays an important role in consolidating a multiethnic society into a 
single, unified nation. Therefore, the role of the standard language in the nation-
building process is also discussed. 
2.1 Ethnicity and ethnic grouping 
Although the terms ethnicity and ethnic group have been actively used in different 
disciplines within the social sciences since the 1960s, they are used with various 
meanings. There are no universal definitions among scholars, and different 
meanings are assigned to these terms. Ethnic group sometimes refers to a group of 
humans living and acting together, and can therefore be translated as ‘people’ or 
‘nation’ (Jenkins 2003: 9).  Ethnicity is also used to mean race or culture 
(Malesevic 2004: 1). When independent states were created in decolonised Africa 
and Asia, ethnicity referred to different cultural groups. The phenomenon of 
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ethnicity received more scholarly interest in the 1960s (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 
1999: 80) with the onset of emigration from post-colonial countries to wealthier 
states.  Immigrants were referred to as members of ethnic groups. 
The term ethnicity, deriving from the Greek ethnos, originally used to 
describe cultural strangers or non-Hellenic people, thus cultural ‘others’ and 
‘outsiders’ (Malesevic 2004: 1; Gillespie 1995: 9), is closely associated with the 
issue of boundaries (Nagel 1994: 154).  But how are ethnic boundaries constructed 
and what is the relationship between culture and ethnicity? Do ethnic boundaries 
coincide with cultural boundaries?  
The relationship between culture and ethnicity is often discussed in the 
context of social interaction within the model developed by the social 
anthropologist Frederik Barth (1969). Barth argues that an ethnic group is defined 
through self-identification and the designation of outsiders. If ethnic groups 
mutually understand that they differ from each other, this is a ‘social reality’ in 
Barth’s words. Since ethnic boundaries are constructed through social interaction, 
they are social, not cultural phenomena. The focus for studying ethnicity should 
therefore be ‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it 
encloses’ (Barth 1969: 15).  By ‘cultural stuff’, Barth means language, religion, 
traditions, customs, cuisine, etc. He further maintains that cultural differences 
between groups are results, rather than causes, of social boundaries which guard 
the ethnic group and separate insiders and outsiders. 
Most works on ethnicity consider the cultural content of ethnic identity to 
be important in constructing ethnic boundaries (Nagel 1994; Jenkins 2003).  For 
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Nagel (1994:161), culture is the basic material used to construct ethnic meaning.  
For Jenkins (2003: 13), ethnicity is a social identity that is mainly concerned with 
culture.  Emphasising the cultural content is important for differentiating between 
ethnicity and its allotropes, such as nationality or national identity, which are 
similar but nonetheless different concepts from ethnicity in various ways (see 
section 2.2.3). 
On the one hand, the social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2002: 
34) notes that cultural boundaries are not well marked and do not necessarily 
correspond to ethnic boundaries. Not every group with a shared culture is an ethnic 
group since, on the one hand, culture can be shared with non-members, and, on the 
other, differences between cultural elements may exist within the same boundaries. 
As Eriksen (2002: 37) notes, ‘[c]ultural differences relate to ethnicity if, and only 
if, such differences are made relevant in social interaction’.  
For A. D. Smith, whose approach is adopted in this study, ethnicity has, 
however, strong cultural roots. Belonging to an ethnic group means belonging to a 
unique culture and sharing among in-group members a belief in common 
ancestors.  
The members of an ethnic community must be made to feel not only 
that they form a single ‘superfamily’, but that their historic 
community is unique, that they possess what Max Weber called 
‘irreplaceable cultural values’, that their heritage must be preserved 
against inner corruption and external control, and that the community 
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has a sacred duty to extend its culture values to outsiders. (A. D. 
Smith 1996b: 189)  
Despite differing definitions of ethnicity and ethnic group, one point of 
general agreement is that ethnic identity is a type of collective identity that is 
socially distinguished or set apart by others and/or by the group members 
themselves on the basis of cultural characteristics (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 
1999: 81) and that there cannot be ethnicity if there is no distinction between 
insiders and outsiders. Identity is always about similarities on the one hand and 
differences on the other. It is important that an ethnic group regards itself as a 
distinct, unique population; its identity is constructed in opposition to other 
(similar) groups, thus creating a distinction between us and them (Barth 1969). As 
Eriksen (2002: 10) notes, ‘[g]roup identities must always be defined in relation to 
that which they are not – in other words, in relation to non-members of the group. 
Ethnic groups may become more similar when contact between them increases, but 
at the same time they may become more and more concerned with their peculiarity. 
Ethnic boundaries maintain and generate cultural similarities produced and 
reproduced internally, between group members, as well as emphasise differences 
vis-à-vis external others (Jenkins 2003: 12). For the social anthropologist Simon 
Harrison (1999: 10), cultural content within ethnic boundaries seeks to 
differentiate between us and them. He considers ethnic boundaries and cultural 
boundaries to be closely connected: a group tries to prohibit the cultural practices 
and symbols of outsiders, such as dress, faith, language, rituals, etc., and is likely 
also to exclude members of a foreign group. Thus, cultural boundaries, 
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highlighting the contrast between similarity and difference, are simultaneously 
concerned with inclusion and exclusion.  
Given these understandings, ethnic identity is understood in this study as a 
collective cultural identity conceived ‘in historical, subjective and symbolic terms’ 
(Smith 1991: 25). This means that ethnicity derives from a largely subjective, 
mythical and symbolic interpretation of history and from objective cultural 
characteristics (such as language, religion, territory, etc.). The next section 
explores ways in which ethnic groups use subjective dimensions to interpret ethnic 
markers.  
2.1.1 Markers of ethnic identity: objective versus subjective 
Various scholars highlight the importance of different markers contributing to the 
survival and maintenance of an ethnic group. Distinct and contrasting paradigms in 
the study of nations and nationalism (see section 2.2) adopt different approaches to 
ethnicity and disagree about the importance of individual features: political, socio-
economic and cultural. For example, primordialists view ethnicity in terms of 
blood ties. Some modernists stress factors which are political in nature, such as the 
degree of a community’s autonomy or its political will to survive, and claim that 
ethnicity is a product of political myths (Leoussi & Smith 2001: 71). Other 
modernists focus on the possession of a homeland, material resources and skills for 
the support of the community, that is, on economic variables. Others 
(ethnosymbolists) emphasise cultural elements, such as language, religion, 
traditions, history and so forth. 
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  The characteristics of ethnicity can be considered as either objective or 
subjective. More accurately, features which are objective (territory, traditions, 
language, religion, etc.) can at the same time be viewed as subjective. That is to 
say that their perception and interpretation may or may not be relevant from the 
point of view of a certain group. Furthermore, the subjective dimension of an 
objective feature may change over time. Eriksen (2002: 38-39) cites the example 
of Serbs and Croats who speak virtually the same language, thus sharing an 
objective marker, but who practise different Christian confessions. This difference 
in religion was largely irrelevant until the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia in 
1991, when suddenly the difference in faith was invoked and employed to create 
boundaries defining these two ethnic groups. Therefore, all markers of ethnic 
identity should be considered from the point of view of their relevance for a group 
and their power, ability and adequacy to define boundaries. It is not the presence of 
objective criteria which contributes to the existence of ethnic identity, but their 
subjective quality. For example, some ethnic groups (e.g. Armenians, Jews) have 
survived for centuries not only without political autonomy, but also without 
inhabiting the territory they consider their homeland. Thus, for an ethnic group, 
attachment to a territory as a ‘promised land’ is sufficient: the mythical homeland 
is more important in defining identity than the existence of physical territory, the 
actual territory occupied by the ethnic group (A. D. Smith 1986: 28-9).  
Even such objective factors as a collective name, language and religion 
become important markers of ethnic identity and are venerated only when 
subjective dimensions, attitudes, perceptions and sentiments are presented together 
with objective characteristics. A collective name – an ethnonym – is important for 
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ethnic group formation because it distinguishes members from non-members, us 
from them. In many languages, one and the same word denotes language and 
people (Bartlett 1996: 128). Many ethnic groups have a name identical to the name 
of the language they speak; linguistic boundaries are often the same as ethnic 
boundaries. The definition of an ethnic group by language is an old phenomenon, 
widespread in the ancient world (Dalby 2002:128). For example, the ancient 
Greeks considered that speaking Greek defined them as Greeks. The particularly 
important role of language in defining ethnic identity is prominent in the Middle 
Ages. The post-Babel differentiation of language was the first step in the formation 
of different groups and this biblically based belief was professed by medieval 
scholars (Bartlett 1996: 128). Language helps to define the cohesion of an ethnic 
group and is often seen as a pillar of groupness (Leoussi & Smith 2001:170). This 
is not surprising, taking into account that ethnicity is a type of cultural collective 
identity and that language is the vehicle of culture. Nevertheless, even a major 
attribute of culture, such as language, is not enough to be a marker of ethnicity. 
Many examples across the world show that, on the one hand, ethnic groups can be 
divided internally by language and that, on the other hand, having the same 
language does not ensure that two or more groups will have the same ethnic 
identity and that language is unable to unite opposing ethnic identities. For 
example, Czechs and Slovaks speak very similar language varieties, but belong to 
different ethnic groups because of considerably different historical experiences 
(Barbour 2002a: 12). The absence of a distinctive language or its loss does not 
prevent an ethnic group from having a sense of unique ethnic identity. Many 
minorities in Russia have lost their languages in the last two centuries, but their 
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ethnic identities have not weakened (Khilkhanova and Khilkhanov 2004). The 
same can be said of religion. Religious communities often do not coincide with 
ethnic groups. For example, although the majority of Georgians are Orthodox 
Christians, more than four percent of Georgians are Muslim or Catholic (Beridze 
2004: 80).  
 A. D. Smith, who underlines the importance of subjective ethnic markers 
(Smith 1996b: 189), suggests paying more attention to the memories, symbols, 
myths and traditions of ethnic groups in order to understand their survival. If a 
group is united by emotional bonds, a belief in a common descent and a shared 
history, an ethnic group exists, whether or not there exists an objective foundation 
for such a belief (Edwards 2005: 127; Weber 1996: 35). The myths of common 
ancestry and the memories of a Golden Age are very powerful in uniting the 
members of the group (A.D.  Smith 1996b). Ethnic identity relies on values and 
symbols, myths and memories which the members of the group believe in: they do 
not necessarily have an objective foundation. An ethnic group does not have a 
biological origin: it is ‘imagined’, in the same sense as nations are ‘imagined 
communities’ (see section 2.2.3). For A. D. Smith, a shared ethnic past and culture, 
even attachment to a territory and other markers of ethnic identity, have a mythical 
dimension. He identifies six criteria for the formation of an ethnic group as (A. D. 
Smith 1991: 21): a named human population; with a myth of common ancestry; 
shared memories; shared cultural elements; a link to a historic territory or 
homeland; and a measure of solidarity.  
Ethnic identity [...] may be seen as the product of shared memories of 
collective experiences and activities of successive generations of a 
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group claiming a common origin and ancestry. Ethnicity in turn may 
be defined as the sense of collective belonging to a named 
community of common myths of origin and shared memories, 
associated with a historic homeland. (A. D. Smith 1996a: 583) 
The importance of the subjective dimensions of ethnic identity for the 
survival of an ethnic group has been noted by many scholars. However, Smith 
brings an important and new element into play – the idea of ethnic election (A.D. 
Smith 1999b: 331-355) as a significant factor in the creation and reproduction of 
the in-group. The belief in being a chosen people has inspired ethnic collectivities 
over many generations and has been an important factor in ensuring their long-
term survival (A.D. Smith: 1999a:130).  For example, ethnic collectivities which 
view themselves as successors of the ancient Israelites (see section 3.2.1) believe 
they have been chosen to preserve the true faith. Such myths sustain the 
community of cultural identity, helping it to survive over centuries and prevail 
against the loss of political independence and exile from the ancestral homeland. 
This belief in the possession of the only true faith encourages not only a sense of 
uniqueness, but also an urge to nurture ethnic values. It strengthens a community’s 
attachment to its religion and sacred language, but, more importantly, to its 
historical territory. The homeland, regarded as God-given, is the place where the 
ethnic group’s ancestors lived and fought for the freedom of the land where their 
heroes and saints are buried. All these factors contribute to the emergence of 
nations and nationalisms, as will be seen in section 2.2.3, which discusses the 
objective and subjective elements of ethnic identity (among them the myths of 
ethnic election) that are used in nation-formation and the construction of national 
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identity in modern times. However, before exploring the role of ethnic identities in 
modern times and the emergence of nationalism, it is necessary to look at the 
relationship between ethnic identity and its elements as they change over time.  
2.1.2 Ethnic identity and historical change 
Barth (1969) argues the necessity of looking at ethnicity from a historical 
perspective: how did ethnically distinctive groups with separate genealogies 
emerge in a given area?  
Ethnicity must by definition arise either from a process of social 
differentiation within a population, which eventually leads to the 
division of that population into two distinctive groups, or by an 
expansion of system boundaries bringing hitherto discrete groups 
into contact with each other. (Eriksen 2002: 79)  
This view fits very well with social and cultural understandings of 
ethnicity, since both processes – social differentiation and cultural expansion – 
mark ethnic boundaries and become elementary dimensions of identity marking.  
Depending to the levels of incorporation and self-identification displayed 
by human populations throughout history, A. D. Smith (1991: 20–21) distinguishes 
between ethnic category and ethnie (a French term he uses for ethnic community). 
Ethnic categories are ‘human populations whom at least some outsiders consider to 
constitute a separate cultural and historical grouping’. An ethnie, by contrast, is the 
highest degree of ethnic incorporation, self-awareness and subjective identification 
with the community, possessing different degrees of such attributes as historical 
memories, myths of common ancestry and narratives of origin, specific cultural 
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elements, association with homeland, a collective name and some elements of 
culture. 
 The evidence of tribes and ethnic groups, as well as certain ethnies, are 
found as far back as five thousand years ago. As Smith notes, at the point where 
written history begins, in the mid-third millennium BC, ethnies were already in 
existence, and named cultural communities appear as historical actors. Ethnically 
based kingdoms appeared in the ancient world and became prototypes for medieval 
kingdoms. In the modern world, ethnic communities not only still exist, but have 
played an increasingly important role, especially after the Second World War. 
They are often associated with political struggles for independence and ethnic 
conflict (for example, in Georgia), one of the causes of which may be a perceived 
threat to ethnic identity. In general, social identity becomes more important when 
faced with a perceived threat. Such threats can vary in nature – economic change 
(for example, industrialisation), integration into a larger political unit, changes in 
demographic profile, migration, and so on. For example, as will be discussed in 
chapter 3, oddly enough, one of the ways in which the Christianisation of Georgia 
gave a strong impetus to the development of ethnic identity was by intensifying 
ethnic sentiments, since this transethnic religion contained a threat to ethnic 
markers. The strength of ethnic ties increased after the disintegration of communist 
regimes, when national movements arose in post-communist countries. Despite the 
view held by some social scientists (for example, Marx; see section 2.2.1) that 
ethnicity and nationalism would decrease and eventually disappear, the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the end of the twentieth century made it clear 
that ethnicity cannot be ignored. 
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 The role of ethnic identity in national movements became the subject of 
growing academic interest in the second half of the twentieth century. Current 
scholars of nationalism have begun to look at links between ethnicity and 
nationalism more carefully, because of the ethnic revival and ethnic nationalist 
movements of the last few decades in various parts of the world. Some theorists 
have provided a better explanation than others of the ethnic roots of nationalism, 
suggesting that there is continuity between pre-modern ethnic groups and modern 
nations. The next section discusses nations and nationalism and their connection to 
ethnicity. 
2.2 Nations and nationalisms 
Like ethnicity, the word nation has no universal definition among scholars and 
there is much confusion surrounding the concept. In daily usage and in academic 
writing, the term nation (derived from the Latin natio) is sometimes used as an 
equivalent of ethnic group, country or state. Some scholars offer a definition that 
would apply to an ethnic group. For example, Tamir (1995: 425) defines a nation 
as a ‘community whose members share feelings of fraternity, substantial 
distinctiveness, and exclusivity, as well as beliefs in a common ancestry and 
continuous genealogy’. As seen in the previous section, these are all qualities 
manifested by ethnic groups. Sometimes nation is used as an equivalent to state. 
From the Middle Ages to the early modern period, nation was used with different 
meanings and connotations in European languages (James 1996: 10-12). Some 
meanings include foreign people, representatives of a community, élite, people. 
Enlightenment philosophers used nation to describe a people. Sometimes nation 
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had the connotation of a distinct character. With the French Revolution (1789–
1799) came the idea that each nation has a specific territory beyond which the 
claims of other nations apply (Miscevic 2005). Thus the Revolution spread a new 
meaning of this term – as an upholder of sovereignty – with a strong political 
connotation. From this time, the concept of nation becomes even more closely 
associated with the state, giving rise to the term nation-state. 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, Europe was divided into nation-states. 
Unlike states of former times, nation-states are sovereign territories for nations, 
where political, geographical and cultural entities coincide – that is, each member 
of the nation is a citizen of the state and the citizens of the nation-state share 
common values and culture. This is different from other, historically older kinds of 
states (O’Flaherty & Gisvold 1998: 265), where mere residents did not relate to the 
society directly, but rather belonged to one of its subgroups (Gellner: 1998: 22), 
and where cultural bonds did not require cultural similarities (Gellner 1998: 24). 
The most important thing about a nation-state is that it creates a uniform national 
culture through state policy: the nation-state is a political unit where cultural 
homogeneity is desirable (Wright 2000:3). This does not mean that nation is an 
equivalent of nation-state or that the nation and the nation-state coincide. They 
almost never do.  
[W]hile the members of a nation are conscious of forming a 
community, the nation-state seeks to create a nation and develop a 
sense of community stemming from it. While the nation has a 
common culture, values and symbols, the nation-state has as an 
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objective the creation of a common culture, symbols and values. 
(Guibernau 2005: 47-48) 
Nevertheless, the substitutive use of the terms nation and nation-state illustrates 
the close link between people and territory, nations and states. Moreover, 
nationhood is a very strong form of territoriality. Striving to achieve political self-
government is one of the major differences between an ethnic group and a nation. 
Thus, an ethnic group is not a nation and a nation-state is not a nation, in 
other words, it is clear what a nation is not, but it is still difficult to define what it 
is. Hobsbawm (1992: 8) suggests calling a nation any group of people which thinks 
of itself as a nation; but in practice there are contradictory views about what 
constitutes a nation and how its membership should be defined. It is clear that a 
nation is a group of people, but how does it differ from other human groups? How 
is national identity different from other collective identities? What constitutes 
national identity? 
Various scholars point out that a common culture and a belief in the right to 
self-determination within a given territory are necessary features of a nation. For 
example, Smith defines a nation as a named human population sharing a historical 
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (A. D. 
Smith 1991: 14). For Nodia (1994:11), a nation is ‘a community of people 
organized around the idea of self-determination’. Some scholars emphasise that 
this self-determination must be a territorial self-determination, that a belief in the 
right to control the homeland is what makes a nation different from other groups 
37 
 
(Barrington 1997). In this study, the modern nation is defined by a common 
culture, and the belief in the right to self-determination and to territory. It differs 
from pre-modern kinds of nations by the clarity of its borders, its status as a legal-
political community, the mass consciousness it engenders and the legitimacy it 
derives from nationalism. According to A. D. Smith (2004b: 210), the pre-modern 
nation nonetheless forms a basis – albeit not the only basis – for the modern nation 
(see section 2.2.3 and chapter 3 for further discussion). While Western scholars 
have long debated the definitions of nation, Soviet scholars found it indisputably 
defined by Stalin in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (see section 2.3). The term 
nationalism has also acquired multiple meanings. Some view it as a political 
principle, others as an extension of ethnicity, as a cultural project, as a linguistic 
movement, as patriotism and so on. In the post-Soviet world, there is much debate 
among scholars about whether nationalism means the same as patriotism (L. 
Berdzenishvili  2005). According to most, patriotism is loyalty to the state, while 
nationalism is loyalty to the nation (Roshwald 2006: 4). Nationalism and 
patriotism are easily confused because some scholars believe that state and nation 
are congruent: nationalism is ‘a principle which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent’ (Gellner 1983: 1), that is, one state – one nation. 
In the real world this is almost impossible. The difference between nationalism and 
patriotism is important for understanding Georgian nationalism (and Soviet and 
post-Soviet nationalisms in general), because these two concepts were confounded; 
while patriotism was valued, and loyalty to the nation would be described by this 
term, words like nationalist, nationalism carried negative connotations. For 
example, in Ozhegov’s dictionary (1986), nationalism is defined as a ‘reactionary 
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bourgeois ideology and politics, which inflames national hostility and puts the 
dominating nation in an exclusive position.’ A similar definition is given in all 
other Soviet encyclopedias and dictionaries. 
 Recent discussions of the doctrine of nationalism have led some theorists to 
conclude that it is impossible to have one universal theory or to generalise about 
such phenomena (Özkirimli 2000: 226; Guibernau 2005: 45). This is due not only 
to different approaches to nationalism, but also to differences between the types of 
nationalisms, nations and national identities found in various parts of the world. 
The next section looks at different theories of nations and nationalism.  
2.2.1 Paradigms of nationalism 
One paradigm of nationalism – primordialism – asserts that nations are natural, 
immutable and ancient phenomena and that national identity cannot be chosen. A 
more extreme variety of the primordial interpretation is sociobiology, which 
considers nations to be an extension of kinship ties. As such, Van den Berghe 
considers cultural symbols of groups (language, religion, etc.) to be biological 
markers, while Horowitz (1985) calls ethnic groups ‘super-families’ (Conversi 
2007a: 16). According to the sociobiological approach, ethnic myths of origin are 
mostly based on real facts. Other primordial approaches assert that nations (as well 
as ethnic groups) are formed through cultural ties, which generate strong affection, 
emotions and attachments to groups, as well as beliefs and perceptions among their 
members (Özkirimli 2000: 72-74). 
 Another paradigm, perennialism, maintains both that nationalism is a 
modern phenomenon and that nations have existed since time immemorial; they 
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may change in form, but not in identity (Hastings 1999a). In other words, nations 
are regarded as updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities, in all epochs 
of history (A.D. Smith 1998: 159). The goal of nationalism in this paradigm is to 
rediscover the appropriate past and ancient culture as a continuum that transmits 
the ethnic groups of history into the nations of modernity. There are two types of 
perennialism: continuous perennialism and recurrent perennialism. While the 
former focuses on continuity and assumes that some nations have a long history 
that can be traced back to the Middle Ages or even antiquity, the latter considers 
the phenomenon of nationhood to be historically universal, although particular 
nations may appear and disappear throughout history (A. D. Smith 1998: 159-165). 
 Yet another paradigm of nationalism – modernism – is shared by most 
contemporary theorists of nationalism. Modernism considers nations and 
nationalism to be the products of modernity and related to industrialisation, which 
demands a workforce with a basic knowledge of ‘high culture’. Many modernist 
scholars represent either an instrumentalist view, considering national identity as 
an instrumental choice, i.e., serving as the instrument of some interests (Gellner 
1983; Anderson 1983), or a constructivist view, according to which a nation is 
socially constructed for political goals and is manipulated by élites in order to hold 
on to power (Hobsbawm 1992). 
 Modernists believe that before modern times people had no sense of 
nationhood and had loyalties only to their local place or religion or to the ruler and 
the ruling house. In the pre-industrial period, society was organised hierarchically, 
with the least enfranchised class of agriculture producer forming isolated local 
communities. This created and maintained cultural differences. According to 
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Gellner (1998), agrarian society could exist only by maintaining this hierarchical 
system, and the role of culture was to reinforce this system. When this is a main 
role of culture, of course culture cannot play the role essential for nationhood: it 
cannot mark the boundaries of a political unit. In other words, nationalism cannot 
arise in an agrarian society where there is no mobility, but where the members of 
the community are kept in their places and the cultural differences between 
different communities are emphasised (Gellner 1998). The knowledge of ‘high 
culture’ can be achieved only through modern education based on a standard 
common language which provides a means of communication with ‘others who are 
like oneself’ (Baycroft 2006: 33). The vernacular must necessarily become a 
written language if the masses are to be involved in a national movement. As one 
commentator explains, ‘[t]he survival of a nation and the success of its drive 
towards nation-state status are predicated upon the existence of a language that its 
people can speak, and more importantly, read and write’ (Caviedes 2003: 250). 
Mass communication and education, what Anderson (1983) has called print-
capitalism, made it possible for more and more people to relate to others. Only a 
state can provide the necessary educational and communication systems, and if 
nationalism is its ideology, then nationalism makes a nation and not vice versa: ‘it 
is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 
44-45). Thus, according to the modernist paradigm, the nation is seen as something 
constructed from above. 
 Anderson (1983) agrees that the structural changes introduced by 
modernisation were a necessary element in creating new ‘imagined communities’. 
Media printed in the vernacular, which become a new instrument for political 
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power (old established élites used it, as do new, créole élites in colonial countries) 
have played an important role. Unlike Gellner and Hobsbawm, Anderson supports 
a cultural understanding of nationalism. For him, nationalism as a cultural 
phenomenon can offer a feeling of community, and the community has a destiny. 
Therefore the nation can appeal to patriotism – it is something worth dying for. 
Another interpretation of the modernist approach is Marxism, which claims 
nationalism to be a logical part of the historical development of humankind and a 
characteristic feature of expanding capitalism. For this reason, it shares the idea 
that a nation is a social construct and a modern phenomenon; but for Marx ethnic 
sentiments and national consciousness were ‘false’ feelings which would disappear 
at some point in history. Marx did not therefore develop a formal theory of 
nationalism, which is why Marxism cannot explain contemporary nationalist 
movements. Other modernists, who deny the historical roots of nations and believe 
that nation-building can proceed without the aid of an ethnic past, also fail to 
explain the aspirations of contemporary ethno-national movements. 
Another disputed point in modernism is the origin of the nation-state. As 
mentioned earlier in this section, modernist theorists see the nation as a result of 
state nationalism. For example, Hobsbawm maintains that the French nation came 
into existence after the French state was established, because it was a state that 
promoted the unification of different languages and dialects spoken across its 
territory. While in the case of France and the USA a nation is brought into 
existence by the effort of the state, this is obviously not the case everywhere. There 
have been nationalisms of stateless nations which had none of the resources 
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available to Western states, but which were nevertheless able to form a nation (A. 
D. Smith 1991: 43-70).  
 A fourth paradigm of nationalism – ethnosymbolism – is situated halfway 
between modernism and perennialism and, in my view, provides a better 
explanation than other paradigms of the ethnic roots of nationalism, suggesting that 
there is continuity between pre-modern ethnic groups and modern nations. It does 
not deny the influence of industrialisation and capitalisation on nationalism, but, 
instead of adopting a radical modernist angle, it takes into account the primordial 
and perennial nature of groups. In other words, by sharing the view that 
nationalism is modern and is related to capitalism, ethnosymbolists are modernists. 
Like other modernists, ethnosymbolists understand the essential role of common 
culture, but they also recognise those elements that existed before modern times. 
That is, they argue that, although nationalism is a modern phenomenon, nations are 
products not only of modernity. The ethnosymbolic approach to nations was 
developed by A. D. Smith (e.g.1986, 1991,1999a, 2008, 2009), who analyses 
myths and symbols, memories and values of ethnic groups, which he calls ethnies, 
and argues that they form the cultural basis for the emergence of nations. Like 
Anderson, Smith also views nationalism as a cultural phenomenon and considers 
ethnic and national identities to be forms of cultural identities. He suggests that 
there is continuity between pre-modern collective cultural identity presented in 
ethnies and national identity found in modern nations. For Smith, ethnie is the 
more general form, and nation the more specific. But he believes that ethnies (a 
premodern basis for nation) and nations coexist, rather than develop in an 
evolutionary sequence. By this Smith distances himself from primordialism and 
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perennialism. Collective cultural identity can change, albeit slowly and within 
certain parameters; at the same time, it remains continuous, self-identical and, 
despite changes, preserved from generation to generation: it is even possible to 
look at development from an ethnic category to a nation as an uninterrupted line 
(A. D. Smith 1991: 19-42). For Smith, an ethnic core is a necessary condition for 
nation-formation and nationalism, because a community cannot survive without 
mythology and symbolism. The memories, myths and symbols of an ethnie 
provide the basis for cohesion in modern times.  
 The most important characteristic that distinguishes a nation from an 
ethnie is the public culture that imbues a majority of members of a given nation 
through a standard educational system and state institutions. In the case of ethnies, 
culture can circulate only within a particular segment of the population. Despite 
giving a list of differences between a nation and an ethnie, Smith himself admits 
that in practice it is not easy to distinguish between the two. Nations can emerge 
from ethnies in any epoch, although more nations appear in modern times because 
only now can a truly public culture exist, thanks to modern means of 
communication and education. 
 In The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986), Smith underlines three kinds of 
revolution that have caused nationalism: the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, revolution in the control of administration, and cultural and educational 
revolution. He considers the last to be the most fundamental in the emergence of 
nationalism. All three are results of modernism, but their features derive from 
characteristics that existed before modern times in ethnies. The function of culture 
in society after these three revolutions changed – it became politicised. The élite 
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and the masses became members of a society united by a shared culture. Such an 
understanding of culture is similar to modernist approaches, but for 
ethnosymbolism the core of a culture lies in the past of an ethnie. 
 Thus, ethnosymbolism combines perennialism with modernism in the sense 
that it underlines the longue durée between pre-modern and modern forms of 
social cohesion and takes into account the changes brought by modernity. It places 
shared myths of descent, memories, values and symbols at the centre of national 
identity and considers ethnies to be the foundation of modern nations. Therefore, it 
recognises an ethnic core in the formation of a nation. 
 Each of the paradigms discussed in this section have made its own 
contribution to understanding the phenomena of nation and nationalism, but this 
study will concentrate on the approach that supports the ethnic origin of nations. 
As such, nationalism is understood here as the desire of a culturally-based group 
for a nation-state – independence, territory and self-rule. An ethnosymbolic 
framework provides a firm explanation of so-called ethno-nationalism, as 
discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 Typologies of nationalism 
Over the last two centuries there has been much discussion about the two opposing 
views of nationalism represented by the French and German models – the so-called 
civic and ethnic models. The French conception associated with the name of Ernest 
Renan and his 1882 Sorbonne lecture Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? arises from the 
idea of a nation as a sovereign state, founded upon the will of free individuals, that 
is, a community of people based on a political choice. It started with the French 
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Revolution, when the third estate, calling itself a nation, opposed the old régime.
2
 
The nation of citizens, created by free choice, exercises its civil rights and duties. 
This kind of nationalism is aimed at unification rather than separation. In such a 
view the ideals of the Enlightenment – universalism and rationality – are declared.3  
The second, ethnic conception of nationalism comes from the ideas of the 
German Romanticists, mainly Herder, who defended ‘the national character’, and 
is based on the common origin, culture, history, language and the spirit of a nation. 
Already in the nineteenth century, adherents of these two views were competing 
for a very practical purpose, to define the territorial situation of Alsace and 
Lorraine. Germans thought the two regions should become part of Germany, 
because their respective populations undoubtedly belonged to German history, 
culture and language. Renan maintained the opposite view, saying that a 
population does not make its choice of state based on ethno-cultural factors but 
rather for political reasons. 
 The distinction between these two types of nationalism was explained by 
the social structure of national movements. Where the third estate was already a 
strong force in the eighteenth century, the demands of movements were mostly 
concerned with politics, economics and civic rights. Where in the nineteenth 
century the bourgeoisie was still weak, the demands were concerned with culture. 
                                                          
2
 The estates were divisions of society. The first estate comprised the nobility, the second estate was 
made up of the clergy and the third estate everyone else (Baycroft 2006: 6). 
3
 Enlightenment is the era of the eighteen century French intellectual movement with progressive 
and liberal ideas, which gave rise to the development of scientific knowledge in opposition to 
clericalism (Sinha 1996: 64) 
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Thus, the two distinct types can be called political/civic and 
cultural/ethnic/romantic nationalisms, respectively. 
 Brubaker (1992) investigates how French and German views of nation have 
influenced the formation of states. In France, the bureaucratic monarchy gave birth 
to a political and territorial concept of national identity. Around a political and 
cultural centre, the nation-state was gradually forming, and cultural assimilation 
was taking place – first, of regional cultural minorities and, later, of immigrants. In 
Germany, the idea of nationhood was not originally political, but cultural and 
linguistic. This helped the development of an ethno-cultural understanding of 
nation. Brubaker himself summarises the difference between French and German 
views of nation in one sentence: ‘The French understand their nation as a creation 
of their state, the Germans understand their nation as the basis of their state’ 
(Brubaker 1992: 184). According to him, there are two types of nationalism: one is 
focused on the state, its institutions and territory, stressing common destiny; the 
other exists in spite of the state, stressing a common past. 
 Kohn (1955) has suggested a dichotomy, based on geographical criteria, 
between civic and ethnic nationalisms. He argues that the civic nationalisms of 
Western Europe, which existed in unified states that developed early and were 
characterised by shared political history, citizenship, a strong political élite and a 
common territorial and legal framework, was progressive and liberal. By contrast, 
the ethnic nationalisms of Eastern European countries, lagging behind in 
modernisation, characterised by shared ancestral myths and historical memories 
and a common culture, were backward and illiberal. Kohn views the Western type, 
examples of which are Great Britain, France, the United States, the Netherlands 
47 
 
and Switzerland, as ‘good’, democratic, rational, civic and peaceful. Examples of 
Eastern nationalism are Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. 
This form of nationalism is ‘bad’, ethnic, regressive, irrational, conflicting, violent, 
and atavistic. Ethnicity in such a discussion of nationalism is presented as 
something dangerous and a destructive force for the modern world. 
 Kohn’s framework is out of step with contemporary studies in nationalism. 
Analysts who share his views always point to cases in modern history where 
ethno-nationalism has caused conflicts and even genocide (like the Balkans and the 
Caucasus). They avoid discussing successful cases of building ethno-nations in 
Europe (for example, Catalonia and Wales) where nationalism clearly has ethnic 
roots as well and which fall within the category of ethnic nationalism (for example, 
Basque or Catalan are not the same as French or British). As Saussure (2006: 3) 
says, the point of view determines the object of the study, not vice versa. The idea 
of a civic nation emerged in the West: it is a very powerful concept, but to consider 
it the only correct point of view for understanding nationalism is wrong. When 
analysing nationalisms of post-communist states, most Western scholars look at 
the last two decades of development, when the focus has been on violence and 
ethnic conflicts. Eastern nationalism was therefore assumed to be a primitive, 
backward movement (see Nairn 1997: 86). If everything that ethnosymbolism 
considers crucial for understanding nationalism – the ethnic core of a nation, its 
collective memories – is dismissed and its symbols and myths are overlooked, if it 
is assumed that Western nationalism is the only positive, progressive and rational 
kind of nationalism, then it follows that Eastern nationalism looks regressive and 
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undemocratic. In reality, civic nationalism does not exclude ethnic elements, while 
ethnic nationalism often encompasses civic elements/dimensions (Kuzio 2002). 
 Moreover, the civic-ethnic dichotomy has nothing to do with geographical 
concepts of Western and Eastern. Industrialisation occurred in the West and East at 
different times, and this played its role in the character of nationalism. A 
discussion of the two types must be related only to the resources used in creating 
national identity and mobilising people around the idea of nationalism (A. D. 
Smith 1986), as well as the aims of their movements. The historical-political 
background helps to explain the ethnic character of nationalisms in Eastern Europe 
(Schöpflin 2002: 279), where nations found themselves in circumstances (imperial 
or communist experience, assimilationist policies, etc.) where civic dimensions of 
nationhood (the will of individuals to form a nation of equal citizens, united in 
patriotism to a political unit) could not emerge. Therefore, different types of 
nationalisms must be understood as responses to different historical, political, 
economic and cultural situations. 
In place of Kohn’s framework, another kind of dichotomy related to the 
aims of nationalism is suggested here. Nationalism could be a political project, in 
which self-determination is understood either as nation-state building or as an 
ethno-cultural project aimed at the activation of an ethnie, cultural revival and 
cultural autonomy (self-determination). Sometimes these two kinds of nationalism 




 Smith also distinguishes between two types of nationalism – territorial and 
ethnic – but he does not tie these differences to concrete states. Many examples 
(Catalan, Scottish, etc.) show that civic and ethnic variants are not mutually 
exclusive and most nationalisms combine both civic and ethnic components. 
Smith’s approach underlines the dynamic character of the development of national 
identities and shows that in practice each nation has characteristics of both ethnic 
and territorial nationalisms (A. D. Smith 1986). Moreover, at different times in one 
and the same nation different types of nationalisms can take over. A. D. Smith 
(1998: 126) shows that even French nationalism, which is considered to be an 
embodiment of civic nationalism, has an ethnic core. 
 Smith also shows that in the modern world outside Western Europe, 
nationalists face a hard challenge in trying to consolidate nations around one of 
two types of nation. Many times making a choice is not totally deliberate, since it 
is dictated by the ethnic structure, culture and the political possibilities of a state. If 
the state has an ethnic core, that is, a majority dominating by number and culture, 
minorities could be assimilated: this is what happened in Western Europe. If there 
is no such core, they must become a political nation. In order to make this happen 
common institutions and systems of communication are not enough if the members 
do not feel an emotional quality, that is, a feeling of belonging to the community. 
And this is a time when a political nation seeks a common ethnic past, heroes and 
traditions. As Schöpflin (2002: 6) states, Western states, ‘far from having “left 
ethnicity behind”, as it were, have in reality done something else – they have 
contextualized it, they have successfully hemmed it in by constructing state 
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machineries and civil societies that ensure that ethnicity is not the sole source of 
political power’. 
 For Smith, ethnic nationalism is the mobilisation of ethnic groups through 
the rediscovery of an ethnic past; therefore ethnic identity can produce nationalism. 
Since ‘ethnic’ nationalisms share with the ‘civic’ nationalisms collective 
attachments to a ‘homeland’ (A. D. Smith 2008: 17), the idea of self-determination 
applies to territory occupied by an ethnic group. Therefore nationalist intellectuals 
mobilise people around the right to this territory. Their rhetoric is closest to the 
primordial understanding of nations as a natural and very old phenomenon. The 
ethnic model is very fertile in cases where pre-modern demotic communities have 
survived into the modern era. A large number of non-Western nations (e.g. 
Georgia, Armenia) began as colonies (e.g. Georgia), parts of empires, and their 
nationalism became a struggle for liberation. Unable to use civic and state 
institutions, they could rely only on culture and history. They had a great desire to 
protect a cultural heritage and make sure that the existence of groups was not under 
threat. As Eriksen (2002: 76) points out, ‘ethnic identity becomes crucially 
important the moment it is perceived as being under threat’. In order to protect 
ethnic identity, a group’s historical memory and cultural symbols can be 
manipulated, selected and even constructed, although not necessarily fabricated. 
The resources of liberal democracy, typical of Western European and North 
American states, as a representative political system based on universal voting 
rights, or competition by political parties for power, and on the protection of 
citizens’ rights (Bruce & Yearley 2006: 172), were not available to colonial 
countries (neither in the nineteenth nor twentieth centuries): civic values and 
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democracy had no chance to emerge. Such countries needed something else to 
preserve their identity: they used ethnic and cultural elements as the glue for 
national identity and an instrument for mobilisation around the idea of nationalism. 
The ethnic past, crucial for nation-building, is elaborated by philologists, 
historians, archaeologists, poets and writers in order to link the past to the present. 
In this way intellectuals help in modernising a nation. Their first task is to identify 
and codify national identity, then to mobilise people around the nationalist idea. 
The next section looks at the markers of ethnic identity used by national leaders to 
mobilise people around the ideology of nationalism and constructing national 
identities. 
2.2.3 The ethnic origins of national identity 
There are similarities as well as differences between ethnic and national identities. 
National identity, like ethnic identity, has two sets of characteristics: objective and 
subjective. Objective features include language, land, religion and other more or 
less identifiable dimensions of ethno-national belonging. These objective markers 
become part of a subjective ‘myth-symbol complex’, which, according to Smith, is 
central to the national self-consciousness. The belief in the existence of objective 
characteristics, irrespective of whether this is true in reality, has great symbolic and 
instrumental value. The strength of ethnic boundaries is different for different 
groups. Various combinations of ethnic markers create unique national identities. 
As Hroch says: 
Now the nation is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the 
product of a long and complicated process of historical development 
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in Europe [...] let us define it at the outset as a large social group 
integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of 
objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in 
collective consciousness. Many of these ties could be mutually 
substitutable – some playing a particularly important role in one 
nation-building process, and no more than a subsidiary part in others. 
(Hroch 1996: 79)  
Like ethnic identity, national identity is also a type of collective cultural 
identity. Usually nations consist of several ethnic groups, and national identities 
are shared by several ethnic identity holders. Ethnic identities have their cultural 
contents. National identity is achieved through cultural integration, that is, by 
bringing together different cultural and social groups. At the beginning of the 
modern period, however, the process was achieved by assimilation (for example in 
France) rather than integration (discussed in detail in section 2.4.3). 
For both ethnic and national identities a collective name is important: 
‘collective names are a sure sign and emblem of ethnic communities, by which 
they distinguish themselves and summarize their “essence: to themselves’ (A. D. 
Smith 1986: 23). Here Smith is talking about ethnic identity, but if we recall his 
definition of a nation, it is obvious that he also considers an ethnonym to be a very 
important marker of national identity. 
 Another similar feature between ethnic group and nation is that both are 
‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). The members do not know each other 
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directly, and they include not only contemporary members but also ancestors and 
future generations. They also share a collective memory of the past, based on 
myths of descent, shared values and symbols, a common fate and history, links 
with particular territories, religion and myths of election, as well as the need for a 
collective defence against ‘the other’. This is where modern nationalism finds its 
power. Nationalist scholars, especially historians and philologists, play a great role 
in discovering and reinterpreting the past, creating their own version of events and 
drawing the masses into their history. They act as ‘chroniclers of the past, linking it 
to present’ (Conversi 2007a: 22-23). A. D. Smith (1999a) considers the central role 
of intellectuals who provide solidarity among members by presenting evidence for 
ethno-history, tracing ethnogenesis and cultural markers, including language, 
names, homeland, customs, etc, through generations over a longue durée, in order 
to identify the links between pre-modern and modern times and to claim a nation’s 
continuity. In his words, ‘those nations with the most durable solidarity and most 
distinctive cultural heritage have emerged on the bases of strong pre-existing 
ethnic ties’ (A. D. Smith 1999: 190). Therefore, the activities of historians and 
philologists are crucial for understanding the ethnic foundations of nations.  
As occurs in many parts of Eastern Europe, including Georgia (see section 
6.2), in order to reconstruct the community as a pure, original nation, the élite 
choose symbolic and social features from an earlier ethnic culture (A.D. Smith 
2008: 21), through which they mobilise the masses around the past and try to 
generate national consciousness among them. Through these linkages between 
present and past, members of a nation feel that they are part of its history and gain 
the strength to engage in heroic action and to defend the interests of their nation. 
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Many modernists admit that nationalists use some elements from the past, mix 
them and create or invent traditions. Nationalism ‘does need some pre-existing 
differentiating marks to work on’ (Gellner 1964: 168). Nevertheless, such 
modernists argue that nationalism can proceed without help from the past. Smith 
agrees that nationalism helps to create nations (A. D. Smith 1991: 71), but he 
believes that sacred foundations and deep resources (A. D. Smith 1996a) provided 
by earlier communities (see below) are much more important in explaining 
nationalism, especially in understanding the ethnic character of many nationalist 
movements in the contemporary world. He also agrees that nationalist scholars 
play a vital role in constructing nations, rediscovering and reinterpreting the past 
according to the needs of their doctrines, but in most cases these interpretations are 
consonant with the historic and archaeological evidence.  
History is no sweetshop in which its children may ‘pick and mix’; 
but neither is it an unchanging essence or succession of 
superimposed strata. Nor can history be simply disregarded, as 
more than one nationalism has found to its cost. (A. D. Smith 
1994: 19) 
In their attempt to confirm the legitimacy of political claims, nationalists look for 
what Smith calls ‘deep resources’. Among these ‘deep resources’, he identifies 
territorial attachments, myths of election and other myths and memories, especially 
those of a Golden Age or Golden Ages – periods when the community was 
wealthy, creative and powerful (A. D. Smith 2001: 23-24). 
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[T]he more faithfully recorded, better documented and more 
comprehensive a Golden Age, the more impact it can exert over 
later generations. [...] Successive generations of the community may 
differ as to which epoch is to be regarded as a golden age, 
depending on the criteria in fashion at the time. [...] [T]hose 
communities with well-documented rich ethno-histories possess 
‘deep resources’ on which to draw, and so can sustain themselves 
over long periods and maintain an extended struggle for recognition 
and parity. Even where they lack political and military security, 
their successive layers of cultural resources underpin their political 
claims as well as their sense of common ethnicity. (A. D. Smith 
1996a: 583-585) 
But not all ethnic communities can appeal to ‘a great past’ or Golden Age. 
Smith draws attention to the ‘uneven distribution’ of ethnic history (A. D. Smith 
1996a: 583). While some communities can boast of a rich, well-documented ethnic 
history (e.g. Armenians, Georgians), others have only bare, shadowy memories of 
the past and shallow traditions (e.g. Slovaks or Estonians) (A. D. Smith 1993: 131; 
1999a: 17), but they are equally interested in a ‘usable past’ and ‘rooted culture’ 
and they often annex the past of neighbours and identify themselves with the 
communities with greater cultural pasts. For example, Abkhaz nationalists claim 
the historic and cultural heritage of a Medieval Georgian kingdom and 
Belorussians have similar claims concerning the Belorussia-Lithuanian Kingdom 
(Shnirelman 2000: 57). Therefore, the historical past and shared memories often 
have the form of myth (Smith 1991: 22); in fact, all markers of ethnic and national 
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identity have a mythical and subjective quality. Nationalist intellectuals, who 
invoke those myths and memories, discover the past and place the origin of their 
group in time, can mobilise people and establish solidarity only if they ‘fit’ popular 
traditions. Even if the members of a community are aware that the myths they 
accept are not strictly accurate, they consider that the story told is more important 
than its verifiable truth (Schöpflin 1997: 19-20). 
 [W]hen acting as ethnic entrepreneurs, nationalist historians must 
sell a plausible product that is both effective and affective. [...] 
National myths cannot be perceived to be inventions. Although the 
predictable nature of their construction and combination may lead 
observers to emphasize the element of artifice, historical mythologies 
as popular systems of belief also need to be understood through the 
eyes of their adherents, for whom they need to be perceived as first 
order truths. (Wilson 1997: 182-183) 
Shared memories include religious movements and their leaders, saints, 
heroes, battles, dynasties and their king; myths include myths of origin (foundation 
myths), myths of national resistance, language myths, etc. They will be discussed 
in detail with regard to Georgia throughout this thesis, but here attention is devoted 
to religion and some religious myths as well as myths of homeland as important 
markers of national identity. 
 Belief has provided a great source for the symbols, memories and myths of 
ethnicity. In some places an image of a nation has been constructed around them 
(for example, Bosnian Catholics consider Bosnian Muslims to be a different nation 
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in religious terms), but in other cases, where ‘religious loyalties threatened to 
weaken or divide the nation, they would be ignored or suppressed in the national 
interest’ (Preece 2005: 29). This was the case in Georgia (see section 3.2). 
Among myths of ethnicity the myth of being chosen is most powerful. 
Smith (2004a) and Hastings (1999b) believe in the power of an ancient election 
model in the formation of national identities and the persistence of nations. 
Religion reinforced the goals of an ethnic group and supplied cultural resources for 
the idea of a chosen people, which in turn guaranteed ethnic survival (A. D. Smith 
1999a: 130). Myths of chosenness and ethnic election were common in the ancient 
world (A .D. Smith 1996c: 452). Such myths meant that a group had a sacred 
mission, moral obligations and special destiny. The paradigm of chosenness was 
provided by the Old Testament (Hastings 1999a: 196). The Jews believed they 
were ‘chosen’ (A. D. Smith 1996b: 190), but the myth of communal election is 
also found among Sumerians, Egyptians, Babylonians and ancient Persians. 
Nevertheless, it has been most powerful among Christians (Hastings 1999a: 198), 
who adopted the model of ancient Israel.  Myths of ethnic election helped to draw 
a strict boundary against others, who did not have the same divine mission. Later, a 
secular ideology of nationalism ‘breathed new life’ (A. D. Smith 1999a: 140) into 
these myths. In modern times this idea of ethnic election ‘may either be fused 
within religious nationalism, where a particular faith and nation coincide, or a 
more secularized nation may simply inherit these ideological forms from its more 
religious past, preserving them while filling them with more secular-nationalist 
content’ (Hearn 2006: 175-6). 
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One of the powerful sources of historic continuity in identity development 
is the interrelation between a people and its land (A. D. Smith 2001: 24). Myths of 
ethnic election often strengthen a community’s attachment to its homeland, which 
is regarded as God-given property (A. D. Smith: 1996b: 194). In general, the 
collective ownership of property is a salient marker of group’s solidarity. Taking 
into account that the most significant property is a territory, territoriality is 
considered to be one of the most salient markers of national identity (Grosby 
1995). As shown in section 2.1.1, the mythical homeland is more important for 
ethnic identity than the actual territory occupied by an ethnic group. However with 
nationalism, a broader geographic perception of home emerged: a feeling that this 
nation belongs only here and nowhere else (Kaiser 1994: 17-18). Nationhood 
cannot be achieved without self-determination over territory. As Penrose (2002) 
argues, nationalism, as a part of modernity, contributed to a major transformation 
in the significance of territory. Thus, territory or homeland has a more significant 
function for nations, and a belief in the right to control the homeland is what 
distinguishes a nation from ethnic groups. 
 But a nation is defined not only by the right to self-determination over a 
given territory, but also by a common public culture. As seen in section 2.2.1, 
Smith identified cultural and educational revolution to be the most fundamental 
factors in the emergence of nationalism. Modernity required the standardisation of 
skills and the homogenisation of culture which became possible through public 
schooling (Eriksen 2002: 103). Thus, a ‘folk culture’ was transformed into public 
culture through mass education and ‘high culture’, previously solely the property 
of the élite, became accessible to everybody. High culture ‘overlaps with 
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communication, most notably language’ (Conversi 2007b: 374). But language is 
more than just a means of communication. One of its fundamental features and 
functions is to mark identity (Joseph 2004: 11), in particular a common cultural 
identity. For nationalists it is also the bridge between their nation and the sacred 
(Blattberg 2006) and a symbol for the articulation of nationalist claims. According 
to Schöpflin (2002: 123), ‘having one’s own language means that political, social, 
cultural and civic institutions can operate without interference from outside’. 
Although a single shared language is not absolutely necessary for a nation, it is 
often very useful for nationalist ideology. 
While the linguistically homogeneous state is extremely rare, and while 
a high proportion of languages are actually not sharply distinct from 
others, the demand for the linguistically homogeneous nation and 
clearly distinct national language has become a standard part of 
nationalist ideology. (Barbour 2002a: 14) 
Nationalism sees a common language for the entire population as a vehicle for 
maintaining a nation. As Deutsch (1953) has pointed out, the study of the 
connection between nationalism, ethnicity and language is very complex. In 
modern times, an ethnic past (objective or not), together with language, becomes 
the basis for the process of turning ethnic identity into national identity. Linguistic 
homogenisation becomes necessary for cultural unity, communication and 
nationhood. In many cases a standard language is the most significant marker of 
national identity (see section 2.4.2). A literary (standard) language is also 
acknowledged by Marxism-Leninism as a necessary attribute of nationhood, 
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although Marx himself did not put primary emphasis on language or other cultural 
characteristics in nationhood but traced its economic roots, as shown in the next 
section. 
2.3 Marxism-Leninism and nationalism 
Georgian nationalism, both in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, has been heavily 
influenced by a Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist understanding of nations and 
nationalism. This section introduces the Marxist view of these concepts and then 
turns to the Bolshevik interpretation of the national question, which resulted in the 
emergence of multiple ethnic nationalisms amongst many ethnic groups within the 
Soviet Union. 
 Marxism is considered to be a modernist theory, since it asserts that 
nationalism is the result of an uneven development of capitalism. However, 
Marxist historians tend to adopt a primordialist approach, because they speak of 
nations as unchanged phenomena from ancient times (Chkhartishvili 2005: 231). 
Their belief in primordialism has its origin in Marxist social theory based on the 
economic development of humanity on the one hand, and the lack of a theory of 
nationalism within Marxism on the other hand. 
 As mentioned in section 2.2.1, Marx never developed a formal theory of 
nationalism; he had no need to, for he did not recognise the strength of national 
aspirations and considered them irrational. For him, ethnicity and national 
sentiments were ‘false consciousnesses’ that would eventually disappear 
(Schöpflin 2002: 8, 241).  Marx believed that as a result of economic development, 
false feelings and irrational cultural or ethnic identity would eventually disappear 
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and be replaced by an economic identity – the only true identity based on 
individual economic interests (Schöpflin 2002: 10-11). The main actors of history 
– social classes (exploiters and the exploited) – have different, irreconcilable 
interests which are always economic in origin, no matter how much they are 
hidden behind other labels, for example, behind the label of nationhood in the 
capitalist era. As for collective cultural identities, according to Marx, these are not 
ethnic phenomena, but rather the result of socio-economic development 
(Chkhartishvili 2006b: 207-208). Marx recognised several stages of such 
development: primitive society, slave-owning society, feudalism, capitalism (the 
highest stage of which is imperialism), and socialism (the highest stage of which is 
communism) (Dorpalen 1986: 24). Later, Lenin further developed Marx’s social 
theory and tied collective identities to different stages of socio-economic 
development: he considered tribes/clans (plemya) as typical for the feudal era, 
whereas nationalities (natsional’nosti) and peoples (narodnosti), as well as nations 
(natsii), according to him, appear under the conditions of capitalism (Hirsch 2005: 
45). Finally, the disappearance of nations and the emergence of internationalism 
occur in the socialist era. Based on these categories, Marxist-Leninist historians 
presented cultural collective identities as absolutely immutable and continuous and 
a sequence of socio-economic development. In Marxist historiography, there is no 
clear distinction between the concepts of tribe, nationality and nation and there are 
no terms to describe pre-ethnic developments (Chkhartishvili 2006b: 208). When 
speaking of such phenomena, Marxist historians are forced to use the same term, 
tribe, interchangeably with ethnographic group (etnograficheskaia gruppa) in 
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early Soviet ethnography, which seems to be an attribute of primitive and also 
slave-owning societies. 
 The confusion over the meanings of terms, along with various connotations 
assigned to some key concepts of nationalism in Marxist academic work, gave rise 
to Bolshevik and post-Soviet interpretations of these concepts. In the various union 
republics, from the establishment of Soviet rule until the collapse of the USSR, the 
Bolshevik interpretation, in turn, influenced the implementation of Soviet national 
policy towards both titular nations and minorities. The final goal was 
internationalism, rapprochement (sblizhenie) and merging (sliianie) (these 
concepts are discussed in detail in chapter 5) in the name of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, which meant imposing a single Soviet identity, without national or ethnic 
boundaries. Marx’s remarks on nationalism were to become essential principles of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
2.3.1 Marxism and the national question 
For Marx, the history of humankind is a history of class struggle. The French 
Revolution established the political supremacy of the bourgeoisie. Modern society 
was divided into two major classes – the bourgeoisie (oppressors) and the 
proletariat (oppressed). Marx considered these two classes – and not nations – to 
be the main actors in history. Nationalism is understood by him as an expression of 
bourgeois interests, since, in his view, the bourgeoisie assumes that a nation 
consists only of its own class, whereas the proletariat, which does not participate in 
political power, has no nation. 
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At the time Marx was developing these ideas, nation-states in Western 
Europe were already established: for the most part, state boundaries were the same 
as national boundaries. The workers had to overthrow their oppressors within their 
states and become the ruling class of the nation. When, according to Marx, 
exploitation of one class by another class comes to an end, the proletariat will 
become a nation and this nation will differ from a bourgeois nation. In The 
Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels wrote: 
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what 
they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire 
supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must 
constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the 
bourgeois sense of the word. (Marx & Engels 1970: 55) 
 Marx recognises the legitimacy of nationalism as part of a logical historical 
development, belonging to the epoch of expanding capitalism. Thus, according to 
Marx’s historical timeline, nationalism is a necessary characteristic of the 
bourgeois era. Since a society moves from one stage to another when the dominant 
class is displaced by a newly emerging class, in order to develop, state power has 
to be transferred from one class to another by social and political upheaval. 
Therefore, Marx supported national liberation struggles in order to abolish 
feudalism and to reach the next step of historical development. He treated nations 
‘as either reactionary or progressive, depending on their social location within the 
world economic order’ (G. Smith 1996: 3). At the same time, Marx viewed 
bourgeois nationalism as an obstacle to the international unity of the proletariat. 
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Once capitalism had performed its historically progressive role, nationalism could 
not be progressive any more and ‘had to be thrown aside’ (Marx 1977: 101). 
 In Marx’s view, after capitalist development, together with its necessary 
condition, nationhood, society would move to the next step in history: a socialist 
revolution, which would bring economic structural changes which would make it 
possible to abolish differences between national cultures. Thus, in the socialist era 
national differences would disappear and nationalism would develop into 
internationalism. Lenin and the Bolsheviks (or ‘men of the majority’, which 
became a faction at the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 
1903 after the split from the Mensheviks, or ‘men of the minority,’ over 
organisational issues (Hosking 1990: 26)) based their understanding of the national 
question on Marx’s remarks and further developed the Marxist approach to 
nationalism. 
2.3.2 The Bolsheviks and the national question before 1917 
By the end of nineteenth century, Western Europe had established nation-states, 
where nations defined themselves within the borders of already existing states. As 
for Russia, this was still an agrarian, multi-ethnic empire where more than half of 
the population did not belong to the dominant ethnic group – the so-called Great 
Russians (a term given to Russians in the nineteenth century in contrast to 
Ukrainians, or Little Russians, and Belorussians, or White Russians). Some groups 
(e.g. Georgians and Armenians) with a developed ethnic consciousness found 
themselves part of an empire. They were influenced by the ideas of nationalism; 
the discrimination which they experienced as a result of imperialism encouraged 
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them to develop their own identity and to struggle for colonial liberation and self-
determination (Chorbajian 1995: 229-230). According to Marx’s timeline of 
historical development, these movements were understood as a revolutionary and 
progressive historic phase, through which every nation had to go on its way to 
internationalism. 
 Since a nation was a historical category of a particular epoch, it was 
impossible to avoid its formation. National movements had to be supported in 
order to accelerate the process of historical development. Moreover, national 
movements could become important allies for Marxists in their fight against the 
bourgeoisie. Lenin made the distinction between the nationalisms of the oppressed 
(the non-Russians of Russia) and the nationalism of the oppressors (the Great 
Russians). According to him, ‘the nationalism of dominant nations (such as the 
Great Russians in Russia) was a reactionary force that hindered the development of 
other peoples. In preparation for socialist revolutions, it was essential to foster 
solidarity between the workers of the oppressor nations and the oppressed nations 
within these countries’ borders’ (Hirsch 2005: 52-53). Liberating national struggles 
of an oppressed people ‘were to be treated with empathy as an expression of true 
grievances destined to decline spontaneously in a socialist society’, whereas 
Russian nationalism ‘was to be fought tooth and nail – reversing the political 
practices of Tsarist Russia’ (Shanin 1989: 417). 
Whether the Bolsheviks would support the right to self-determination also 
depended on the interests of the working class: non-Russian peoples of Russia had 
the right to set up their own nation-states, but secession had to be opposed if it was 
against the interests of the working class. Thus, Marxism needed to wean the 
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working class off bourgeois nationalism by supporting national self-determination 
movements only when Lenin considered them progressive and capable of being 
brought into the revolution (Wade 2005 151): that is, to split national alliances of 
different social classes and recruit the proletariat and the peasantry for Marxist 
interests. 
 Marx’s view that nationalist movements could play a progressive role in 
the economic development from feudalism to capitalism (A. D. Smith1998: 47) 
became an issue of political debate amongst his followers – the Bolsheviks, who 
placed class interests above national interests, and the Mensheviks, who placed 
national interests above class interests. The Georgian Mensheviks advocated the 
necessity of institutions that would help the development of every nationality 
(Pipes 1997: 37) and demanded territorial autonomy for the nationalities of the 
Russian Empire. The Armenian Mensheviks also demanded the introduction of 
cultural autonomy (Pipes 1997: 19). Lenin and the Bolsheviks thought that national 
autonomy would weaken the proletariat. They opposed the idea of the Bund (The 
Jewish Social-Democratic Party in Russia and Poland); they opposed socialist 
parties from the Baltic and Caucasian countries who sought the right to represent 
the working class of their respective areas. Lenin argued that nationality-based 
divisions would be an obstacle to economic development. Stalin agreed with Lenin 
and wrote in 1904: ‘Clearly, the demolition of national barriers and close unity 
between the Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Polish, Jewish and other proletarians is 
a necessary condition for the victory of the proletariat of all Russia’ (Stalin 1954a: 
35). National independence was related to the bourgeois revolution. With the 
triumph of the socialist revolution, national boundaries would be destroyed. Once 
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the Russian proletariat took power, they would offer the right to self-determination 
to the oppressed nationalities. But, at the same time, Lenin made clear that the 
Bolsheviks’ supreme task was to spread the socialist revolution and that the 
national question should be subordinated to the interests of the working class; 
therefore, the world revolution and the struggle for liberation would be supported 
only if it was directed against imperialism and autocracy, which in the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of twentieth century fought against democratic and 
national struggles in the Russian empire.  
 Many nationality-based political parties gained popularity after the 1905 
Revolution. They started to demand the right to cultural autonomy and, in some 
cases, the right to political self-determination. Their demands were based on the 
example of political parties in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Lenin’s view, 
however, the demonstrations of 1905 expressed not national aspirations but a 
universal desire for equal rights. He dismissed the significance of nationalism and 
emphasised the international character of proletarian struggles. Lenin, whose pre-
revolutionary outlook was international (Gecys 1953: 100), wrote in 1913: 
‘Marxism cannot be reconciled with any nationalism [. . .] Combat all national 
oppression? Yes, of course! Fight for any kind of national development, for 
“national culture” in general? – Of course not’ (Lenin 1964b: 34-35). Despite his 
clear point of view, the popularity of nationality-based political parties within the 
Russian Empire and the demands from the Mensheviks, as well as the national 
struggles of Austro-Hungary’s multi-ethnic population, forced Lenin to understand 
the urgent need to elaborate a special programme for national and minority issues 
(Pipes 1997: 36-37). At the same time, he realised that a Bolshevik view on the 
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concepts of ethnicity, nation and nationalism was not yet formulated. He asked a 
young Georgian Bolshevik, Stalin, a representative of an oppressed nationality, to 
write an article on these concepts. 
In 1913 Stalin wrote two articles: ‘On the Road to Nationalism’ and 
‘Marxism and the National Question’. Here, he defined a nation as a ‘historically 
evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological makeup, manifested in a community of 
culture’ (Stalin 1953b: 307). Later, Stalin’s definition of nation became standard 
for Soviet academic writing. Stalin’s articles did not really represent Lenin’s 
opinions. Lenin denied the existence of such concepts as national culture and 
national psychology – terms used by Stalin in the definition of nation as well as 
throughout the essay ‘Marxism and the National Question’. Stalin’s definition 
implied that nations had cultural identities and objective ethno-cultural attributes, 
such as a language and territory. The emphasis on territory as a necessary feature 
of a nation meant that some groups – for example, the Jews – could not be 
considered a nation since they had no common territory or common language 
(some Jews in Russia did not speak Yiddish). It also meant that minority groups in 
a given territory could not be called nations. Stalin argued that many peoples of 
Russia were primitive and that their cultures should not be preserved. In his 
opinion, territorial autonomy, rather than national-cultural autonomy, was the only 
way to solve national issues. Territorial autonomy would break national barriers 
and unite workers (J. Smith 2005: 19; Kaiser 1994: 104). In his articles, Stalin 
criticised the view of the Bund and Georgian Mensheviks. Unlike the Austrian 
Social Democrats, who assumed that nations were permanent entities, Stalin made 
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it clear that nations belonged to the epoch of expanding capitalism. In his view, 
most people did not have deep national feelings, and their movements came into 
existence as a result of political and economic oppression. Stalin suggested that in 
the transitional period of expanding capitalism in the Russian Empire, nations must 
choose not to secede, but rather to have regional autonomy, where they could use 
their languages. Thus, national majorities and minorities would live together in 
territorial autonomies and their ‘international solidarity’ would supplant national 
sentiments (Hirsch 2005: 27-28). 
 Any discussion of the right to political and national self-determination was 
completely absent from Stalin’s article. That is why in 1914 Lenin wrote the article 
‘On the Right to Self-determination’, in which he maintained that nationalities 
have a right to secede. In this article, Lenin explained that the Bolsheviks should 
support certain national movements in order to use them for their own needs. As a 
Marxist, Lenin believed theoretically that national consciousness, as a ‘false 
consciousness,’ would disappear at some point in history, but for the time being 
nations and national identities were real phenomena. The nationalisms of the 
oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire were legitimate movements against Great 
Russian chauvinism and could not be considered reactionary. They must be given 
support and granted forms of nationhood (Martin 2001: 8), although this was not a 
final goal of the revolutionary movement. The final goal was explained by Lenin in 
1916: ‘The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the present division of mankind 
into small states and all national isolation; not only to bring the nations closer to 
each other, but also to merge them’ (Lenin 1964a: 147). In his ‘Speech Closing the 
Debate on the Party Programme’ delivered in March 1919, Lenin once again not 
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only advocated the merging of nations, but also supported the ultimate aims of a 
comrade Piatakov, according to whom ‘We don’t want any nations. What we want 
is the union of all proletarians’. To this, Lenin replied: ‘This is splendid, of course 
and eventually it will come about, but at an entirely different stage of communist 
development’ (Lenin 1965: 194). Lenin’s views on the right to self-determination 
and on ‘Great Russian chauvinism’ were later reversed by Stalin.  
2.3.3 Stalin as a theorist of nationalism  
Stalin’s writings helped form the Soviet approach to many disciplines, but best 
known are his articles about nationalism and linguistics. Although these articles 
were not academic essays, but had a polemical purpose and were written to deal 
with particular circumstances, they became the basis of Soviet academic studies. 
Stalin’s article ‘The Social-Democratic view on the National Question’, which was 
meant as an interpretation of the ninth clause of the Party programme regarding the 
right to self-determination, was published in Georgian in proletariatis brdzola (The 
Proletarian Struggle), No. 7 (September 1904), and was his first work on the 
subject of national issues, although Western academic literature often states that 
Stalin did not touch on the subject before 1913 (see, for example, Pipes 1997: 37) 
and had no competence in the field. Here Stalin tried to define the Bolshevik 
approach to national issues as an interpretation of certain points of the Party 
Program: 
 Everything changes. [. . .] Social life changes, and with it the ‘national 
question’ changes too. At different periods different classes enter the 
arena, and each class has its own view of the ‘national question’. 
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Consequently, in different periods the ‘national question’ serves 
different interests and assumes different shades, according to which 
class raises it, and when. (Stalin 1954a: 31) 
In this article, as an example of development of national consciousness, Stalin 
discusses nationalism in Georgia and identifies three steps of its development. The 
first stage left a visible trace in the lives of Georgians in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century with the plot against Russian rule in 1832 (see section 4.1.3). 
This, according to Stalin, the most significant event in the movement of Georgian 
nobility who wished to restore the Georgian Kingdom, was an expression of 
feudal-monarchist nationalism. The concept of feudal-monarchist nationalism was 
something new, unknown to Marxism, which considers nationalism to be a result 
of capitalist developments. Stalin considers it to be the first stage of nationalism. 
As mentioned above, Marxist-Leninists recognised two kinds of nationalism, 
bourgeois and socialist. In the first, the bourgeoisie is the leading class, and in the 
second, the proletariat. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Georgia was an 
agrarian country with neither of these classes. In the national liberation movement 
the Georgian aristocracy was supported by peasants, who suffered most from 
Russian rule. Rebellions against the Tsarist regime started immediately after the 
occupation of Georgia in 1801. The first uprising broke out in 1802 in eastern 
Georgia and was followed by others in 1804, 1812, 1819-20 and 1841 (see section 
4.1.2). These movements are regarded by Stalin as the first stage of the national 
question. The next stages of nationalism Stalin connects with capitalism and the 
emergence of two classes: the bourgeois and the proletariat. Two other steps are 
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related to the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and, 
correspondingly, are expressions of their interests. 
Stalin’s next, most substantial work on the national question was the 1913 
essay on Marxism and the national question, which shows that he ‘had given 
considerable thought to the problem of nationalities long before Soviets took 
power’ (Stern 1944: 230) and gave answers to basic questions which later became 
a cornerstone of Soviet policy and Soviet studies in the field of nationalism. By the 
time Stalin was writing his famous essay, the Bund had for a decade been 
demanding organisational autonomy. Stalin’s emphasis on territory as an essential 
marker of a nation was meant to answer the Bund’s demand (see section 2.3.2). 
Jews did not have their own territory; thus they were not a nation and could not 
have national representation. The other goal was to show that the interests of 
revolution preceded those of nations. Stalin showed this by tying the idea of 
nationalism to the epoch of expanding capitalism. If a nation is a product of the 
bourgeoisie, it will no longer exist after capitalism is finished. In this article Stalin 
makes clear that nationalism can be studied only with reference to space and time. 
Like the previous article, this was not written as an academic essay but had a 
concrete goal, to refute the Bund’s views. Therefore it is obvious that Stalin did not 
mean this work to be a universal textbook on nations and nationalism. 
Nevertheless his views became universal and his pre-revolutionary definition of 
the nation dominated in the Soviet Union. In volume 41 of the Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia (Shmidt 1938: 402), the article nation gives Stalin’s definition of 
nation and calls it a classic definition of the term. The article states that the only 
scientific definition of nation was elaborated by Stalin, who creatively developed 
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Marxist-Leninist views on the national question. In later editions of the Great 
Soviet Encyclopedia nation was defined as a ‘historically constituted community of 
people, formed on the bases of territory, economic ties, literary language, some 
features of culture and character’.4 Essentially it was still Stalin’s definition, but 
his name was not mentioned any more. Instead, the article said that this, the only 
scientific understanding of nation, was developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The 
articles also spoke about the differences between bourgeois and socialist nations 
(Stalin’s concepts). 
 Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin was appointed People’s 
Commissar for Nationalities and devised a Soviet national policy based on his own 
theory of nationalism, which meant the temporary admission of national 
aspirations in order to gain the support of oppressed groups of the former Tsarist 
Russia – ‘prison of nations’ (Lenin 1970: 10) – and the creation of nations out of 
‘backward’ peoples, in order to make sure that every group had gone through all 
stages of the Marxist historical timeline (Hirsch 2005: 146).
5
 National 
consciousness of all groups, as an attribute of bourgeois ideology, would disappear 
later, under socialism, and they would merge into one socialist nation. But after 
supporting the national development of all ethnic groups through the state-
sponsored process of korenizatsiia (nativisation or indigenisation, discussed in 
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 For example, the encyclopedias of 1967 (vol. 10, p. 77), 1974 (vol. 17, p. 375), and the Georgian 
Soviet Encyclopedia, 1979 (vol. 4, p. 189). 
5
 The term ‘prison of nations’ was first used by a French writer Astolphe-Louis-Léonor, Marquis de 




chapter 5), Stalin realised that history was not developing in accordance with 
Marx’s timeline: nations were not only not disappearing, they were actually 
becoming stronger. The ideology of nationalism was competing with communist 
ideology and it was necessary to adopt a different strategy: to strengthen socialism 
and internationalism, on the one hand, and win the hearts of nationalists, on the 
other, by allowing cultural development, while removing political aspirations from 
their agendas. 
 In 1928 Stalin formulated his dual strategy for the transitional period of the 
proletarian dictatorship in one phrase: ‘national in form, socialist in content’ 
(Stalin 1955). This phrase asserted that ‘proletarian culture does not cancel native 
culture, but pervades its content; native culture on the other hand, does not cancel 
proletarian culture, but lends form to it. National culture is a bourgeois 
phenomenon only when power lies in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Thus, as long 
as socialism is not yet formed, culture remains ‘national in form, socialist in 
content’ (Roucek 1960: 20). 
In his next important work on the issue, ‘The National Question and 
Leninism’ published in 1929, Stalin does not speak about the disappearance of 
nations under socialism. On the contrary, he asserts that under socialism they will 
become even stronger: 
The fact of the matter is that the elimination of the bourgeois nations 
signifies the elimination not of nations in general, but only of the 
bourgeois nations. On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations new, 
socialist nations are arising and developing, and they are far more 
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solidly united than any bourgeois nation, because they are exempt from 
the irreconcilable class contradictions that corrode the bourgeois 
nations, and are far more representative of the whole people than any 
bourgeois nation. (Stalin 1954b: 355-356) 
In his 1950 article, ‘Marxism and Problems of Linguistics’ (Stalin 1972), Stalin 
again maintained that nations result from a long historical development. Here for 
the first time he identified the stages of such development: clan, tribe, people and 
nation. This assertion, as well as all others by Stalin, immediately became a by-
word in academia. It was cited by all Soviet social scientists, and even today 
among post-Soviet scholars is often considered to be a ‘classical’ statement. 
 Although Stalin tied nationalism to capitalism, his definition of nation 
suggests that nations were historically formed cultural groups. Those ethnic groups 
within the Soviet Union whose level of development was not enough to achieve 
the status of a nation had to be supplied, in order to accelerate their development 
through the Marxist historical cycle, with the attributes of a nation by Stalin’s 
definition, that is, territory, language, culture and shared history. They needed a 
past within a given territory to claim it as their homeland. In the Soviet period, 
histories of ethnic groups were written and rewritten, with emphasis placed on the 
autochthonous relationship with occupied territories, shared language, religion, and 
so on. National histories were fabricated in order to convince members of nations 
that the historical events which actually took place within a given territory were 
part of the history of its current inhabitants. 
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 Such an approach to the national histories of Soviet ethnic groups and the 
national and language policies based on it (see chapter 5) deeply affected the 
national identities of corresponding groups. People interpreted the past according 
to this approach and became bonded with places. Territory became a very 
important marker of their identity. In general, territory (homeland) has always been 
one of the defining factors of human identity, but in the era of nationalism – an 
ideology requiring that a nation has full sovereignty over its territory inhabited 
only by its members – such a bond became threatening to non-members and indeed 
eventually led in some places to ethnic cleansing. 
 Stalin’s views, largely following the Romantic conception of national 
identity, were further developed by Soviet scholars, ‘rooting contemporary realities 
in primordial origins’ (Broers 2004: 73) and teaching masses their own histories. 
Through education the masses were invited to participate in the creation of 
primordial identities, increasing nationalisms empty of political ambitions, 
strengthening fixed territorial and ethno-cultural markers, and thus defining the 
ethnic character of their nationalisms, which soon after the Soviet Union was 
created, was no longer only a top-down process, but was moving largely from the 
bottom up, throughout the whole history of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet understanding of key issues of nationalism and nations played a 
crucial role in the formation of the national identities of titular nations of the 
Union’s republics: it did not give minority groups within them a chance to share 
the national identity of the dominant group. Ethnic identities of minority groups, 
which caused bloody conflicts in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, were 
largely constructed through Soviet language policy, discussed in detail in chapter 
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5. Before turning specifically to the language policy in Georgia at different times 
in the next chapters, the importance of language policy for nation-building and the 
theory and various types of language policy will be discussed. 
2.4 Language policy and language planning (LPP) 
Language policy, as a response to linguistic diversity, is a set of statements and 
orders by governmental or other organisations, which usually leads to language 
planning, although there are cases when planning may lead to recognition of a need 
for policy. Language planning is the factual realisation of language policy. The 
term language planning was introduced by the Norwegian linguist Einar Haugen 
in 1959 and referred to all conscious efforts that aimed at changing language, 
language use or the linguistic behaviour of a society. According to Haugen 
himself, it could include anything ‘from proposing a new word to a new language’ 
(Haugen 1987: 627). 
 The objectives of the stated policy (either to maintain existing policy or to 
alter it) are to be achieved by various bodies through planning: how to optimise the 
functioning of the national language – to enlarge the spheres of its use, its 
development in all directions, to normalise the literary language, its use in the 
educational system and mass media, take care of minority languages and defending 
minority language rights and so on. All these aspects of language policy constitute 
a series of theoretical principles and practical measures, which are aimed at solving 
language problems in a state. Language policy may result in language legislation, 
which regulates the use of languages in different social situations. For example, a 
law might say that the polity over which it has jurisdiction shall be a unilingual 
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society. Alternatively, it may not be explicitly stated but rather concealed within 
some larger policy. The objectives of LPP are usually social, political, or economic 
in character. 
 Although throughout history almost all states had some sort of a language 
policy, LPP as an issue of sociolinguistic studies emerged in the 1960s, when 
many new states in Africa and Asia faced a problem of selecting and implementing 
a national language. This included creating alphabets, compiling dictionaries, 
terminologies for different disciplines, and so forth. According to the German 
linguist Heinz Kloss, issues related to the internal structure of the language (such 
as spelling reforms, the development of new terms and language standardisation, 
that is, the creation and establishment of a uniform linguistic norm) are concerns of 
corpus planning, whereas status planning refers to all efforts undertaken to change 
the use and function of a language or language variety within a society (such as 
using it as medium of instruction or as an official language). According to Kloss, 
corpus planning, focused on the linguistic characteristics of a language, involves 
linguists and philologists, whereas status planning, concerned with the social 
position of a language, is carried out mostly by state officials (Kloss 1969: 81). 
 Other linguists identify two more dimensions of language planning: 
prestige planning, directed towards creating a favourable psychological 
background crucial to the long-term success of language planning (Haarmann 
1990), and acquisition planning, the effort to spread and promote the learning of a 
language. The latter was introduced by Cooper (1989) to describe the policies and 
strategies in order ‘to bring citizens to competence in the languages designated as 
“national”, “official” or “medium” of education’ (Wright 2004: 61). The efforts 
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may be based on policies of monolingualism (assimilationist) or multilingualism 
(pluralist) as discussed in section 2.3.2. 
 The process of language planning can be described by the useful 
framework of the four stages developed by Haugen (1987): selection (the choice of 
a language or language variety to fulfil certain functions in a society), codification 
(the creation of a linguistic standard/norm for a selected linguistic code), 
implementation (the realisation of the decisions made in the stages of selection and 
codification), and elaboration (terminological and stylistic development of a 
codified language to meet the demands of modern life and technology) (Mesthrie 
et al. 2004). These four processes do not necessarily occur in this sequence. 
Moreover, they can occur simultaneously. 
2.4.1 Linguistic standardisation 
The first process in Haugen’s framework of language planning is selection, 
through which decisions are made with regard to the status of language/s; it is a 
stage during which some languages are legitimised to be used, learned and taught 
and therefore become official languages, while others are not. An official language 
refers to a language that has a legal recognition in a state and is used in 
governmental business, administration, the courts, media and education. Usually 
an official language is designated by law, but not always. Sometimes an official 
language is called a state language or a national language, but there is a difference 
between them. Unlike official languages, national and state languages also have a 
symbolic value for national unity. Some official languages might have a co-official 
status in a state or in some part of a state. For example, until 1992, Abkhazian was 
80 
 
the co-official language, alongside Georgian, in one part of the Georgian state, 
namely the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Sometimes co-official languages 
are called regional languages (Mackey 1989: 6). Some other languages within a 
state might not have an official status, but are recognised by the state as a language 
of a linguistic minority. 
 This process of selection is a part of status planning and, therefore, 
involves the participation of statesmen or bureaucrats (Kloss 1969: 81). Selection 
is made among available languages and/or their variants. Where there is a single 
(not necessarily numerically) dominant group, there is no issue on the choice of 
language. The choice is related to political power and is not determined by 
linguistic factors. As shown in section 2.2.4, an official language is chosen/created 
by an élite/dominant ethnic group and then imposed on other groups. As a rule, it 
is a variant spoken in the politically and socio-economically advanced region 
(capital) which has de facto advantage, and its language becomes post factum 
official, since selection of an official language is always post-factum after the 
formation of the state (Wright 2004: 43). 
 After selecting the language/languages to receive official status, a variety 
of the language is chosen for standardisation. According to Kloss (1967), a 
particular dialect of a language to be recognised as official has to meet both the 
criteria of an Ausbau (upgrade) and Abstand (distance) language. These criteria are 
designed to distinguish between a language and a dialect, since there is no clear 
distinction that can be drawn between the two. 
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 A variety of language can be called Ausbau when it has its own standard 
spelling and grammatical forms independent of other languages. Usually this 
involves having a certain amount of written literary production. A language is 
Abstand in relation to another language when the two are different enough for 
them not to be considered dialects of the same language (for example, Georgian 
and Russian). Thus, the first category is based on the social function of a language, 
the second on the structural properties of the linguistic system. Kloss’s model for a 
dialect to achieve a status of language requires both Abstand and Ausbau criteria, 
but some languages are Abstand but not Ausbau, for example, minority languages 
used in the private domain (e.g. Bats in Georgia). On the other hand, a language 
can be Ausbau without being Abstand, when it is mutually intelligible with another 
language, but, based on Ausbau criteria, is considered to be a separate language 
(e.g. Norwegian with regard to Danish). 
 Many contemporary linguists do not regard mutual intelligibility as a 
distinct criterion because it is unclear how complete this mutual intelligibility must 
be: whether it is enough to be understood orally, or whether mutual comprehension 
extends to written texts. The same can be said of other purely linguistic criteria 
such as language structure or regular sound correspondence, which are not strict 
and universal enough to delimit language and dialect.
6
 Joseph (2006: 27) notes that 
the question of what is or is not a language is a political question. Similarly, Millar 
observes that: 
                                                          
6
 Establishing regular sound correspondence between sounds or sound clusters in etymologically 
identical words of different languages is a method of historical linguistics which proves a genetic 
relation between languages (Campbell 2004). 
82 
 
Max Weinreich is reported to have said that “a language is a dialect 
with an army and a navy”. It is possible to see what he meant by this: 
many languages could have been perceived as dialects of a larger 
language if the historical development of particular societies had 
been different; by the same token, there are a number of language 
varieties considered dialects which, if the history of the territories 
involved had been even slightly different, might now be perceived as 
languages. (Millar 2005: 57) 
 Indeed, political borders, as well as historical-cultural orientation and other 
extra-linguistic and socio-cultural factors, are essential, but most importantly, the 
language-users’ self-perception seems to distinguish a language from a dialect. 
Many languages spoken in China are far from mutually intelligible, but their 
speakers consider that they speak Chinese – that is, that their linguistic identity is 
Chinese and therefore these ‘languages’ are referred to as Chinese ‘dialects’. 
Communication between them is facilitated by a shared writing system. Thus, 
extra-linguistic factors – political, historical and cultural, together with the 
speaker’s linguistic identity – seem to be of the utmost importance. 
 On the other hand, because of external considerations, two variants of 
language can be regarded as different languages. This is especially true for the 
languages to which Kloss refers to as Ausbau, languages which have passed 
through a written stage of development. The best example of this is the 
proclamation of Serbian and Croatian as independent languages after the break-up 
of Yugoslavia. Until 1991, one Serbo-Croatian language existed (Carmichael 
2002: 238), but the different and mutually irreconcilable feelings of identity among 
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users of its dialects became a reason to regard them as independent languages 
(Schiffman 2004: 66): different alphabets and different literary norms were 
established for three varieties (Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian) of what was once a 
single language. Moreover, the speakers of these three languages try to distance 
themselves from each other by borrowing vocabulary from other languages: 
Catholic Croatians mostly borrow from Latin, Czech and other Western European 
languages; Orthodox Serbians mostly from other Slavic languages; whereas 
Muslim Bosnians borrow from Arabic and Turkish. This is an example of 
deliberate changes made through language planning, namely through one of the 
stages of planning in Haugen’s framework), codification (the creation of a 
linguistic standard or a norm for a selected linguistic code), which consists of three 
parts: graphisation (developing a writing system), grammatication (deciding the 
rules/norms of grammar) and lexicalisation (identifying the vocabulary) (Haugen 
1987: 627). 
 All three of these processes were used to serve political purposes in the 
Soviet Union. For example, after the USSR annexed the Romanian province of 
Bessarabia in 1945, the province was renamed Moldavia and the variety of 
Romanian language spoken there was named Moldavian (Grenoble 2003: 89). In 
order to weaken any sense of common national identity with Romania, the Cyrillic 
alphabet and different grammatical norms were adopted and Slavic vocabulary was 
imported (Majewicz 1989: 13). These linguistic changes, together with historical 
and political developments, helped to establish a distinct Moldavian national 
identity so strong, that after Moldavia gained its independence in 1991, standard 
Moldavian was declared a state language and the use of the Latin alphabet was 
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restored (Grenoble 2003: 92). Proposals to change the name of the language back 
to ‘Romanian’ were rejected, however, despite the fact that Moldavian and 
Romanian are mutually comprehensible. On the one hand, the use of the Latin 
alphabet shows closeness to Romanian; on the other, Moldavians see themselves as 
a distinct nation and believe that they speak Moldavian, which they regard as the 
standard language corresponding to their vernacular. Their notion of language is 
based not on linguistic criteria but on socio-political factors. The Moldavian case 
shows that modern nation-states give language a role as a marker of national 
identity. There are many other examples of this in the world, like the much-cited 
Serbo-Croatian or Danish-Norwegian examples, to name only two. 
 The national language is promoted in education, the media and literary 
writing and, thus, is standardised. Therefore, it has high prestige and is usually 
perceived as more ‘correct’ than other variants of the language spoken in society. 
The situation in a society where there are two closely related languages, one with 
high prestige and one with low prestige, is called diglossia. Ferguson (1972) 
describes diglossia as a kind of bilingualism, where two languages – a high variety 
(H-language) and a low variety (L-language) – have different functions and are 
used in different domains, for example speaking Megrelian (as the L-language) at 
home and speaking Georgian (as the H-language of great ancient literature and 
liturgy) in other domains (work, school, church, etc.). L is the language learned as 
the mother tongue and H is acquired mostly through schooling. When L and H are 
related languages, there is a tendency among native scholars to view the L variety 
as a dialect and only the H variety as a language even when by all linguistic criteria 
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L is a related but separate language. This is a case with Megrelian and Georgian as 
discussed in section 6.1.3. 
 In a diglossic situation, the maintenance of domains for each language is 
regarded as essential for L language survival (Baker 2006: 212), because if an H 
language replaces the functions of an L language, it will inevitably lead to 
language shift. Selection of one single language for official use and its 
standardisation already gives this language an advantage. The two last processes 
of Haugen’s framework, implementation and elaboration, as well as acquisition 
planning, offer further advantages to the standard language, simultaneously 
exposing other languages to potential shift, since ‘any attempt to manage one 
language [. . .] inevitably has implications for all other languages’ (Kaplan & 
Baldauf 1997: 321). Language shift, which is a kind of assimilation, might be 
planned (overt) or unplanned (covert). The rate and degree of the shift vary 
according to the type of language policy carried out in a state, whether by the 
government (top-down) or by the speakers themselves (bottom-up). Shiffman 
(2004: 13) suggests looking not only at overt (explicit) policies, but also at covert 
(implicit) policies, since formally stated or not, when carried out, they still have the 
same effect, and, where there is no official policy, the linguistic status quo 
becomes the implicit policy. For example, the American Constitution does not 
specify an official language, but the USA promotes one single language, and 
culture is mediated through that language in the same way as other nation-states. 
The same demands are made of immigrants in order for them to become citizens; 
knowledge of English is usually a requirement for getting jobs (Kymlicka 1997: 
57). Thus, in the USA English is the de facto official language and a national 
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symbol. The next section looks at how language becomes a symbol of national 
identity and why. 
2.4.2 Standard language and national identity 
Before the emergence of nationalism in modern times, the political significance of 
language in human history was limited to the ruling class, and the linguistic 
diversity of a state was not a political issue. Medieval states were multilingual. The 
language used in official documents and education was seldom the language of 
everyday life. There was no feeling that all the people of the state should speak one 
language. It is only in modern history that the idea emerges of a nation being 
defined by its language. 
 Linking language to nation and the notion of a national language was 
developed by Romantic thinkers, such as Herder, Fichte and Humboldt, in 
nineteenth-century Europe. These intellectuals related language, territory and 
history to a nation. They promoted language to make a nation aware of its past and 
culture and find pride in them. For Romantic thinkers, where a distinct language 
existed, a distinct nation existed as well. In his Addresses to the German Nation 
Fichte (1968: 90) wrote: ‘Those who speak the same language are linked together 
by Nature – quite aside from any human intervention in the matter – through a host 
of invisible ties. [...] They are an indivisible, natural unit.’ The Romantic 
philosophers came up with the idea of a folk-nation and spoke about national spirit 
and national consciousness determined and expressed by national language. 
 According to these philosophers and their followers (in Georgia among 
other places, as shown in chapter 4), the main goal of the nationalist ought to be 
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the revival of a collective cultural identity through not only language but other 
‘primordial’ cultural elements. For some modernist theorists of nationalism (e.g. 
Hobsbawm and Ranger), modern common cultures and national languages are 
essentially invented. They believe that modern common cultures and national 
languages are essentially invented. Gellner (1983) argues that intellectuals play a 
dominant role in the development of nationalism by using language as an 
expression of national identity, but this language is not necessarily the language of 
the peasants, who usually speak some variety of the language. For modernists a 
language, accompanying the spread of the idea of popular sovereignty and 
representative government, is artificially constructed by the élite in order to 
communicate with people, because unlike old states, the situation in modern states 
requires communication between its citizens. 
 As noted before, according to ethnosymbolism, the power of nationalism 
lies in memories, myths, traditions and symbols – a living past, rediscovered and 
reinterpreted by the nationalist intelligentsia: this is also true for language. In order 
to turn a language into a proper tool for the expression of a common ‘high’ culture 
and national identity it has to be upgraded to a standard language, that is, become 
semi-artificial. Indeed, today’s standard national languages are constructed through 
a modernisation process, but they are not invented, but rather rediscovered (A. D. 
Smith 1986: 174-200). They are usually based on one politically advanced dialect, 
but often have elements of other dialects. If they were completely invented they 
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would not be able to create loyalty and serve their roles as symbols of national 
unity and the marker of national identity.
7
 
 Print-capitalism made it possible to spread a single standardised linguistic 
code to the masses. Those standardised vernaculars which are now the languages 
of modern nation-states made it easier for people to understand each other and 
reinforced the realisation that there was a wider community that spoke the same 
language. Standardised vernaculars opened a path for searching the roots of 
national identity in the remote past. They represent the ideal of Europe in modern 
times – one nation, one language – and motivate the standardisation or even the 
revival of a language, as in the cases of Hebrew and Irish. Through the printed 
word, the thinking of past generations became accessible (Puri 2004: 185) and the 
cohesion of the ‘imagined community’ increased. People could return to an 
idealised image of what they were. This helped them to discover the unique 
character and future destiny of the nation. ‘It is not enough simply to mobilize the 
masses; to sustain that mobilization, to turn “masses” into “nations”, it is first 
necessary to ”vernacularize” them and thereby bestow a unique identity and 
destiny upon them’ (A. D. Smith 1991: 140). 
 Thus, not just a language, but a standard language is a marker of national 
identity, especially in places where a large majority of the nation speaks that 
language. However, because of voluntary or forced migration, annexation and 
other historical means, the populations of nearly all states speak more than one 
                                                          
7
 Most theorists of nationalism recognise a standardised language as a very important element of 
nation-building. (e.g. Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Greenfield 1992). 
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language – they are bi- or multilingual. The imposition of one single language can 
motivate repressive politics towards other, non-official languages and, 
correspondingly, their speakers, who might not have the same feeling of 
nationhood as the majority. There is a danger that linguistic division will lead to 
political division, especially when language is an important marker of ethnic 
identity among a minority population. Each political unit has boundaries, but its 
population shares not only political boundaries, but a whole set of values, symbols 
and institutions. One such symbol is language: therefore, the relationship between 
a political unit and its population, in general, and the degree to which linguistic 
conflicts occur, in particular, are significantly affected by the type of language 
policy the state adopts (see section 2.4.3). 
 Through a process of promoting a standard language governments of 
nation-states have conducted nation-building and become legitimate authorities, 
because a sense of common membership based on a common language has 
guaranteed equal access to the social institutions operating in the standard 
language. Thus, language has become a governmental issue. A ruling group has 
started the institutionalisation of its language and culture through education. This is 
achieved through language policy as a major tool of nation-building. 
 Since national identity, together with other factors, is defined by language, 
the latter is also a central issue of ethno-politics, because in multilingual states 
there is a danger of potential contradictions between loyalty to a given ethnic 
group and to a wider national identity. When, in a newly independent state, ethnic 
and linguistic diversity is found, it is viewed as a possible danger to the building of 
a nation-state. Therefore, in order to avert this danger, there is an urgent need to 
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create a unilingual society. Nationalistic campaigns and efforts to abolish linguistic 
diversity often run into obstacles caused by attachments to other languages, as well 
as to ethnic groups, since the role of language in maintaining ethnic boundaries is 
great. If ethnic groups do not have the appropriate conditions for keeping and 
developing their cultural and linguistic originality, then their ethnicity and 
language will be politicised. An extreme expression of this is separatism and the 
search for alternative loyalties to other states. Conversely, if ethnic minorities have 
the means to safeguard and develop their ethno-cultural originality, the political 
salience of ethnicity lessens. When different ethnic groups are brought together 
under a common political entity, one group and its language usually has a more 
powerful position than others. It does not matter whether the groups were brought 
together by invasion, conquest, migration or on a voluntary basis. When a part of 
the population has a distinct language, as a rule it views itself differently not only 
from a linguistic dimension, but also in many other respects. The danger of 
potential contradictions between loyalty to a given ethnic group and to a wider 
national identity is no less significant than the threat that arises from lack of a 
common shared identity and language in a multilingual state. There are many 
examples of this across the world, of which one example is Georgian. In Georgia, 
language is a fundamental marker of ethnic identity (see chapter 3). In general, 
when language plays such an important role in defining ethnic identity, it could 
also serve as the main binding factor for the nation, especially where language 
speakers represent a dominant group and the membership of a nation is determined 
by the language of the élite, identified with a dominant group, as a symbol of 
nationalism, unity, power and patriotism. In such cases, the dominant group 
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imposes its language on those with less power. This also means that other 
languages within a state have to be ignored or even suppressed. Then language 
becomes not just an instrument of inclusion, but also of exclusion, a tool for 
domination and oppression. Attitudes towards some groups are based on language: 
those who know the language have a higher status in a society than those who do 
not and whose loyalty is questionable. 
 The majority of modern states are multi-ethnic and multilingual. They 
exercise different types of language policy. Which language policy is the best and 
most democratic? One that helps assimilation or one that promotes linguistic 
pluralism? What political consequences ensue from different policies? The 
answers to these questions can be found, firstly, in international experience, and 
secondly, by analysing the context of each specific case.  
2.4.3 Types of language policy 
Language policies can be classified into several types, according to the character of 
the relationship between a state and the languages spoken on the territory of its 
jurisdiction. Cobarrubias (1983) identifies four major ideologies behind language 
policies in multilingual states: assimilation, pluralism, vernacularisation and 
internationalisation. 
 Linguistic assimilation is aimed at the elimination of multilingualism and 
means the disappearance of languages and other cultural distinctions of small 
ethnic groups. Its ideology is based on the belief that everyone must speak and 
function in the official language of the nation. The policy of assimilation can 
restrict minority languages; that is, the elimination of linguistic diversity can be 
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achieved through a legal ban on the use of a language and often leads to language 
shift. In other versions of assimilationist policies other languages may be 
discouraged or ignored, which also could lead to shift, as shown in the previous 
section. 
 Linguistic pluralism, on the other hand, maintains and cultivates the right to 
multilingualism and involves the coexistence of different language groups on an 
equitable basis. It may try to reduce the possibility of language loss by ensuring its 
use not only in the private domain but in the public domain as well. This does not 
mean that all languages will be used equally, but it guarantees linguistic rights and 
mother tongue education, whether private or state-funded. 
 Two other ideologies centre on the status which language policy assigns to 
the indigenous languages spoken within the state’s territory. Vernacularisation 
means the selection and restoration of an indigenous language as the main vehicle 
of communication and the official language. Internationalisation, by contrast, is the 
selection of a non-indigenous language of wider communication as an official 
language or language of education. Usually it is the language of a former colonial 
power (for example, in the postcolonial countries of Africa). The reason behind 
selecting a language of a colonial power is the purported ‘ethnic neutrality’ of a 
European language, which prevents segregation and avoids giving advantage to 
one ethnic group, although it erects social boundaries, since educated upper and 
middle classes are often the only groups proficient in the foreign language and 
with political power. 
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 Assimilationist policies were carried out in all nation-states before the First 
World War, but, afterwards, the principle of self-determination (discussed in the 
next section), mostly based on language, was applied. Especially after the Second 
World War, an increasing number of states made significant attempts to 
accommodate linguistically and ethnically diverse groups. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights considers language to be one of the most 
fundamental components of human identity and encourages protection of minority 
languages.
8
 It is obvious that issues of linguistic diversity themselves are not a 
problem for the stability and security of a state. All world organisations involved in 
the promotion of peace, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, agree that 
multilingualism does not cause violent conflicts, but many conflicts around the 
world are the result of assimilationist policies (Kymlicka 2001: 248). The cause of 
conflict is a denial of the right to cultural and linguistic diversity (Koenig & 
Varennes 2001). Linguistic groups living under the rule of another group may 
develop linguistic nationalism. Myths of common ancestors, speaking a common 
language, serve a group’s nationalist ideals. Such groups often follow Fichte’s idea 
that ‘whenever a separate language exists, there is also a separate nation which has 
a right to manage its affairs and rule itself’ (1968: 184). While language policies 
promoting one single language are practical from the perspective of 
communication and are aimed at national unification, they may become a tool of 
separation (see section 2.4.2). Thus, the issue of minority language protection and 
                                                          
8
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is available at: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1975/ 01/1903_en.pdf.  
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policies of multiculturalism and pluralism are important not only for human rights, 
but also for conflict avoidance. 
 A government decides what type of language policy will be implemented, 
but this does not mean that the policy cannot be changed by the people. There are 
many examples of democratic countries where the policy has changed according to 
the choice of a community. For example, the struggle for collective rights, among 
them language rights, in Catalonia and the Basque Country made it possible to win 
the status of official languages in the respective autonomous communities (Mar-
Molinero 2002). Contemporary nation-states are characterised by the recognition 
of different linguistic groups, especially indigenous groups, which are expected to 
remain culturally distinct. Differences may even be supported by the state, but the 
preference for dominant languages is the case, not only in those states that promote 
monolingualism, but also in those with multilingual policies. In such states 
linguistic harmony and national/social integration is achieved by recognising the 
language rights of minorities, but at the same time establishing a unified, civic and 
cultural identity based on a standard national language. An advantage of a 
pluralistic language policy is that it allows practical and symbolic involvement in 
state life by offering minorities a cultural space within the wider society. It is 
precisely the sense of involvement at the collective level that welds citizens into a 
nation. 
 2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the main paradigms in understanding ethnicity, nation 
and nationalism and highlighted the ethnosymbolist approach taken in this study. 
95 
 
The paradigms of nationalism based on the natural character of nations and 
referring back to the earliest periods of history (primordialism, perennialism) not 
only fail to explain the date of the emergence of nations, but also include all types 
of human groups in the category of nation. As argued in section 2.2, a nation 
differs from other collective identities and is defined here by common culture, the 
belief in the right to self-determination and the right to territory. Correspondingly, 
nationalism is understood as the desire of a culturally based group for a nation-
state – that is, independence, territory and self-rule. 
The modernist paradigm, although it has made an important contribution to 
nationalism studies, is also deficient in explaining certain nationalisms in the 
contemporary world. In merging their political and, at the same time, ‘ethnic’ 
character, it cannot inadequately explain nationalisms of non-Western stateless 
nations (both in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries). These nations, without 
access to power and resources available to Western states in early modern times, 
were often influenced by their ethnic and cultural elements more than by the 
political and civic dimensions of those of the West. 
The theoretical framework of this study – ethnosymbolism – offers 
adequate explanation of the continuity between ethnic identity and national identity 
and does not fail to account for the nature of ethnic and national ties and links 
between nationalism, the ethnic core of nations and cultural identities in different 
types of nationalism.  
In modern times, a common cultural and political identity for all members 
of a nation is achieved largely by a standard language obtained through language 
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policy and planning. Soviet Georgia provides an interesting case where national 
language was manipulated, on the one hand, to create a sense of identity among 
certain groups, and, on the other, to exclude some other groups. Marxist-Leninist 
and Stalinist understandings of nations and nationalism (examined in section 2.3) 
and Soviet language policy (discussed in chapter 5) arguably strengthened the 
ethnic and linguistic character of Georgian nationalism and increased the potential 
for ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet Georgia. 
The next chapters examine the emergence of Georgian national awareness 
from the ethnic and cultural identity of pre-modern times and show not only how 
ethnic boundaries helped to maintain Georgian ethnic group identity through 
periods when the cultural content embraced by these boundaries has changed, but 
also how the ethnic boundaries themselves have changed over time in their 
meaning or importance, while always referring to ‘the ancient language, religion, 
kinship system or way of life […] crucial for the maintenance of ethnic identity 
(Eriksen 2002: 68).  The study then explores the strategies used by the repressed 
Georgian nation under the colonial regimes of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union 





Language and identity in pre-modern Georgia 
 
The material examined in this chapter has been studied elsewhere from various 
points of view. The novelty of this chapter is that the material is re-examined from 
an ethnosymbolist approach. Although recognising the importance of modernity 
and capitalism in the formation of nations, such an approach nevertheless holds 
that any study of nations must consider the culture of pre-modern times, 
specifically the culture and structure of an ethnie as a historical community 
preceding a nation. Once formed, an ethnie tends to be durable and its myths, 
symbols and memories, believed to be objective and legitimate boundaries, 
constitute a framework within which social and cultural processes develop. The 
ethnic resources form a core upon which national identity is built. 
Each national identity is unique in the sense that the components used, 
selected and interpreted in the process of national identity formation are unique. In 
other words, the combination of these components is never exactly the same as in 
other national identities. Georgian nationalism and national identity are 
distinguished by the centrality of language as the strongest historical factor in 
national consolidation. Both Georgian and Western scholars have noted the 
linguistic foundation of Georgian nationhood, characterising the Georgians as ‘a 
highly language-conscious society’ (Law 2000: 169). As shown throughout this 
thesis, there are numerous examples in the history of Georgia when language was 
used to settle fundamental cultural and political issues, and defined Georgia’s 
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future path in history. Language seems to be the most important marker of 
kartveloba (Georgianness) not only in the modern era, but also in all periods of 
documented history. While cultural content and the enclosing boundaries of 
collective identity have changed over time to various degrees, language has 
remained a criterion of belonging, differentiating us from them. It is a central 
feature in all contexts – ethnic, national and state/political. 
Over the centuries, language defined the membership of the Georgian 
ethnie, nation and polity as well as the perceived collective historical destiny of the 
Georgians. Therefore, in order to understand national identity in contemporary 
Georgia, a historical perspective on identity development is needed. The goal of 
this chapter, however, is not to review the history critically, but to draw attention 
to the linguistic and other cultural dimensions used in national histories of Georgia, 
which were later ‘popularized and institutionalized’ (Hobsbawm 1983: 13). 
Historiography in Georgia was one of the major instruments for constructing 
nationhood and therefore provided the discourse needed for nationalism. The input 
of Georgian nationalist historians in the Tsarist Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods is underlined throughout this thesis. However, this chapter gives a picture 
of kartveloba before ‘official’ histories were written. Special attention is paid to 
the linguistic foundation of kartveloba and the role of language in the 
understanding of the self. Still, Georgian nationalism is not simply an attachment 
to some linguistic sentiment, but a more complex phenomenon. Therefore, other 




For that reason other key components of kartveloba, which later played a 
crucial role in nation-formation, are also identified in this chapter. After discussing 
the history of language policy and planning (LPP) in section 3.1, and examining 
some of the ethnic background and ethno-national resources (such as religion, 
homeland, and the choice of myths and symbols) in relation to language (sections 
3.2.1 and 3.2.2), the chapter touches upon a fundamental question of nationalism 
debates regarding pre-modern nations (section 3.2.3). It is impossible to 
understand modern Georgian nationalism without analysing the history of ancient 
ethnic solidarity and in particular the role language played in the national 
consolidation of Georgians. Nor is it possible to identify the forces at work behind 
Georgia’s recent ethnic conflicts without understanding the colonial language 
policy of the Russian empire (discussed in chapter 4) and, later, of the Soviet 
Union (discussed in chapter 5), when Georgia strove to revive the nation through 
linguistic consolidation. 
Therefore, before analysing the emergence of the modern nation in the next 
chapter, this chapter will trace the development of kartveloba since ancient times, 
concentrating on the role of language and LPP in relation to ideology predating the 
Georgian national movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cultural 
components of Georgian national identity reach far back into the Georgian past and 
can be traced over long periods of time. Not only are they tied to the process of 
modernisation, but their recurrence and continuity provided sources for modern 
nationhood in the nineteenth century, when the nationalist intelligentsia 
rediscovered myths, memories, traditions and symbols of national heritage of the 
Golden Age. While ethnosymbolism agrees with the modernist view that the 
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ideology of nationalism creates nations where they did not exist, it also asserts that 
many nations have grown out of pre-existing societies as a modification and 
extension of their cultural heritage and ethnic ties (A. D. Smith 1999a: 190-191). 
The modern Georgian nation is a product of modern nationalism as much as it is a 
product of the pre-modern development of ethnic elements recognised by the 
ethnosymbolist approach. It will be argued that a pre-modern nationalist ideology 
emerged in Georgia in the tenth-thirteenth centuries at the zenith of the country’s 
political, military, cultural and economic strength, when the population of Georgia 
was united by well demarcated territory, an effective government, religion and, 
most importantly, language. A thousand years ago, the Georgian writer Giorgi 
Merchule defined Georgia as a country bounded by linguistic identity (see section 
3.3.3). Since that time Georgia has been called Sakartvelo – ‘a place for 
Georgians’. One of the questions addressed in this chapter is what it meant to be 
kartveli (a Georgian). Did the Georgians constitute an ethnic group or a pre-
modern nation? Could the community of Georgians in the Middle Ages be 
considered a nation? When addressing these questions, it is important to 
distinguish between modern and old nations and not to restrict the meaning of 
‘nation’ to its modern meaning. The issue of a pre-modern nation also raises 
further questions, such as whether ‘nation’ has one single meaning when used with 
regard to the Georgian nation (discussed further in this thesis) and whether kartveli 





3.1 Language in ancient and medieval Georgia  
The Georgian people (currently about 4.5 million) came into existence through the 
long interrelation and confluence of related tribes. Although in ancient times there 
may have been more proto-Georgian speaking tribes in Transcaucasia (Suny 1998: 
4), the three tribes which constitute the modern Georgian people are the Karts, 
Zans and Svans, corresponding to speakers of modern Kartvelian (South 
Caucasian) languages, that is Georgian, Megrelian-Laz (Colchian or Zan), and 
Svan. The Kartvelian language family descended from proto-Georgian (Kobalava 
2008: 503). The Proto-Georgian (or common Kartvelian) language began to break 
up into distinct languages about four thousand years ago.  The Svan language was 
the first to break away. It is now the native language of about 40 000 people and is 
mainly spoken in northwest Georgia, in the province of Svaneti. As for Megrelian-
Laz, this became a distinct language in the eighth century BC. Megrelian is spoken 
in western Georgia (province of Samegrelo) by about half a million people and Laz 
is spoken mainly in Sarpi, a southwest Georgian village on the border of Turkey. 
Most Laz speakers live in Turkey along the Black Sea coast. Many linguists, 
particularly from outside Georgia and mainly guided by extra-linguistic criteria, 
such as different political borders, consider Megrelian and Laz (Chan) to be 
separate languages. However for most Georgian scholars, they represent two 
dialects of a single Megrelian-Laz language (Amirejibi-Mullen 2006: 5). On the 
other hand, a few contemporary Georgian ‘linguists’ consider the Kartvelian 
languages to be dialects of a single language, since Svan and Megrelian-Laz 
speakers in Georgia identify themselves as Georgians (see sections 5.2.1 and 
6.1.3). Among the Kartvelian languages, only Georgian has literary status and a 
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long written tradition. Megrelian, Laz and Svan have always been limited to 
domestic use. Their speakers within Georgia often refer to their languages as ‘our 
kitchen language’ or ‘our cradle language’ and consider the Georgian language to 
be their literary and second native language. Georgian is also a main marker of the 
national identity they share with the rest of Georgians. 
Particular historic conditions are necessary for a language to become the 
most important marker of cultural identity (Boeder 2006: 54). In the history of 
Georgia from the earliest times, there were several periods during which language 
played a more important role than at other times. Although discussions of language 
policy and planning within sociolinguistics mainly concern the modern era, old 
states more often than not had some sort of language policy, including the 
selection, implementation, codification and elaboration of languages in order to 
enable their functioning in a given society. The adoption of Christianity in Georgia 
in the fourth century was a strong incentive for language standardisation. In fact, 
the spread of Christianity became a language movement strengthening ethnic ties 
(see section 3.1.1). Later on, in the strong feudal state in the eleventh to thirteenth 
centuries, language became a political issue and the rulers of Georgia carried out a 
language policy which encouraged the further consolidation of the Georgian nation 
(see section 3.1.2). 
3.1.1 Language standardisation after conversion to Christianity (5
th
 – 10th 
centuries AD) 
Non-standard languages can be and often are markers of ethnic identity. However, 
in order to serve as a marker of national identity, a language has to be standardised 
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(see section 2.4.2) and become a literary language, i.e. it has to be a language in 
which literary texts are written. Most non-Georgian, as well as some Georgian, 
scholars support the view that the Georgian alphabet was created after the spread 
of Christianity in the fourth century in order to translate essential Christian texts. 
Pre-Christian inscriptions in Georgia are written in Aramaic and Greek scripts. The 
oldest inscriptions in the Georgian alphabet date back to the 430s AD and are 
found near Bethlehem in Palestine (Tsereteli 1960). The oldest Georgian 
manuscripts also date from the fifth century. Three scripts have been used to write 
Georgian: Asomtavruli, Nuskha-khutsuri and Mkhedruli. They represent a single 
alphabet which gradually acquired different graphic forms (Kemertelidze 1999: 
232). Asomtavruli or Mrgvlovani was in use from the fifth through the eighth 
century. Gamkrelidze (1994) considers the Greek influence to be evident in 
Asomtavruli: in order to avoid violation of numerical values of letters, the order of 
letters follows Greek; the sounds specific to Georgian are added at the end. Each 
Georgian sound is represented by only one letter and the Georgian alphabet is 
almost totally phonetic, which indicates that its creator was familiar with the 
phonetic principles of sounds elaborated by Dionysius Thrax (Boeder 1975). 
During the ninth century, Asomtavruli gradually developed into Nuskha-khutsuri, 
which was replaced by Mkhedruli in the eleventh century and is used to this day. 
Since ‘[t]he development of a written form of the language has, throughout history 
and across cultures, been closely bound up with the recognition of a standard form 
of the language’ (Joseph 2006: 29), it is therefore possible to speak about the 
development of the Georgian standard language since the fifth century. 
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The difference between eastern and western Christianity contributed to the 
standardisation and spread of the vernacular. Religion was one of the most 
important markers of collective identity before the emergence of nationalist 
ideology throughout the world and Georgia is no exception. The defence of one’s 
religion has often been understood as the defence of one’s nation or ethnic group. 
For example, the Irish literary language had been created by the clergy (Safran 
2008: 176); only later did it become a defining element of Irish identity together 
with Catholicism and territory. The Irish struggle against English domination was 
interpreted as the struggle between a Catholic Irish nation whose church language 
was Latin, and a Protestant English nation. Defending the Irish language was 
largely insignificant until the late nineteenth century (Barbour 2002b: 36). In 
general, until modern times in the western-Christian world, where Christianity was 
intended to be above national differences (Safran 2008: 176), the language used in 
the church was not the same as that used in day to day secular life. Holy texts, 
church services and prayers were written in Latin and local languages had no 
written forms. Literary languages were not the property of regular people, but of 
the upper classes.
9
 However, in the Eastern Christian world, all national languages 
were equal and used in religious life (Bolkvadze 2006). There was thus a strong 
connection between religion and the literary language. Here the defence of one’s 
                                                          
9
 In Western Europe, Latin was the language of worship and contact. In the eastern part of the 
continent, Greek played the role of lingua franca and lingua sacra of the Orthodox Church until 
Slavic countries started using Church Slavonic as a sacred language and lingua franca in the tenth 
century (Wright 2004: 23). Arabic, used as a language of Islam, was often remote from local 
dialects (Kamusella 2001: 236). 
105 
 
nation was consciously linked to language and, as the Georgian case shows, 
language movements appeared much earlier than in the West. 
In this way, one of the main factors differentiating Eastern Christians from 
Western European Christians was their use of language as an additional marker of 
identity. The Bible in the West was presented in the language of the masses only 
beginning with Martin Luther, who wished to ensure that the Holy Scripture was 
not the exclusive property of the clergy (Safran 2008: 174). Some Eastern 
Christian countries, among them Georgia, had the Bible translated into the 
language of masses much earlier. This fact served not only the spread of Orthodox 
Christianity, but also language development. Hence, the Eastern-Christian tradition 
enabled the standardisation of Georgian much earlier than the languages of 
Western European nations, the standard varieties of which are partly products of 
modernity (Barbour 2002a: 13). 
The history of the Georgian literary language began with the translation of 
religious texts from Greek, Syrian, Armenian and Arabic, soon followed by 
original Christian literature.
10
 Religious figures ‘used their native tongue for 
theological writings and commentaries, as well as in the day-to-day life of the 
Church [. . .] The difficult task of mastering a foreign language was thus 
confronted in the East by only a small number of individuals – those engaged in 
the work of translation and those who were destined to become leaders of the 
Church in their area, who spent time studying in Constantinople or Jerusalem and 
                                                          
10
 It is often assumed that the earliest surviving original piece of literature is The Martyrdom of 
Shushanik, the Queen, written in 475-84 (Baramidze & Gamezardashvili 1968: 9).  
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returned with first-hand knowledge of major texts and doctrinal disputes’ (Law 
2003: 124). 
Both original Georgian literature and the translated texts from the early 
Middle Ages show some degree of standardisation (Danelia 1998: 490). It is also 
obvious that the authors were trying to equip Georgian with all the vocabulary 
necessary for the status of lingua sacra. In this way, the first standardisers and 
codifiers of Georgian were religious figures. Translation work abroad became 
more intense from the tenth century. The modernisation of Georgian, carried out 
by translators, was a process of catching up with Greek and other developed 
literary languages. Despite the Eastern Christian tradition of equality of all 
languages, it was extremely difficult to compete with the Greek language. A 
Georgian monk, Ioane Varazvache, on Mount Athos, wrote in the tenth century: 
In our Georgian tongue, no one had been found up till now to make 
accessible these holy books of the interpretation of the Holy Gospel. 
While the churches of Greece and Rome were filled with them, those 
of our land lacked them. Not only these books, but many others, 
were wanting in our language. Seeing this I, the poor John, the last of 
the monks, was sorrowful at this shortage of books in the Georgian 
land. So […] I gave my son Euthymius a complete Greek education, 
and destined him to translate books into Georgian. (Blake, Athos 
Catalogue, #10. Cited in Lang 1955: 317)
11
 
                                                          
11
 John and Euthymius are equivalents of the Georgian names Ioane and Ekvtime respectively. 
Translations by Euthymius or Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli are discussed further in this section. 
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Language became central to the process of affirming not only cultural 
differences vis-à-vis Greek, but also to raising the prestige of Georgia on the 
whole. In this regard, the role of Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli and Giorgi Mtatsmindeli 
are especially important. Giorgi Mtsire in his biography of Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, 
indicates that several Greek religious figures and aristocrats told Giorgi 
Mtatsmindeli that although he was Georgian, he was equal to Greeks in knowledge 
and education (Giorgi Mtsire 1967: 148, 151, 153, and 177). For Georgian 
religious figures who worked abroad, especially on Mount Athos, it was important 




Beginning in the eleventh century, translators and writers composed 
frequent commentaries of a linguistic character, such as the evaluation of 
translating skills. For example, Giorgi Mtatsmindeli (1009-1065) commented on 
Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli’s (ca. 955-1028) translations from Greek into Georgian and 
vice versa, appreciating their high quality, which, in his words, is comparable only 
with the first anonymous translators of the Bible into Georgian (Giorgi 
Mtatsmindeli 1967: 61).
13
 According to Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, Ekvtime ‘distilled 
                                                          
12
 The Monastery of Iviron on Mount Athos, named after the classical name of eastern Georgia, 
Iberia, was built by Georgians for Georgian clerics under the supervision of Ioannes the Iberian 
between 980-983. A large part of the Monastery’s library (2000 manuscripts and 20000 books) is 
Georgian. For more information in English, see Dowling (2005) and Allen (1929). 
13
 Ekvtime was fluent in Greek. Lang (1955: 314-215) gives a full list of the texts translated by him 
from Georgian into Greek. Some Greek originals of Ekvtime’s translations are lost and, therefore, 
Georgian versions acquire the importance of primary sources (Mgaloblishvili 1998: 10). 
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the sweet honey of the books of God, with which he adorned our language and our 
Church’ (translated by Lang 1957: 86). Giorgi Mtatsmindeli evaluates Ekvtime’s 
contribution to the literary language as enlightenment for the Georgian language 
and Georgia, as well as his input into Greek language development (Giorgi 
Mtatsmindeli 1967: 41, 44).  Giorgi Mtsire (1967: 121), a biographer of Giorgi 
Mtatsmindeli, evaluates Giorgi’s contribution to Georgian in the same way. In 
general, practitioners of later generations have a high opinion of the translating 
activities of early religious figures. The input is measured by their choice of 
literature, translating skills and the work done in order to enlarge the Georgian 
vocabulary and protect the purity of the literary language (Tabidze 2005: 27-28). 
Many early linguistic commentaries are related to translations from Greek 
and to grammatical features of the original language in comparison with Georgian.  
In this regard, the contribution made by Eprem Mtsire (? — ca. 1101) is immense. 
As Auroux (2000: 445) notes ‘[n]umerous original and translated works of Eprem 
Mtsire (Ephraim the Little, second half of the eleventh century) clearly reveal the 
attention the great scholar paid to linguistic problems [. . .] He deals with several 
linguistic features of both languages [. . .] Eprem shows considerable linguistic 
insight.’  Eprem’s contribution to the development of theological terminology, 
based on the terminological achievements of Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli, is significant 
(Chelidze 1997: 507).  The fact is that some Greek texts
14
 were translated first in 
the tenth century by Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli, and then again in the eleventh century 
                                                          
14
 For example, the works of Maximus the Confessor, who is believed to have died in Georgia in 
exile in 662 (Ferguson, McHugh & Norris 1998: 743). 
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by Eprem Mtsire and other representatives of the Gelati Academy.
15
 They show 
many linguistic differences, because Ekvtime was trying to simplify the texts for a 
broader audience, whereas the translations of the Gelati school were intended for 
the well-educated reader (Khoperia 2001: 136, 137).  Eprem believed that, in order 
to put the Georgian language on an equal footing with Greek, it was necessary to 
translate Greek texts word for word. Some of his principles of translation, which 
altered the Georgian language considerably enriching it with new constructions 
and phraseology, include immediate translation from the original, keeping the 
natural style of the target language and providing full commentaries and glosses 
(Rayfield 2000: 9-10). 
Eprem distinguished between bookish and rural languages. Analyses of 
several terms used for these notions show that by rural language, he meant 
colloquial words from geographical dialects, as well as a non-literary style of 
writing. The bookish language for him was the ecclesiastic language of high 
prestige (Bolkvadze 2005: 55-56). Eprem Mtsire also devised punctuation rules 
according to the Greek system and wrote the first explanatory dictionary in 
Georgian, where terms are listed in alphabetical order (Shanidze 1968: 121). 
Eprem’s most famous followers, Ioane Petritsi and Arsen Iqaltoeli, who are 
known to have been familiar with the Greek linguistic literature (Uturgaidze 
1999:7), further elaborated theological and scientific terminology.
16
 These two 
                                                          
15
 Gelati Academy was the most important scholarly centre in western Georgia in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries (Suny 1998: 38).  
16
 Arsen Iqaltoeli is believed to be the author of the first original Georgian linguistic work 
(Shanidze 1990; Uturgaidze 1999: 11). 
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outstanding Georgian religious figures were invited to the newly established Gelati 
Academy by King David the Builder (1073-1125), who actively supported the 
development of education and research in Georgian and who had regularly selected 
Georgian children to be sent to the Byzantine Empire to study foreign languages 
and carry out translations into Georgian.
17
 However, after the establishment of the 
Gelati Academy, called ‘the second Jerusalem of the whole East’ and ‘the second 
Athens’ by David’s historian for its educational activity (Davitis istorikosi 1955: 
330-331), advanced courses in such disciplines as jurisprudence, natural sciences, 
mathematics, medicine, grammar, astronomy, historiography, philosophy, 
literature, architecture, music and arts were taught in Georgian (Narkvevebi III 
1979: 370, 378-379). Theological and secular education in Georgian became 
possible through schools of philosophy and literary style based on philosophical 
and linguistic traditions brought by Arsen Iqaltoeli and Ioane Petritsi from 
Constantinople and from a Georgian monastery at Petritsoni in Bulgaria. In order 
to enable its use in different spheres of science, a conscious effort was made to 
promote corpus planning, in particular lexical growth. Arsen Iqaltoeli and Ioane 
Petritsi worked hard on the lexical elaboration and establishment of the Georgian 
scientific language and their work deserves special attention. Although they 
                                                          
17
 In the early feudal period, only primary schools existed in Georgia and for advanced studies the 
Georgians had to go abroad.  As revealed by Armenian sources, the Catholikos of Georgia Kirion (c 
6-7 AD) went to Nicopol in Asia Minor for his theological education (Narkvevebi III 1979: 612-
613). However, in eleventh- and twelfth-century Georgia, the number of elementary schools 
increased. Instruction was conducted under the Byzantine educational system – the so called 




borrowed some Greek terms, they mostly created new grammatical and other 
scientific terms based on Georgian roots and Georgian affixation. Thanks to its 
productive word-formation and compounding abilities, it was easy to innovate in 
Georgian. New vocabulary elaborated by Ioane Petritsi, whose stated goal was to 
differentiate the scientific language from the language of common people, is 
linguistically motivated and reflects the exact meaning of each notion (Melikishvili 
1999). 
Not only was Georgian theological and scientific terminology elaborated in 
the process of translation mainly from Greek, but, in general, the development and 
modernisation of the Georgian literary language took place in competition with 
Greek. In the beginning, Greek was regarded as a model language giving the 
literate élite access to philosophy and Christian literature. It had an obvious 
influence on the Georgian language and graphisation (as mentioned above); it also 
influenced Georgian linguistic thought.  Many Georgian grammatical terms of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, such as case names, are exact equivalents of Greek 
terms. They were used in later grammars and are partly used in modern Georgian 
linguistics. Eprem Mtsire and his pupils, who formed the School of Hellenophiles 
and adopted a principle of word for word translation, brought Georgian syntax 
closer to Greek syntax. Grammatical works written later, such as Zurab 
Shanshovani’s (1737) first Georgian grammar followed by the monumental 
Grammar of Catholicos Anton (first version, 1753; second 1767), were based on a 
continuity of tradition going back to a source which was greatly influenced by the 
Greek cultural environment’ (Auroux 2000: 446). 
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Before looking at the further development of standard Georgian in the next 
section, we may conclude that the development of Old Standard Georgian has to be 
viewed as part of the Christianisation of Georgia. The adoption of Christianity and 
the culturally transcendent quality of this religion enabled Georgians to 
communicate with the rest of the Christian world, thus ensuring Georgia’s strong 
cultural identification with Europe (Jones 2005: 10). It is evident that religious 
figures contributed a great deal to the development of the standard language and 
upgraded it to the status of lingua sacra. However, without the patronage of strong 
monarchs, Georgian cultural and educational centres abroad would have been 
unlikely to achieve the striking success they had. They witnessed a great outburst 
of cultural energy resulting in the development of deeply Christian literature in 
Georgian – translations as well as the composition of saints’ and martyrs’ lives. 
With the financial support of kings and aristocrats, in the early Christian period 
Georgians started building churches and monasteries outside the country (e.g. in 
Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Byzantium) (Vachridze 2004). In addition to religious 
services, Georgian monks in these outposts performed national and cultural 
activities (Alasania 2006: 123), produced works in theology and philosophy, 
translated foreign works from various languages and copied old Georgian 
manuscripts. Religion and education were closely linked in the Middle Ages and 
the medieval church in Georgia ‘was the purveyor and guardian of culture and 
language’ (Rapp 2000: 570). The most important contribution to the 
standardisation and codification of the Georgian language was made by the 
Georgian Monastery of Iviron on Mount Athos, where the Georgian clergy was 
involved not only in literary work but also in seeking the recognition of Georgians 
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as a non-Barbaric people. Giorgi Mtatsmindeli’s role in this regard is especially 
remarkable. According to his biographer, Giorgi Mtsire (1967: 176-180), the 
Byzantine emperor Constantine Ducas, agreed, when requested by the Georgian 
king Bagrat, to allow a greater number of monks in the Georgian monastery. Well 
aware of Giorgi Mtatsmindeli’s activities and considering him equal to Greeks, the 
emperor received him as Georgia’s ambassador.  Several times during the meeting, 
the emperor said to Giorgi that, although he was Georgian by blood, he was equal 
to Greeks in knowledge (Giorgi Mtsire 1967: 151, 153). While this was personally 
flattering for Giorgi, it was somewhat humiliating for Georgians in general. 
Therefore Giorgi decided to show the moral superiority of Georgians. The two 
men started discussing spiritual issues and rules of faith, as the emperor was 
interested in the difference between the Georgian and Greek orthodoxies. In his 
answer, Giorgi emphasised the similarities, but then pointed out that, unlike the 
Greeks who in the past were involved in heresy, the Georgians had never changed 
their faith. Constantin Ducas was not insulted by such responses, since Giorgi 
linked heresies not to that emperor’s reign, but to those of his predecessors. During 
his life on Athos, Giorgi Mtatsmindeli had to defend the equal treatment of 
Georgians many times. The Patriarch of Antioch, who considered Georgians 
uneducated, since he was not aware that any of the Apostles had preached in their 
country, required that the Georgian monastery obey the Greek monastery on 
Mount Athos. Giorgi was able to prove that Simeon the Canaanite was buried in 




By this time, the Georgian language had become  a vehicle for spreading 
Christianity, given its status of lingua sacra through the translation of the Holy 
Scripture, the creation of an original Christian literature and the celebration of 
liturgy in Georgian. At the same time, the policy of using Georgian for religious 
purposes can be understood as a conscious distancing from Greek heritage and 
preservation of selfhood against Christian others. It is not surprising that the 
process of equalising Georgian with Greek became a language movement, grew 
into the idea of the superiority of the Georgian language and emerged as an 
ideology of a Messianic role of Georgia, as discussed in detail in section 3.2.2. 
3.1.2. Towards modern standard Georgian (11
th
 – 18th centuries AD) 
As has been noted in section 2.4.1, Haugen (1966) provides a model for the 
emergence of a standard language. First, one of the dialects has to be chosen 
(selection of norm) and then standardised through elaborating its grammar, 
dictionaries and translations (codification of form). After this, the newly 
standardised language has to be used in many social contexts (elaboration of 
function) and, finally, it has to be accepted by people (acceptance by the 
community). Standard Georgian has passed through all the stages of language 
planning (selection, codification, elaboration and acceptance). 
Usually the dialect of a region that is politically, economically and 
culturally advanced becomes a standard variety (Melikishvili 2007: 125). 
Throughout Georgia’s history, the province of Kartli was a cultural and 
administrative centre. Both the old capital of Mtskheta (since the third century BC) 
and the current capital Tbilisi (since the fifth century AD) are located in Kartli. 
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Therefore, the Old Georgian language (ca. 5-11 AD) was based mostly on the 
Kartlian dialect. But throughout the whole history of the literary language, 
Georgian has been enriched by vocabulary borrowed from different geographic 
dialects. At the same time, the process of corpus planning continued in contact 
with other languages which contributed to the lexical growth of Georgian (Lezhava 
1984: 11-12). 
Starting at the end of the eleventh century, Georgia became a powerful and 
a large state and by the end of the twelfth century included the territories of 
modern Azerbaijan, Armenia and a significant part of modern Turkey. During the 
reign of Queen Tamar (1184-1213), widely called Georgia’s Golden Age or the 
Georgian Renaissance, Georgia was the most powerful country in Asia Minor 
(Kaufman 2001: 91). Prosperity, stability and success enabled Georgian kings to 
become guardians of cultural life. They supported the development of not only 
original religious and historiographic literature, but also Georgian secular 
literature: court poetry, chivalrous and romantic epics (expressing highly moral 
human aspirations), as well as the translation of Muslim books (Rayfield 2000: 
61), mostly from Greek, Persian, Arabic, Azerbaijani and Tajik during this period 
(Baramidze & Gamezardashvili 1968: 14-15). Although the language of secular 
literature is closer to the spoken language, it follows the norms and standards of 
religious and scholarly texts elaborated through the conscious efforts of the 
Georgian clergy. Thanks to their work, by the twelfth century the Georgian 




The Georgian language at the greatest period of Georgian history 
and culture (the twelfth century AD) probably had the same number 
of speakers and readers and the same prestige among its neighbours, 
as the English language in the time of Shakespeare. It certainly had 
a longer history and drew on resources just as rich as those of 
English. The language of today is recognisably the same as the 
language first recorded in AD 430. 
The fact that Modern Standard Georgian is essentially the same as Old 
Georgian indicates that the Old Georgian literary language was not too different 
from the dialects, meaning there was a high degree of linguistic homogeneity.  
Despite Old Georgian being comprehensible to modern Georgians, there are 
enough (mostly morphological) differences between them to enable scholars to 
distinguish two periods in the history of Georgian. Modern Georgian developed 
essentially between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries (I. Gigineishvili 1983: 13), 
although its beginning can be traced back to Ekvtime Mtatsmindeli’s and Giorgi 
Mtatsmindeli’s works. While revising old texts, they paid some tribute to previous 
translators, typically trying to bring old texts into conformity with contemporary 
language. Eprem Mtsire, on the other hand, as noted in section 3.1.1, initiated the 
development of a more bookish language, different from the daily language which 
had entered the writings of Athonites. One of the first extended narratives in 
almost colloquial Georgian is Makari Meskhi’s translation (thirteenth century, 
revised fifteenth
 
century) of the lost Syrian text of The Life of Peter the Iberian 
(Rayfield 2000: 89). 
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Invasions by foreigners in the thirteenth-sixteenth centuries caused a 
decline in Georgian cultural and scientific development in general and in linguistic 
thought in particular (Melikishvili 2007: 125-127). Georgian unity collapsed. 
There were several desperate but unsuccessful attempts to re-establish the kingdom 
(Suny 1998: 44-46). Cultural relations with the Christian world, maintained before 
through Georgian monasteries abroad (in Palestine, on Mount Sinai, Mount Athos, 
Black Mountain in Syria, Petritsoni in Bulgaria, Cyprus, etc.), were interrupted 
after the fall of Byzantium. There were no more schools which could set statutory 
standards and norms or principles of translation for Georgian. Political instability 
and cultural impoverishment left their mark on the literary language, which in this 
period is characterised by a diversity of grammatical and lexical forms. Many 
Georgian words as well as some scientific terminology elaborated by the Georgian 
cultural élite of the previous centuries were replaced by Persian and Turkish 
words. 
From the seventeenth century, Georgian kings re-established ties with 
Europe (Potskhishvili 1999: 235). This fact did not have any positive political 
consequences for Georgia, but resulted in the arrival of Italian religious 
missionaries attempting to spread Catholicism among the Georgians. As Wright 
(2004: 112) notes, ‘those involved in conversion needed a common idiom with 
those they sought to convert. Christian missionaries often learnt autochthonous 
languages to proselytise.’ Italian Catholic missionaries were taught Georgian in 
Italy by the Georgian ambassador in Rome (Uturgaidze 1999: 30). After arriving in 
Georgia, they started writing grammar books and dictionaries of the Georgian 
language and later published the Dizionario Georgiano e Italiano composed by 
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Stefano Paolini (1629) and the first printed Georgian grammar, a Greek-based 
paradigm, by one of the missionary grammarians, Francisco Maria Maggio (1643) 
(Chikobava & Vateishvili 1983). These and other works by the Italians influenced 
the Georgian prince, Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani (1658-1725), an outstanding writer 
and clergyman. Known as the father of the Georgian ‘enlightenment’, Orbeliani 
laid the foundation for standardising Modern Georgian with the support of King 
Vakhtang VI (1675-1737). He was the first to introduce modern schooling to 
Georgia and, most importantly, he composed sitqvis kona (Orbeliani 1991, 1993), 
an explanatory dictionary of Georgian that put an end to the distortion of the 
language, and also facilitated knowledge and correct use of its rich vocabulary 
(Bolkvadze 2005: 197). Rayfield (2000: 119) compares sitqvis kona to Dr 
Johnson’s achievements in England, arguing that Sulkhan-Saba did even more than 
Johnson, ‘for his material includes almost every text extant from the earliest 
period, and, as the medieval dictionaries compiled by translators such as Eprem 
Mtsire had disappeared with the Mongols, the lexicographer was working from 
zero’. 
The introduction to the dictionary, where the Georgian sound system and 
grammar is analysed, shows that Sulkhan-Saba based his thought on the linguistic 
literature of the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Uturgaidze 1999: 83). Sulkhan-
Saba’s definitions, referring to over one hundred and forty sources, are short and 
precise. When interpreting a word, he gives a list of semantically related 
vocabulary and explains suitable contexts for them. Sometimes he evaluates the 
words as ‘noble’ or ‘bad’ showing his own attitude towards various lexical units, 
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or marks them with ‘not usable’ as they are foreign words introduced into 
Georgian ‘because of changes of time’ and their use should be avoided. 
There are many other features of this dictionary which make it of great 
importance for the restoration of the Old Georgian linguistic tradition and the 
adoption of contemporary tendencies and directions. Despite being a religious 
figure, Sulkhan-Saba used the language of the daily life of Georgians in his 
original non-religious literature and translations from foreign languages. In his 
lifetime, the Modern Georgian language was finally established (I. Gigineishvili 
1959: 42). 
Sulkhan-Saba’s attitude to the Georgian linguistic heritage was quite 
different from that of his successor, the representative of the King’s family and 
also a religious figure, Anton Bagrationi or Anton I Catholicos (1720-1788). 
Widely educated in religious studies and sciences, Anton became the head of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church at the age of twenty-four (Potskhishvili 1999: 235). He 
not only worked in theology and various spheres of science, but also initiated and 
supervised the opening of a number of Western-style schools in Georgia. He 
fostered Western education in general by establishing close relations with the 
Catholic missions and bringing Georgian principalities closer to Europe. He 
himself designed the curricula of the schools, translated and wrote handbooks for 
ethics, logic, rhetoric, grammar and stylistics as well as taught physics. He was 
very productive in creating original texts in almost all spheres of religious 
literature and translated many texts from Armenian. His Georgian Grammar 
(Anton pirveli 1997) is considered to be an important step in the development of 
Georgian linguistic thought, as well as a great contribution to the unity of Georgian 
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identity, since it set standards of literary Georgian in all the disintegrated kingdoms 
and principalities of his time (Uturgaidze 1999: 149; Babunashvili & Uturgaidze 
1991: 7-8).  
Despite his accomplishments, Anton had an overall negative influence on 
the development of literary Georgian. Influenced by Russian, Latin, Greek, 
Persian, Turkish and Armenian linguistic thought and rhetoric, he developed the 
‘Theory of Three Styles’. He forbade writing about different topics in the same 
style, which meant using ‘high style’ for divine services and religious writings, 
‘middle style’ for historical and literary texts and ‘low style’ for plebeians 
(Bolkvadze 2005: 158-161), the latter being actually the language of daily life in 
Georgia at the time. Due to Anton’s influential position in Georgian society, the 
‘Theory of Three Styles’ became a norm and a law, which prevented the natural 
development of the Georgian literary language. Anton’s influential pupils 
continued this path and many important scientific, historical and literary texts from 
the end of the eighteenth century were created in a language which was largely 
artificial and incomprehensible to ordinary people. A single standard linguistic 
code as a medium of communication was rejected. Only in the nineteenth century, 
thanks to Georgian nationalists who needed to spread nationalist ideology among 
all Georgians, did it become possible to restore one common language for all 
Georgians, as discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
It is possible to discuss more authors of different academic schools and 
periods who contributed to the codification, standardisation and elaboration of 
standard Georgian, but from what has already been said it is clear that linguistic 
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culture and language planning in Georgia existed from the earliest documented 
period. 
3.1.3 The role of standard Georgian for kartveloba in the Middle Ages 
The existence of a standard language creates a ‘proto-nation’ (Hastings 1999a: 21). 
At the same time it helps the state to establish a universal language in education 
and government. Once a universal language is established, a more conscious 
community of users emerges. This community consists of one or more ethnicities 
which share political loyalty. This section shows that in the Middle Ages 
kartveloba represented a prototype of a modern nation and that Georgia resembled 
a nation-state in terms of accommodating and incorporating ethnic minorities into 
a strong unified polity based on shared language. The ideology behind a political 
claim of the right to the territory and cultural uniformity, identified here as a pre-
modern equivalent of nationalism, is discussed in 3.2.3. At the same time, we 
should look at Georgia’s socio-political structure during the zenith of its feudal 
state because it has been used as a standard for contemporary Georgia in the 
process of building a nation-state. 
In the eleventh and twelfth century Georgia, there were sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a peaceful multinational state, where minorities had 
the right to participate in state life. The reigns of David the Builder and Queen 
Tamar (1184-1213) were especially remarkable, when Georgia’s sociopolitical 
administration reached its greatest geographical size, resulting in the creation of a 
multiethnic empire covering the whole South Caucasus and most of the North 
Caucasus (Demetriou 2002: 865). The historian Ronald Suny (1998: 33) describes 
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Georgia of the eleventh-thirteenth centuries as the dominant regional state 
stretching from Muslim Shirvan (in present-day Azerbaijan) on the Caspian to 
Christian Trebizond (now in Turkey) on the Black Sea. In this way, Georgia 
became a Georgian-dominated imperial confederation, consisting of both Muslim 
Khans and Christian princes (Jones 2005: 11). 
The first socio-political reforms aimed at strengthening the state are 
associated with David the Builder. Determined to create a centralised, stable and 
strong country, he took several important steps: 1) religious reform: at the Ruis-
Urbnisi religious council (1103) he expelled ‘unworthy’ people holding high 
positions due to their noble origin, and subordinated the Church to the Crown 
(Alasania 2006: 124); 2) military reform: he created a new type of army which 
stood up better to invasions. In addition to having a twenty-thousand-strong 
Georgian regular army, a twenty-thousand-strong feudal lords’ army and five 
thousand personal royal guards, he settled forty thousand Kipchak (nomadic 
Turkic people) families from the North Caucasus in various parts of Georgia; each 
family was obliged to provide one soldier with a horse and weapons in case of 
emergency. He made provision for the recruitment of a mercenary army among 
Ossetians, Kurds, etc. (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 85); 3) sociopolitical reform: 
he suppressed the influence of powerful feudal lords and extended the power of the 
middle and lower classes, incorporating them into the political and social arena. 
The social system in Georgia took the shape of well-developed feudalism; 4) 
judicial reform: he subordinated the court to the new position of a Royal 
counsellor, through whom he supervised the court’s activities and set up regional, 
corporative and social courts (Maskharashvili 2006: 129-130); 5) administrative 
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reform: he set up the institution of regional and border governors and six ministers; 
he created a rigid civil police, criminal police, tax police and secret police 
(Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 87; Maskharashvili 2006: 130-131). 
These reforms and a new political apparatus substantially reduced any 
possibility of insurrections against an autocratic king and united Georgia in the 
face of external danger. Political, administrative and cultural figures collaborated 
closely. According to Chkhartishvili (2003), ‘[m]onasteries served to help different 
groups merge; the Georgian language and Orthodox Christianity represented the 
principal means of Georgian cultural expansion and the assimilation of non-
Georgian subjects of the Georgian monarch.’ Georgia was a united and 
independent state and Tbilisi attracted talented people. Remarkable achievements 
were made in science and culture. The necessary conditions for an educational 
system were created. There was no mass education, but for the élite, regardless of 
ethnicity or faith, a specifically Georgian system of education functioned. As a 
country at the crossroads between the West and the East, Georgia attracted not 
only Christian but also Muslim, especially Persian and Arabic, scholars and artists 
and absorbed these cultural traditions. Georgian kings offered protection to Arab 
and Persian writers and poets who came to Tbilisi in order to participate in literary 
contests (Narkvevebi III 1979: 493-495). Their works were translated into 
Georgian, enriching the latter with borrowed words. 
Georgian rulers were tolerant of the non-Orthodox Christian and Muslim 
populations and created favourable conditions for freedom of religion. In the case 
of Armenia, after taking it from Seljuk control, Georgia helped restore Armenian 
autonomy and revived its original culture (Manandyan 1941:32). David the Builder 
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was well acquainted with Muslim culture and took part in theological discussions. 
There were many Muslims living in Tbilisi and the king granted them various 
privileges. He built community centres for them and provided the means to 
maintain them. He forbade Christians to do anything which might offend their 
religious feelings (Vivian 1982: 7). According to the Arab historian Mohammed 
Al-Hamav, David the Builder treated Muslims better than any Muslim rulers. He 
not only read the Koran regularly, but every Friday went with his children to the 
Great Mosque, listened and donated great sums of money (Defremery 1849: 486). 
Other Muslim historians confirm that David’s successors continued this policy and 
practice of tolerance (Narkvevebi III 1979: 498).  As a great statesman (and an 
equally great poet), who enjoyed international prestige not only because he built a 
strong state, but also a tolerant one ‘where ecclesiastical and secular nobilities 
accepted their feudal obligations’ (Rayfield 2000: 88-89) and where all ethnicities 
lived in peace, David the Builder set a model for his successors for accommodating 
ethnic and religious minorities and cross-class inclusion, as one of the important 
policies carried out by Georgian kings and queens. Tamar’s contemporary 
Armenian historian Stepanos Orbelyan informs us that all confessional arguments 
were solved with the participation of leaders of all religions in courts where 
Muslims and Christians had equal rights (Narkvevebi III 1979: 499-500). Rayfield 
(2000: 81) argues that religious tolerance expressed in the masterpiece of Shota 
Rustaveli (1160 - ?), The Knight in the Tiger’s Skin, suggests that Georgia in his 
time made little distinction between its peoples and their religions. Obviously this 
educated élite (among them Rustaveli and Petritsi) supported the policy of 
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tolerance and tried to enlarge the scope of Georgian thinking in order to match the 
political vision of the rulers (Rayfield 2000: 91). 
Intermarriage with ethnic minorities was one expression of their 
accommodation. For example, David the Builder married a Kipchak princess and 
Tamar married an Ossetian prince raised at the Georgian king’s court (Silogava & 
Shengelia 2007: 96). Another accommodating measure towards peripheral ethnic 
cultures expressed by Tamar was giving her first born son two names, one 
Georgian (Giorgi) and one Abkhazian (Lasha). The latter is an Abkhazian word 
meaning ‘enlightened, resplendent’ (Kaufmann 2001: 95). 
The dominant Georgian aristocracy was able to incorporate the ethnic 
minority aristocracy, as well as representatives of the Georgian and non-Georgian 
middle and lower classes into the dominant Georgian cultural and socio-political 
sphere
18
. This defined a new and broader cultural and political identity for the 
society united by the language of prestige and education. Already by the end of the 
tenth century, Georgia had a rich original and translated religious, scientific and 
historical literature (Mgaloblishvili 1998: 12) and all the stages of language 
planning had been completed: first a vernacular, the Georgian language became a 
written language and a lingua sacra. By the zenith of the feudal period, however, 
its prestige was enhanced — it became a language of education, science, literature 
and faith, thus a universal language. Hastings (1999a: 21) notes, that: 
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 For example, a rich Persian merchant, Zankan Zorababeli, organised Queen Tamar’s marriage 
and the Armenianised Kurdish brothers Zakaria and Ivane Mkhargrdzeli held high positions at the 
king’s court (Suny 1998: 39). 
126 
 
The more the vernacular is written, the more stable it becomes, the 
wider its ability to express current ideas, the larger the number of 
people who will understand one another better by using it and not 
something else. This almost of necessity begins to create what one 
may call at least a ‘proto-nation’ and its users start to see all sorts of 
benefits in further retrenching the use of the universal language in 
religion, government and education. 
 The Holy Scriptures, translated early on into Georgian and heard by people 
regularly in churches, helped the spread of Georgian and served as an instrument 
of nation formation. Georgian as well as non-Georgian sources confirm that all 
church services were held in Georgian (Rayfield 2000: 11). Consequently, great 
importance was attributed to the standard Georgian of Christian texts and the 
church service in promoting Georgian ethnonational consciousness. The religious 
identity of Georgians was not just about Orthodox Christianity, but Orthodox 
Christianity preached in Georgian. Thus, the status of lingua sacra was an 
additional salient marker of Georgian identity. It indeed became a decisive factor 
and a major instrument for the development of a sense of nationhood. This was not 
a spontaneous process, but, as shown above, a joint effort of religious figures and 
the supreme political rulers, under whose direct supervision the process of 
language planning and policy was accelerated and Georgian consciousness 
constructed (Chkhartishvili 2006a: 91). Their effort resulted not only in acquiring 
the status of lingua sacra, but also facilitated the development of a standard variety 
with a new symbolic function of marking national identity, thus strengthening the 
related process of nation-building. 
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Indeed one of the strengths of the ethnosymbolist approach lies in the 
ability to explain why some ethnic groups choose to assimilate or integrate into 
other ethnies. Knowing that a sacred, prestigious language of culture exists, 
strongly motivates people to learn it. Georgian, with its developed literary and 
educational traditions and status as lingua sacra, could play the role of a lingua 
franca as well. As the language of the powerful group and as the sacred and 
prestigious language, Georgian was put forward as the binding element of the 
ethnic élites, which accepted kartveloba as a linguistic, territorial and largely 
religious community and identity. It not only offered more cultural or socio-
political opportunities to noblemen, higher clergy, military officials and rich 
merchants of all ethnic groups, but only those who had mastered Georgian could 
exercise power and influence in the country. By the eleventh century, Georgia’s 
political, military and economic élite consisted of representatives of many different 
ethnic groups who accepted Georgian as ‘their own’, integrated into the Georgian 
state through it and for whom standard Georgian became a symbolic code of 
kartveloba. Non-Georgian (Armenian, Kurdish, Ossetian, Abkhaz and other 
ethnic) élites not only expressed their thoughts in Georgian, and communicated 
with each other and with God in Georgian, but also shared political loyalty and 
served Georgia. Kartveloba was no longer the preserve of the right genes or 
common descent, but acquired a broader meaning to designate a wider cultural 
community and identity (Narkvevebi III 1979: 370), not just the demarcation of an 
ethnie as in previous times. It was determined by cultural characteristics, 
particularly language, the relevance of which had increased as the basic component 
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of nationhood. Having these functions, Georgian in the Middle Ages can be 
compared to the national languages of modern times. 
3.2 Language and identity in medieval Georgia  
Chapter 2 emphasised that by adopting an ethnosymbolist approach, this study 
distinguishes nations from nation-states and concentrates not only on the political 
dimensions of nations, but also on their cultural content, considering ethnic and 
national identities mainly as models of collective cultural identities. Unlike 
Marxist-Leninist analysts, who also consider culture to be important for nation-
formation, ethnosymbolism does not view ethnic and national identities as stages 
of historical development and does not tie them to social constructions and class 
struggle. For ethnosymbolism, these identities are more complicated phenomena. 
Ethnic categories, ethnies and nations are forms of collective cultural identity 
distinguished by the level of incorporation and self-identification of people (see 
section 2.1.2). Soviet scholarship (which referred to the dominant groups of the 
union republics as nations and other groups as nationalities) considered Jews to be 
a nationality, not a nation, since they did not occupy a ‘homeland’ within the 
Soviet Union. A. D. Smith considers Jews to be an example of an ethnie of ancient 
times. Such ethnies at first sight resemble, but are not, nations (Armstrong 2004: 
11). According to ethnosymbolism, in some cases, it is possible to look at the 
development of cultural identity from an ethnic category to a nation as an 
uninterrupted line (see section 2.2.1). Despite changes over time, the core of 
cultural identity remains constant and self-identical. This cultural core includes 
myths, memories and symbols of the nation. 
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When speaking of myths, memories and symbols of nations, A. D. Smith 
(1991: 25) defines the meanings of these concepts. Myths refers to ancient stories 
used to describe the origin of a given people and their destiny; memories refer to 
the ability to remember events, shared experiences, values and to express them 
with a collective name, common ancestor, history, territory and solidarity; symbols 
refer to people, things and events that prove the shared culture of these people. 
Mythology, symbolism and memories acting as ‘deep resources’ play a vital role in 
the longue durée of cultural communities and identities and later become sacred 
foundations of nations (see section 2.2.3), but before the emergence of nations they 
are essential for the survival of ethnic groups. 
The goal of this section is to show how the contemporary Georgian nation 
is a product not only of modern nationalism, but also of the ideology of the Middle 
Ages, when the cultural foundations for nation-building were laid. It will try to 
show that the nation-building process in Georgia started long before modern times 
and that Georgian nationalism has strong roots in pre-modern consciousness. 
Whether the degree of the consolidation and consciousness reached the degree of 
national identity is arguable. Many theorists of nationalism (Özkirimli 2000: 186) 
maintain that the degree of cohesion of ethno-religious formations of the Middle 
Ages could not form nations because they did not make claims to territory and 
there were no effective modern means of communication, therefore nationalism 
could not exist. This is one of the issues dividing the paradigms of nationalism 
discussed in section 2.2. Is it legitimate to speak about a pre-modern ‘nation’ and 
‘nationalism’ in Georgia in the eleventh-thirteenth centuries? Part of the discussion 
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will involve exploring ethnic ties and sentiments and the pre-modern ideology of 
the ‘invention’ of a nation. 
The evidence coming from Georgian historical chronicles and literature 
suggests that national consciousness appeared among the educated classes and was 
articulated first in the tenth century. Cultural homogenisation generating national 
consciousness was closely linked to the rise of a strong state and was rooted in 
three concepts: language, faith and homeland. Starting from the tenth century, a 
collective cultural identity of the Georgians was developed and strengthened in 
such a way that in the eleventh to thirteenth century the Georgians, possessing a 
new form of collective consciousness, formed a pre-modern nation. The dynasty 
and the church, the two pre-modern institutions that were able to provide 
institutional foundations for ethnic allegiances (Özkirimli 2000: 184), worked in 
unison for the political consolidation of an ethnically, territorially, religiously and 
linguistically unified population forging loyalty to the dynasty and entrusting the 
people with a new destiny. By the twelfth century a significant amount not only of 
religious but also of historiographical literature existed. Old Georgian 
historiography used all the methods of modern scholarship in defining the 
boundaries of the community, outlining and cultivating the sense of uniqueness 
and the sacred mission of a nation, engendering an ethnic core upon which a nation 
could be built. Section 3.2.1 looks at the role of medieval historians in forging the 
nation.  
Section 3.2.2 looks at language ideas and myths in old Georgia which seem 
to be the most powerful myths for Georgians. In the Georgian context, language 
appears also to be the strongest marker, a symbol of political, territorial and 
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religious unity. Together with other ‘deep resources’ of the Georgian nation, the 
idea of divine election through language was elaborated and cultivated by the 
educated Georgian élite in the Middle Ages and then rediscovered and revived in 
modern times. Section 3.2.3 examines the features that prove the existence of a 
community in Georgia in the Middle Ages with more of the features of nationhood 
than most groups at the threshold of the twentieth century: it was a named 
population with a strong sense of homeland occupying historic territory, it had 
myths of descent and several myths of election, shared historical memories, 
common linguistic and religious culture, mass common culture (such as religious 
practice), common laws and rights, and an effective government (dynasty). 
3.2.1 Myths, memories and symbols of the Georgian nation 
After being fragmented by the Arab and Seljuk invasions, the Georgian lands were 
reintegrated again into a strong feudal state in the tenth century and a new royal 
dynasty, the Bagrationi, emerged. This dynasty signalled the revival of Georgian 
statehood, a task which required a new ideological foundation (Lerner 2004: 77): 
this foundation was laid by the writings of Georgian intellectuals of the time. For 
all its political, social and cultural achievements, the period from the rule of David 
the Builder until the end of Tamar’s rule is widely termed Georgia’s Golden Age 
or the Georgian Renaissance (Baramidze & Gamezardashvili 1968: 140). More 
importantly, this is the epoch when the cultural foundation for the emergence of a 
nation was laid down as a result of a new ideology adopted by political rulers, 
whose goal was to create a fairly homogeneous and loyal community which could 
attain and keep political independence. This ideology was strongly supported by 
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the educated élite, especially historians, who started selecting and reinterpreting 
past values and virtues, rediscovering and reconstructing often exaggerated 
heroism of past ages and an ancestral civilisation. 
Ethnosymbolism considers the important role of historians in forging 
national identities (see section 2.2.3). Modernists also admit that nationalism 
sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations (Gellner 1983: 
48). Halliday (2000: 167) considers writing history to be ‘central to nationalism 
[…] in the way it presents the origins of cultures and moral communities’. 
Although this is said about historians of modern times, it is also true of the first 
Georgian historians. Nationalist historians of modern times enquire into the ethnic 
past and link it to a sense of collective destiny. The Old Georgian historians did the 
same. They discovered the shared national past, the heroes of the nation, religious 
and military leaders, told stories of the collective past experience of the Georgians 
including the history of wars, foundations of cities and states, dynasties and their 
kings; they provided the sense of collective memories and evoked blood ties, 
beliefs, myths, sentiments and symbols and strong attachments among the 
members of the community, who spoke the same language and prayed to God in it. 
Among intellectuals of the time, the role of the eleventh century historian 
Leonti Mroveli was especially important. In his mepeta tskhovreba (The Life of 
Kings) Mroveli identifies the glorious ancestry with the particular territory and the 
particular community, which survived over many generations.
19
 Mroveli is a 
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 Mepeta tskhovreba is incorporated in the most important Georgian chronicles kartlis tskhovreba 
(The Life of Georgia) (1955). 
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‘nationalist’ historian in the sense that he attempts to awaken the community to its 
true collective ‘self’, identity, authenticity, unity and fraternity through the 
inclusion of the required attributes of national identity – common ancestry, shared 
history, language, symbols, heroes, myths and so on. This is how Herder started 
‘rediscovering the “collective self” in order to ascertain the authentic identity 
beneath the alien accretions of the centuries’ (A. D. Smith 1991: 75). And just as 
the nationalist ideal of unity has had profound consequences for European civic 
nations (A. D. Smith 1991: 76), Mroveli’s ideology had strong consequences for 
the formation of the early Georgian nation. While Western civic nationalism and 
nations are products of the bourgeoisie, the early Georgian nation owes much to 
the feudal aristocratic culture and the activities of Mroveli, other religious figures 
and the intellectual élite in the formation of an ethnocultural nation. All the 
markers of a nation which Mroveli emphasised, A.D. Smith (1991: 12) finds in 
ethnic nations: ‘Genealogy and presumed descent ties, mobilization, vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions: these are the elements of alternative, ethnic 
conception of the nation’. 
Mroveli’s goal is to incorporate certain features of the earlier ethnie into the 
model of kartveloba of his time. In order to prove the continuity of kartveloba, he 
brings together a variety of evidence – mythological (especially for the pre-
Christian period), linguistic, military, administrative, architectural, religious and 
social — and suggests a certain pattern of formation of the Georgian ethnie. By 
claiming a pre-existing cultural heritage, he does what A. D. Smith (1991: 65-66) 
calls ‘furnishing maps’ of the community, its origin and history, destiny and 
morality, through the use of history and the cult of the Golden Age. In section 
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2.2.3, it was said that not all communities can appeal to a great past or Golden 
Age, as their history is either poorly recorded or not recorded at all. The ‘better 
documented and more comprehensive a golden age, the more impact it can exert 
over later generations and epochs of that community’ (A. D. Smith 1996a: 583). 
Thanks to Mroveli, Georgian nationalists of modern times could turn to a well-
recorded and rich ethno-history with several Golden Ages. 
The first one is the epoch of Parnavaz (believed to have lived 299-234 BC) 
who, according to Mroveli, founded a unified state, military and administrative 
power, and Mtskheta, the military-administrative centre and the major trading 
artery. Before the unification there were two states on Georgia’s territory – Colchis 
(Egrisi) in the western part and Iberia (Kartli) in the eastern part (Braund 1996), 
first mentioned in Greek and Eastern historical and literary sources between the 
twelfth and eighth centuries BC and in Greek mythology in the fifteenth century 
BC (Chkhartishvili 2003).  According to Mroveli, after the unification of the two 
kingdoms in the third century BC, Parnavaz encouraged the consolidation of 
separate tribes into a larger ethnic conglomerate and took several important steps 
in order to unify the country and to gain political control over the unified territory 
which he had divided into eight administrative units.
20
  Among other steps, he put 
Georgian in a privileged position by forbidding the official use of any other 
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 ‘The king appointed a military governor (eristavi) to each of the seven major provinces (Argveti, 
Kakheti, Gardabani, Tashir-Abotsi, Javakheti-Kolas-Artani, Samtskhe-Ajara, and Klarjeti) while 
keeping the central district of Shida Kartli under the administration of his highest official, the 
spaspeti [. . .]  At the top of society stood the royal family, the military nobility, and the pagan 
priesthood’ (Suny 1998: 12). 
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language. Thus, governors and state institutions became instruments not only for 
administrative centralisation, but also for linguistic unification. According to the 
same source, during the reign of Parnavaz, six languages were spoken in Georgia 
(Georgian, Armenian, Khazar, Assyrian,
21
 Hebrew and Greek), but the king 
‘expanded Georgian, and no other language than Georgian was spoken in Georgia’ 
(Mroveli 1955a: 26). From a linguistic point of view, it is absurd to consider that 
no other languages were spoken at that time in Georgia, but by saying this, Mroveli 
underlines that the king’s decision to strengthen Georgian and forbid other 
languages in state institutions showed his political goal of integrating people of 
different origins and speakers of other languages into a common Georgian culture. 
The imposition of Georgian as an official language by Parnavaz upon his 
population (if such a thing took place) was most certainly dictated by the needs of 
effective governance, but Mroveli’s words indicate Parnavaz’s pride in reinforcing 
the status of Georgian and his appeal to linguistic ‘nationalism’. The significance 
of the expansion of the Georgian language and its official status granted by 
Parnavaz is also emphasised by another Georgian historian, geographer and 
cartographer of the eighteenth century, Vakhushti Batonishvili (1696-1757), in his 
Description of the Kingdom of Georgia (Batonishvili 1973). Although his work is 
about the medieval Georgian Kingdom, he finds it necessary to underline 
Parnavaz’s role in the development of the Georgian language and follows Mroveli: 
Parnavaz, the first king of Georgia, spread the Georgian language, so that no other 
language would be spoken besides Georgian, and Parnavaz invented the Georgian 
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script (Batonishvili 1973: 57). This source of the Georgian script is also claimed by 
Mroveli, who notes that Parnavaz ordered the writing of historical chronicles for 
the newly created state and either created an alphabet or made official one that 
already existed (Mroveli 1955a: 26). However, archaeological evidence does not 
support the assertion that Parnavaz created the Georgian script (see section 3.1.1). 
Whether he really did or not is not of decisive importance in this case. The 
important fact is that Mroveli has a clear understanding of the political significance 
of a language and an alphabet and connects the emergence of the script to the first 
king of Georgia; in other words, he considers that the graphisation of a language is 
related to the creation of a state. More importantly for understanding the 
development of kartveloba, he links language and alphabet, together with other 
markers (discussed below), to the emergence of the Georgian ethnie. This ethnie 
was a language community comprised of different ethnic groups and tribes, united 
by state power, which did not allow the linguistic pluralism of previous times and 
ensured an unambiguous polity by adopting a state language. According to A. D. 
Smith (1991: 26-27), the foundation of a unified polity plays a major role in the 
development of a sense of ethnic community and, ultimately, of a ‘cohesive’ 
nation. As will be shown later in this thesis, the collective sentiments and 
perception of language and territory of Parnavaz’s times were later employed in 
historical and symbolic terms to instil a sense of continuity from generation to 
generation. 
Mroveli, who, for each epoch of Georgian history that he describes, writes 
not only about politics and language, but also about confessional issues, underlines 
that Parnavaz was able to unite the country not only through the language of 
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communication and administration, but also in terms of religion. He notes that 
before the adoption of Christianity, Kartlosians (the term used by the historian to 
designate ethnic Georgians as opposed to non-Georgian ethnic groups in Georgia) 
worshipped Armazi, ‘God of Gods’. The idol of Armazi, considered to be 
Parnavaz himself, was erected in the centre of a newly built pantheon, while idols 
brought from different parts of former kingdoms stood on either side. Mroveli 
notes that loyalty to Armazi meant being kartveli (Chkhartishvili 2008: 223) and 
thus defines the boundaries of kartveloba by religion. The community of 
Georgians under Parnavaz occurs as a named population (Kartveli or Kartlosians) 
with their own territory (a state), a distinct language with an official status, and an 
official religion. For Mroveli, the Georgia of Parnavaz’s time is a multi-ethnic 
political entity. It is a country of more than one ethnicity. The author justifies the 
eradication of local differences on the official level because it served the interests 
of cultural and political homogeneity. Kartveloba is a dominant identity and its 
cultural content, most notably language, expresses its dominance. The powerful 
group, while imposing its language on less powerful groups, simultaneously 
offered equal socio-political, economic and military opportunities to those who 
were fluent in the official language. Although, according to Mroveli, one of the 
significant changes under Parnavaz was religion, the formation of the Georgian 
ethnie was crowned by the establishment of a linguistic community, where no 
other languages were spoken. 
Thus, in Mroveli’s model of the development of an ethnie, it is possible to 
trace an ethnosymbolist model of the development of ethnic categories into an 
ethnie. ‘How does an ethnie form?’, asks A. D. Smith (1991: 23) and suggests a 
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pattern which includes the coming together of separate units under one polity or 
the assimilation of different tribes. For Mroveli, the process of formation of the 
Georgian ethnie starts by bringing together different areas inhabited by the 
Kartvelian groups (descendents of Kartlos) under the united power of the 
Parnavazid dynasty. The founder of the dynasty is also a founder of an ethnie, 
because during his rule the boundaries and cultural content of Georgian identity 
and community changed. A. D. Smith (2003: 28-29) identifies a ‘typical’ format 
and structure for an ethnie, including elements such as a large mass of peasants in 
villages and a small urban stratum (rulers, administration, nobles and militaries), a 
stratum of religious figures and the existence of values, symbols and 
communication using mainly rituals of worship. Mroveli credits all of these 
characteristics to Parnavaz, who brought the two proto-Georgian kingdoms under 
his rule, turned Mtskheta
22
 into an advanced capital city, founded the royal 
Parnavazid dynasty, put the military nobility and the pagan priesthood at the top of 
society and ‘appointed a military governor [...] to each of the seven major 
provinces [...] while keeping the central district [...] under the administration of his 
highest official, the spaspeti’ (Suny 1998: 12). 
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 Mtskheta, located approximately 20 kilometres northeast of Tbilisi, is one of the oldest cities in 
the Caucasus. Archeological evidence reveals Mtskheta to have been an advanced city since 
Parnavaz’s rule. Because of the historical significance and numerous ancient monuments, 
outstanding examples of medieval religious architecture showing the high artistic and cultural level 




For ethnosymbolism, the subjective components of ethnic identity, such as 
myths, are very important, including the myths of origin and common ancestry (A. 
D. Smith 1991: 23). The resemblance between the ethnosymbolist model of the 
emergence of ethnies and Mroveli’s model becomes clearer when considering how 
Mroveli ties identity of community to the myths of origin and the importance of 
historical continuity. According to Mroveli, the legendary founder and eponymous 
father of Georgians was Kartlos, a descendent of Noah. In this way, the historian 
links the Urvater of the Georgian people to the Bible (Coppieters 2002: 89). This is 
understandable considering that Mroveli was a Christian chronicler, probably a 
bishop (Rayfield 2000: 54). Ethnicity, in the sense of collective cultural identity in 
the Christian world, is based on common ancestry. Genesis traces the division of 
humanity into different peoples back to the three sons of Noah. Kartlos was a great 
grandson of Japheth, Noah’s youngest son (Genesis 10: 3). The story of the Tower 
of Babel associates this ethnic division with linguistic division. It is since 
Mroveli’s time that the Georgians know who they are: a community of common 
descent and kinship. As Eriksen (2002: 1007) points out ‘[k]inship terms are 
frequently used in nationalist discourse’. The myths of origin and kinship are very 
powerful because they link different generations and create ‘imagined 
communities’. By evoking the mythological past and reminding the Georgians of 
their common heritage and kinship, Mroveli strengthened their sense of common 
cultural identity and of belonging to an ‘imagined community’, the sense of which 
can be based only ‘on the shared memories of experiences and activities of 
successive generations of a group distinguished by one or more shared cultural 
elements’ (A. D. Smith 1996a: 583). 
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Thus, Mroveli traces continuity between identities before his time and of 
his time by identifying ancestors. Smith (1998: 175) notes that the search for 
ancestors is part of the nationalist idea, which seeks to prove cultural authenticity 
and historical continuity. Descendents of Kartlos – Kartlosians (Georgians) had 
occupied the territory of Georgia from time immemorial. For Mroveli, this is the 
Georgians’ original habitat. Therefore the myth of origin and ancestral myths are 
tied with homeland myths. Mroveli’s message reads: it is our sacred land, ‘the land 
of our forefathers, our lawgivers, our kings and sages, poets and priests, which 
makes this our homeland’ (A. D. Smith 1991: 23). Thus, according to The Life of 
Georgia, the ethnic boundaries of kartveloba in the third century BC seem to be 
based on five concepts: ethnogenesis, territory, the myth of divine election (the 
new dynasty is started by Parnavaz who is the incarnation of the Armazi), religion 
(the Armazi cult) and the Georgian language. 
Georgians remained faithful to Armazi until the adoption of Christianity. A. 
D. Smith (1991: 24) underlines the importance of cultural content and cultural 
changes in the formation of an ethnie. As discussed in section 2.2.1, ethnic 
boundaries and content embraced by ethnies are perennial, but not immutable. 
Collective cultural identities change over time, although within certain limits (A. 
D. Smith 1991: 24), but at the same time remain continuous and self-identical. A 
shift in the boundaries of kartveloba happened with the adoption of Christianity as 
the second major step in the development of Georgian identity after Parnavaz’s 
reforms. Although there were Christians in Georgia from the first century, 
Christianity did not become an official religion until 326 (Binns 2002: 15-16). 
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In 326, Christianity was officially adopted by King Mirian (284-361) who, 
before the conversion, worshiped the cult of Armazi, considering himself a 
successor of Parnavaz’s legacy (Chkhartishvili 2003). In this period Georgia was at 
an ideological crossroads as the Roman Empire and Sassanid Iran were struggling 
for pre-eminence in Georgia. King Mirian made a political and cultural choice by 
adopting Christianity and turned an ethnically heterogeneous state into a unitary 
polity with common Christian values and culture into which local peculiarities 
were incorporated (Chkhartishvili 2003). In the beginning, this transethnic and 
cosmopolitan religion, containing perhaps some form of threat to already 
established ethnic markers, caused an intensification of ethnic sentiments and met 
some resistance from the population. Mirian and his son fought against paganism, 
destroyed old idols and spread Christianity by force (Suny 1998: 21, 38). Local 
peculiarities were incorporated into the new religion and it was transformed into 
the ideology of group solidarity soon after, as happened in many other places 
where Christianity was naturalised and fused with ethnicity (Chkhartishvili 2003). 
While causing the intensification of ethnic markers and sentiments against the 
threat coming from its trans-ethnic character, Christianity stimulated the 
emergence of nations (Hastings 1999b: 394). The myth of chosenness became the 
movement of the cultivation of the peculiar culture which had to be preserved in a 
particular vernacular, as shown below. Therefore, cultural change did not destroy 
the former identity but renewed and redefined it. 
The adoption of Christianity also changed the political orientation of 
Georgians. Most scholars (e.g. Chkhartishvili 2003; Alasania 2006) believe that 
the conversion of Georgia was, on the one hand, a result of missionary activities, 
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which started from the first century and became intense in the fourth century and, 
on the other hand, an expression of a political decision taken by the king, who 
hoped to use Christianity to form alliances with Rome against Persian aggression. 
The Persian empire was a dominating regional power in Mirian’s time and the 
Georgian community felt its deep cultural and political influence (Chkhartishvili 
2009a). In order to avoid merging Georgian with Persian cultural space, Mirian 
had to make a choice for a new political orientation for his kingdom. The 
geopolitical location of Georgia (situated at the crossroads of the West and the 
East), which was the second country to convert to Christianity after Armenia in 
324, positioned it in the frontier zone of Christian resistance to Islam throughout its 
history (Jones 1989: 171). 
According to The Conversion of Georgia by Mroveli (1955b), written as a 
biography of Saint Nino, the person who introduced Christianity to Georgia, the 
Armazi cult was very strong among Georgians in the pre-Christian period. 
Mroveli’s Conversion of Georgia is a reworked version of the original, composed 
by an anonymous author (Rayfield 2000: 50) using various sources some time 
between the actual date of the conversion itself and the tenth century (Gippert 
2006: 104). Linguistic analysis shows that ‘the text undoubtedly draws upon a 
considerably older oral and/or perhaps written tradition’ (Rapp & Crego 2006: 
171). Some scholars, for example Chkhartishvili (1987: 89), believe that it must 
have been created no later than the fifth century and might even have been written 
shortly after the conversion. In any case, it is the oldest single source containing 
very important information for the history of Georgian identity. First of all, it 
shows how ethnic boundaries of the Georgian in-group are defined. When 
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speaking about the pre-Christian period, Mroveli underlines the strength of this 
purely Georgian religion – the Armazi cult – which distinguishes Kartlosians from 
the rest of Georgia’s population. At the same time, he notes that Georgia was 
awaiting a saviour-messiah and King Mirian knew about it, as well as about the 
fact that two members of the Jewish community of Mtskheta had allegedly 
witnessed the crucifixion of Jesus, brought Jesus’s tunic to Mtskheta (‘the second 
Jerusalem’) and that Christ’s tunic was buried there: 
Elioz and all the Jews from Kartli [Georgia] went there [to 
Jerusalem]. And at the place they saw the Crucifixion of the Lord [. 
. .] And Elioz brought the tunic of our Savoir Jesus Christ to 
Mtskheta [. . .] he gave her [his sister] Christ’s raiment and she 
took and pressed [it] to her breast. And immediately her soul left 
her [. . .] Elios buried his sister with the tunic in her hands. 
(Conversion of Kartli 2004: 170-171) 
This fact, together with the traditional belief that several Apostles were buried in 
Georgia, prepared a solid basis for the advent of a widespread new religion in the 
country. According to Georgian ecclesiastical tradition, when the Apostles were sent 
out to preach Christianity throughout the world, the Holy Virgin – and Georgia is 
referred to as ‘Dedicated to the Theotokos’ (in other words, coming under the 
auspices of Virgin Mary) (Alasania 2006: 117) – gave her divine icon to Andrew the 
First-Called and sent him to Georgia, where he became the first preacher.
 23
 Andrew, 
                                                          
23
 The icon is kept in the National Museum of Art in Tbilisi. According to the Georgian church 
tradition, some other great relics were kept in Georgia: the Virgin’s robe, now in the museum of 
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who on his third visit to Georgia was accompanied by Simeon the Canaanite (or 
Simon the Zealot) and Matthias, established the very first episcopacy in Atsquri and 
appointed the first bishop, priests and deacon (Alasania 2006: 118). The same 
tradition asserts that Simeon and Matthias died in Georgia and are buried in present 
day Adjara and Abkhazia respectively.
24
 But Christianity did not officially spread 
throughout Georgia for another three centuries. 
These traditional beliefs turned into the first myths of election. Several 
different passages of the text (Mroveli 1955b: 123-124, 128, 129) reveal a belief in 
being chosen by God after the Jews lost his grace. The land where Christ’s tunic is 
buried as well as Elijah’s mantle, a vivid memory of which the Jewish Diaspora of 
Mtskheta seems to have preserved for four centuries, had been chosen by God for 
his Kingdom: ‘in this city [Mtskheta] is a marvellous sign, the garment of the Son 
of God, and they say that the mantle of Elijah is also here and that many miracles 
are here’ (Conversion of Kartli 2004: 173). The text also emphasises the fact that 
Jews in Mtskheta, who held a dominant position before the adoption of 
Christianity, from now on give up this dominant place to the Georgians. A very 
interesting fact noted by Chkhartishvili (2002) regarding the text is that storytellers 
in Conversion of Georgia are the Georgian ‘others’ – Jews, Armenians and Greeks, 
who are competitors of the Georgians in being ‘chosen people’. The author of the 
text considers it important to emphasise that all of these people acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                                                                
Zugdidi, and the icon of the Mother of God created by Luke the Evangelist, now in the National 
Museum of Art in Tbilisi (Alasania 2006: 117). 
24
 Some other sources also attest to the presence of the Apostles Bartholomew and Thaddeus. For 
more about the preachers in Georgia, see Dowling (2005). 
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burial of Christ’s tunic in Mtskheta. As for the story of Elijah’s mantle, it must be 
understood as a symbolic indication of the second coming, because, according to 
the Old Testament, Elijah, a prophet in Israel in the ninth century BC, did not die, 
but was lifted up to heaven and will return (Kittel et al 1985: 307). Chkhartishvili 
(2002) argues that the author of the text wanted to relate the Second Coming to 
Georgia by talking about Elijah’s mantle, on the one hand, and about Mtskheta as 
‘the second Jerusalem’, on the other. 
Mentioning Christ’s tunic and Elijah’s mantle in the same passage brings 
the Old and New Testaments together. This is an important fact, because, as 
Hastings (1999b: 389) argues, a belief in being chosen in the Western Christian 
tradition depends more directly on the Old Testament, while the Eastern one rests 
mainly upon the New Testament: 
In the West, far more than in the East, the road to an elect people lay 
across the Old Testament and the model of a chosen nation there 
presented, rather than the New, but also across the conception of the 
world as a society of nations witnessed to by New Testament texts 
[...] as well as Old Testament ones [...] While the New Testament 
offered little if any guidance about the nature of a nation, the Old 
Testament offered a great deal. 
Considering the power of election myths in the formation of national 
identities (see section 2.2.3), the early Christian version of being elected is very 
important in discussing the Georgian proto-nation. Mtskheta, where Saint Nino 
stayed after her arrival in Georgia, is marked out not only with the presence of the 
146 
 
tunic and mantle, but is also the location of a royal court and garden, called 
‘heaven’ in the Georgian text, where the first Georgian church is built. The word 
‘heaven’ in Georgian (samotkhe) is a compound word consisting of the  roots of 
‘three’ (sam) and ‘four’ (otkh). According to the Holy Scriptures, the Heavenly 
Kingdom has three gates on each of four sides: ‘There were three gates facing east, 
three north, three south, and three west’ (Revelation 21:13). Chkhartishvili (2002) 
suggests that calling the Royal garden heaven associates it with the Heavenly 
Kingdom, a New Jerusalem and a spatial co-ordinate of the second coming of the 
Messiah. The Messiah will come to Georgia and will judge in the Georgian 
language. It will be shown later in this chapter that in subsequent centuries there 
was a belief that a Georgian king would be the Messiah. Later still, the belief in 
being chosen in the Georgian case became associated with the Georgian language 
(see section 3.2.2). The myth of chosenness gave rise to a movement that sought in 
part to develop a specific culture preserved in a specific language. 
Mroveli, who understood the significance of language for an ethnie, again 
pays special attention to it at the time that Georgia became a Christian country, 
considering this time as a second Golden Age in Georgia’s history. King Mirian, 
according to Mroveli, was Persian by origin, but the historian notes that ‘[h]e loved 
the Georgians, forgot the Persian tongue, and learned the Georgian language’ 
(translated by Thomson 1996: 77). He became a Georgian and had Georgian 
consciousness, most importantly because he loved and knew only the Georgian 
language and because he was loyal to the cult of Armazi (the exclusive religion of 
the Kartlosians). ‘King Mirian increased the well-being of the Georgians’ 
(translated by Thomson 1996: 78) and they ‘were happy’ and considered Mirian to 
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be one of their own. As Jenkins (2003: 10) notes, ‘[s]hared language and ritual are 
particularly implicated in ethnicity’. Mroveli emphasised that his kartveloba was 
generated and confirmed through language. 
According to The Conversion of  Kartli , by the time of Christianisation 
under Mirian, the Georgian ethnie appears as a strongly established ‘imagined 
community’; Mirian belongs to this ‘imagined community’ and his ethnic origin 
does not matter. This is an ‘imagined community’ of Georgians because it includes 
not only contemporary members, but also ancestors and future generations. Many 
examples of such an understanding of a community related by blood include the 
following two passages: 1) in The testament to his son Rev and his wife Nana, 
which is a part of the text, Mirian speaks of the idols of previous times, instructs 
his son to destroy them: ‘From now on, whenever you find in your land these idols, 
the temptation of Georgia, burn them with fire and give the ashes to drink to those 
who mourn over them. And announce this to your sons’ (Conversion of Kartli 
2004: 193); and 2) Saint Nino, the introducer of Christianity to Georgians, 
speaking of the same idols in her address to native born people, calls them ‘the 
gods of your fathers’ (Conversion of Kartli 2004: 165). In this text, a community 
unified by the belief in common ancestry and cultural distinctiveness, thus an 
equivalent of ethnie, is referred to as natesavi (Chkhartishvili 2003), a term which 
in Old Georgian has several meanings: people, nation, kin, descendents, posterity 
(Rayfield 2006: 1048). For example, Mirian speaks of the Jewish community as of 
utskho natesavi – ‘foreign people/nation/kin’ (Mroveli 1955b: 87). Saint Nino, 
who was from Cappadocia, perceives Georgians as utskho natesavi. The term 
natesavi, to describe an ethnie, remained in use in later centuries and will be 
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discussed in relation with other terms used to describe ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ later 
in this thesis. 
One of the markers of in-group solidarity, and therefore a salient marker of 
an ethnie, is a collective ownership of property, most importantly of a land, which 
usually is regarded as God-given (see section 2.2.3). The power of a specific 
territory comes into play when space is a simultaneously historical, political and 
symbolic phenomenon. It must be noted that ‘[t]he relationship between people 
and land is the product over the longue durée of continual myth-making and the 
recitation of shared memories [...] The association is even stronger where the 
ethnie is also a community of believers, animated by a unifying faith and cult’ (A. 
D. Smith’s 1996a: 589). This argument is true for the community of Parnavaz’s 
time, as emphasised by Mroveli, as well as of Mirian’s time. When Saint Nino, 
before coming to Georgia, asks her teacher about the country to which she has 
been assigned to go, the land of the Georgians is described geographically, 
culturally and politically (Chkhartishvili 2002: 41). The teacher answers Nino’s 
question by saying that it is mountainous territory to the north of Armenia 
(geographical data), pagan (cultural data), and under Greek and Persian influence 
(political data) (Mroveli 1955b: 113). The community of the Georgians in 
Mroveli’s time collectively owns this property and their attachment to it is 
strengthened because it is also a sacred territory where several Apostles and first 
preachers are buried. The mission of a people united by faith and language must be 
realised in that special place. All possible territorial myths identified by A. D. 
Smith (1996a) as ‘deep resources’ of nations are brought together by Mroveli in 
the history of a single community: it is a place of origin, the scene of historic 
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events, battles and heroic deeds. It is a place which our ancestors defended 
collectively, where they spread their blood and where they are buried. Mroveli 
elaborated the myths of common origin of all Caucasians and explained how the 
concrete land came to belong to the Georgians. By emphasising the achievement of 
the ethnic past and outlining the authenticity of the Georgians on the given 
territory, Mroveli enforced also the feeling of a historic homeland. While exploring 
important events of the past, Mroveli emphasised also the history of Christianity in 
order to awake sentiments of solidarity in his fellow compatriots. This included 
listing several Apostles as contributors to the dissemination of Christianity in 
Georgia and the myths of election. According to Hastings (1999a: 196), writing the 
story of the baptism of a first king begins the Christian history of many peoples. 
The next step in the history of faith is claiming the divine mission according to the 
Old Testament paradigm which reinforces national identity and ensures its survival 
across the centuries (A. D. Smith 1991: 13). The election myths of newly 
Christianised Georgia were different from the pre-Christian period. They belong to 
the so-called Western model according to Hastings’ classification (1999b) and 
come directly from the Holy Scriptures. The election myths in Mirian’s period are 
based on several beliefs: 1) several apostles are buried in Georgia; 2) the royal city 
Mtskheta is a representation of heavenly Jerusalem; and 3) Elijah’s mantle and 
Christ’s tunic are kept in Mtskheta. The latter is the most important belief. Even 
today, it is the most significant fact in the history of the Georgian Church. But in 
Mroveli’s time, the Georgian nation was singled out by a different myth of 
election. Georgians were entrusted with a divine sacred mission, which had to be 
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realised through language. Section 3.2.2 discusses the most important myth for 
Georgians. 
3.2.2 The dominant myth: a special language for a special people 
As shown in section 3.1.1, the process of cultural crystallisation in the Middle 
Ages was linked to religion. Religion also stimulated the need for a new ideology 
taking into account several factors in Georgia’s past: the autocephalous church, a 
standard literary and sacred language and myths of election. Before looking at 
myths of election as the most powerful myths of nationhood, the importance of 
receiving autocephaly and language planning will be considered. 
Through the Eastern Christian tradition the Georgian Church became 
autocephalous, in other words, achieved international recognition and total 
ecclesiastical autonomy (Alasania 2006: 120) in 466, under King Vakhtang 
Gorgasali (447-522). It adopted the name of the Georgian Orthodox Church and 
maintained it until 1811 (Jones 1989: 173). The head of the Georgian Church 
received the title of Catholicos. Hastings (1999a: 196) notes that ‘[t]he total 
ecclesiastical autonomy of a national church is one of the strongest and most 
enduring factors in the encouragement of nationalism because it vastly stimulates 
the urge to tie all that is strongest in God’s Old Testament predictions for one 
nation and New Testament predilection for one church contemporaneously to one’s 
own church and people’. Hastings (1999b: 389) notes also the double effect of an 
autocephalous church: ‘On the one hand, it stimulated the development of a 
literary vernacular which stabilized a given community vis-à-vis everyone else. On 
the other hand, it provided a political textbook. A Christian kingdom standing very 
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much on its own naturally applied to itself everything that it could find in the 
experience of Israel’. When biblical texts are translated into a vernacular, they 
create a more conscious community (Hastings 1999a: 31) and provide a strong 
resource for cultural identification and a path to nationhood. A nation’s special 
mission and destiny applied to themselves according to the paradigm provided in 
the Bible – to become a chosen, holy nation and therefore to have a special 
mission, reinforces the process of identity formation. According to Safran (2008: 
172-173), while Christianity demands attachment to the nation, almost all early 
national identities developed from religious consciousness: ‘Loyalty to the nation 
was based on the belief that one’s nation was God’s chosen people’. Autocephaly 
of a church is distinguished by the fact that it provides the most systematic 
language planning. Hastings (1999b) sees the development of a belief in 
chosenness in the Eastern Christian world decisively determined by the translation 
of the Bible into vernacular languages and a church’s attaining the status of 
autocephaly. Language planning and myths of election have deep ideological 
consequences leading to a belief in a fully elect nation, as a true successor of 
Israel. These are some of the conditions for creating a pre-modern nation. In the 
Georgian case, they are closely tied to other deep resources of nationhood such as 
myths of origin, myths of homeland and language myths. After introducing 
Georgian religious services, a new force appeared – the Christian doctrine 
preached in Georgian. Since then, the use of the Georgian language in liturgy 
ensured the further unification of all ethnic entities and reinforced ties between the 
political centre and the peripheries. 
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In the seventh century a new religion sprang up in the Arab Peninsula and 
Georgia was subjected to Arab invasion (Alasania 2006: 121). This was what A. D. 
Smith (1991: 25) calls a disruptive cultural change. The Georgian chronicler of the 
eighth  century Ioane Sabanisdze (1981: 120) describes the situation in Georgia 
with grief that ‘many of those who betrayed Christ were tempted and misled from 
the Path of the Truth, some by force and lies, others by the inexperience of 
adolescence and by evildoing’, but, at the same time, he declares proudly that the 
majority of Georgians remained ‘devoted to the only begotten Son of God with 
love and fear of Christ, responsibility to the motherland, with patient grief and 
sorrows’. The author views religion as an instrument of homogeneity which was 
strong through the centuries and helped the Georgians to survive. It renewed the 
sense of common identity and, in fact, crystallised kartveloba. At this time, the 
western Georgian Church was subordinated to Constantinople, but in the ninth 
century, divine service in Greek gave way to Georgian, which at that time was the 
native tongue of the overwhelming majority of the population in the western part 
of the country, previously dominated by the speakers of other Kartvelian 
languages. Georgian speakers, escaping the Arab invasion of eastern Georgia, cut 
right into the middle of this territory and separated Zan speakers into two groups 
(now Megrelians and Laz). Since then, the majority of the population of what is 
now Imereti and Guria, are Karts, mixed with local inhabitants who soon mastered 
the Georgian language (Danelia 2006: 18-19). 
The ecclesiastical union of a disintegrated Georgia was followed soon by 
the political unification of western Georgian lands with the south and east (except 
Tbilisi, which was liberated only in 1121) under the rule of Bagrat III (975-1014), 
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the king of Abkhazia and later (after 1008) the king of Georgia (Suny 1998: 32).
25
 
Bagrat’s policy was supported by the Georgian Church, under the jurisdiction of 
which came other parts of Georgia (Lordkiphanidze 1987). Georgia was no longer 
simply a territory, but a community of faith ministered in the Georgian language. 
The united kingdom was called Sakartvelo (Alasania 2004), literarily ‘a place for 
Georgians’. It is a more inclusive term than Kartli, considering that Kartveli, just 
like in the early Christian period, did not carry an ethnic meaning, while Kartli was 
a collectivity of Karts related by blood. After establishing religious services in 
Georgian, religious identity appealed across ethnic boundaries, Christ’s message 
was universal and so was the Georgian language. Religious identity coincided with 
linguistic and territorial identity. The Georgians occupied a clearly identifiable 
territory, possessed a distinctive Orthodox culture and spoke a common and unique 
language which set them apart from other Christian and non-Christian peoples. 
As shown earlier in this chapter, a considerable corpus of original and 
translated literature was created in the Georgian language, which in the tenth 
century acquired a divine mission. The status of an official, standardised literary 
sacred language has great power to forge cultural homogeneity and play a vital role 
                                                          
25
 Modern Georgian and Abkhaz scholars disagree about the issue of the ethnic origin of the ruling 
family of the Abkhazian Kingdom, although Abkhazian historians agree that the great majority of 
the kingdom’s population was Kartvelian (Shirelman 2000: 57). Historical sources do not give 
information on the ethnic origin of Abkhaz kings, but according to their state and religious politics 
they were Georgian kings. The kings Leon II (758-798), Theodos II (798-825), Demetre II (825-
861), Georgi I (861-868), Konstantine III (893-922), Giorgi II (922-957) and Leon III (957-967) 
showed the strong determination for Georgia’s political and religious unification (Akhaladze 2004), 
which was fulfilled under Bagrat III.  
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in the formation and preservation of the nation. Schiffman (2004: 74) notes that 
‘[i]n linguistic cultures with ancient religious traditions, especially textual 
traditions, there are often ideas about language’. Georgia is no exception, but a 
special case in which a language myth at the same time is one of the myths of 
election. In the Georgian case, the idea of nationhood was strongly supported by 
the messianic idea expressed by the hymnographer of the tenth century, Ioane 
Zosime, who outlines the sacred mission of the chosen people, for ‘[t]o be chosen 
[…] is to be singled out for special purposes by, and hence to stand in a unique 
relation to the divine’ (A. D. Smith 2004a: 48). Considering how deeply religious 
figures were involved in the development of language and culture, giving central 
importance to the purification and equalisation of Georgian with Greek, it is not 
surprising that the strong tendency to spiritualise the concept of speakers of this 
language as ‘chosen people’ took a definite shape. Zosime, in his Praise and 
Glorification of the Georgian Language, draws a sense of the uniqueness of the 
Georgian language and relates it to the destiny of the nation, reassuring his people 
that Georgia will see the days of Glory: 
  Buried in the Georgian language 
  As a martyr until the day of the Messiah’s coming, 
So that God may look at every language 
Through this language. 
And so the language is sleeping to this day. 
And in the Gospels this language 
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Is called Lazarus. 
[...] 
Every secret  
Is buried in this language. 
[...] 
And this language 
Beautified and blessed by the name of the Lord, 
Humble and afflicted, 
Awaits the day of the second coming of the Lord. (Translated by 
Rayfield 2000: 33-34) 
Taking into account the importance of myths of ethnic election for survival 
and nation formation, the cultivation of such a myth can be expected when a new 
ideology is founded. According to A. D. Smith (1996a: 587), one of the functions 
of myths of election is to offer to the members of a community a chronological 
scheme of status reversal: ‘The elect may be persecuted now and subjects today; 
but in time their sufferings will be recognized and their virtue rewarded. They will, 
in the end, triumph over their enemies and attain the goal of their journey in 
history’. Entrusted by the mission of their language, the Georgians could look to 
their future status. In this way the language, together with religion, demarcated the 
boundaries of the nation. 
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Just as Fichte identified standard German as the most precious thing and 
superior to all other languages (Kamusella 2001: 238), centuries earlier Zosime 
preached the superiority and virtue of Georgian and the Georgians. 
The belief in a national (religious, moral) mission in the Georgian case 
coincides with the mission of the language. This happened nowhere else in Europe 
at such an early date (Law 2000: 181). The idea of a special destiny for Georgians 
through their language was renewed, restored and rediscovered under different 
conditions at different times in Georgia’s history, as shown later in this thesis. It 
inspired nineteenth and twentieth century nationalists, for whom the purity of the 
Georgian language together with Georgian Orthodoxy constituted evidence of 
Georgia’s chosenness and the mission of the Georgian nation. The sharp boundary 
established by this belief justified a program of self-purification by modern 
nationalists, which entailed excluding and segregating outsiders through language. 
Understanding the continuing role of this pre-modern consciousness is crucial for 
explaining modern Georgian nationalism as discussed further in this thesis. The 
next section, however, summarises the ideology behind the emergence of this 
consciousness and tries to answer the question of whether or not the Georgians 
constituted a nation in the Middle Ages. 
3.2.3 Pre-modern nation? 
The tenth century seems to be a turning point in Georgia’s history, not only 
because it is Zosime’s and Merchule’s epoch, but also because the Bagrationi 
dynasty emerged in this century — the dynasty which gave rise to an unbroken 
ruling line until the incorporation of Georgia into Russia in 1801. 
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After the tenth century, the assertion of chosenness was enriched with 
certain other myths of election: the myth that Georgia comes under the aegis of the 
Virgin Mary, which existed before in oral tradition and in religious arts, entered 
the writings of Georgian intellectuals (Bezarashvili 2004; Machabeli 2004) and, 
more importantly, with a new dynastic myth, first articulated in the eleventh 
century by Sumbat Davitis-dze, claiming that the Bagrationi royal family 
descended directly from the Israelite King-Prophet David, and therefore was 
uniquely suited to rule (Sumbat Davitis-dze 1955). The main goal of Sumbat 
Davitis-dze’s Life and Known Facts about the Bagratid Kings (ca. 1030) seems to 
be the legitimisation of the dynasty’s authority, given by God (Sumbat Davitis-dze 
1955: 376), to rule in Transcaucasia. 
Soon after establishing their rule, the title of the Bagrationi kings changed 
to ‘king of kings’ (Sumbat Davitis-dze 1955: 382). As discussed in section 3.2.1, 
Georgia had been awaiting the Messiah since the fourth century. From the tenth 
century, Georgians believed that he would judge in the Georgian language. All the 
divine signs showed that God had a special attitude towards the Georgians and, 
with the emergence of the Bagrationi dynasty as descendents from the biblical king 
David, that divinity was embodied in real individuals (Chkhartishvili 2003). The 
Georgians were ‘chosen’ because, in addition to other signs, their kings were 
destined to govern and the Messiah would be a Georgian king. When the medieval 
Georgian kingdom became one of the pre-eminent powers of the Eastern Christian 
world under David the Builder, his sword was engraved with the inscription 
‘Sword of the Saviour’. A copper coin of his time was engraved with ‘King of 
Kings, David, son of George, Sword of the Messiah’. Later Queen Tamar was 
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conceived as ‘the incarnation of the Holy Spirit and the place of her son’s birth 
was called ‘Bethlehem’, while the Georgian kingdom was described as Paradise 
on Earth by Georgian chroniclers and historians (Chkhartishvili 2003). 
The Bagrationi dynasty united all the Georgian lands. These were the lands 
where people prayed in Georgian, where the saints, apostles and many Christian 
relics were buried. Hence, this was the dynasty under which the three concepts 
(language, faith, and homeland) were combined. According to A. D. Smith (1996c: 
453-4), ‘to become national, shared memories must attach themselves to specific 
places and definite territories. The process by which certain kinds of shared 
memories are attached to particular territories so that the former become ethnic 
landscapes (or ethnoscapes) and the latter become historic homelands, can be 
called “territorialization of memory”’. A. D. Smith also notes that ‘[i]t was only in 
the late medieval and early modern periods that the territorialisation of memory 
began to influence the ways in which some states became increasingly congruent 
with their dominant ethnies’. A similar process of nation-formation in the late 
Middle Ages can be discerned in French, English and some other European 
histories (A. D. Smith 1991: 55-58). They are seen in Georgia during the zenith of 
the feudal period, several centuries earlier than in Western Europe. The awareness 
of language as a boundary marker of a geographical and religious community was 
elaborated long before the enlightenment age in Europe. In section 2.2.3, it was 
claimed that one of the differences between ethnic and national identities is that 
ethnicity does not demand command over the land, whereas a nation holds that 
political boundaries should be the same as cultural boundaries: this nation belongs 
here and nowhere else. 
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Attempting to match this linguistic community to a political unit was first 
expressed in the tenth century by the outstanding Georgian writer Giorgi Merchule 
(1981: 279): ‘Georgia is the whole of a country where church services are 
performed in Georgian and people pray in Georgian’. Merchule issued a definition 
for Georgia as a geographic, religious and linguistic area: each individual 
worshipper offers up the prayer in Georgian and through this act unites in one 
‘whole country’. At the same time, Merchule uses the unifying effect of language 
and religion to express a political claim: Georgia is a country bounded by linguistic 
identity. Considering that this is the language to which the divine mission of the 
Georgians is linked (by Zosime, also in the tenth century) and that this is the only 
land where the nation can fulfil its destiny and perform its mission, the importance 
of national territory or land becomes more obvious. The Georgians saw the 
realisation of their mission on this particular land and in this particular language 
with this particular faith for centuries. Taken separately, language, religion and 
homeland are powerful markers of community and identity, but in the Georgian 
case they coincide. For the Georgians it was not just Christianity, not just 
Orthodoxy, but Orthodoxy preached in Georgian on Georgian land that they would 
fight and die for. Merchule’s definition shows that these three concepts are not 
isolated from each other, but are closely tied together. With his definition, 
Merchule combined cultural identity with territorial community, in other words he 
gave territory a larger political, cultural and religious importance. He extended the 
meaning of a territory into a linguistic and religious identity and defined an 
‘imagined community’ as the whole country where they pray in Georgian. Thus he 
recognised the power of language and its symbolic significance in controlling the 
160 
 
country and achieving ethnic integration. At the same time, his definition, based on 
faith, language and territory, served to differentiate Georgia from its neighbours, 
where language is singled out as a basis of faith and territorial claim. 
In Merchule’s time, many ethnicities lived in Georgia and his words should 
be understood not as an attempt to designate ethnic boundaries, but as a political 
statement made by the élite of a dominant ethnie, whose sacred language was a 
political (official) and cultural language, standardised and modernised, and 
therefore could function in all domains. The native speakers of this language 
sought a link between all ethnic groups and the state through the idea of unified 
language as a prominent marker of culture and political borders. Consolidation of 
power in a strong sovereign state, as well as legal developments discussed in 
section 3.1.3, made the emergence of such a link possible. Thus, during the zenith 
of Georgia’s statehood, the assimilationist policy through language, religion and 
territory was formed among the elite of the multinational empire. It embedded an 
official symbolism of unity, representing the interests of one particular ethnic 
group over minority groups. It should be emphasised that Georgia at that time was 
an empire and not a nation-state, and that the assimilation did not take place across 
the empire, which remained an ethnic hierarchy based on military and economic 
domination. Apart from standardised laws, regular tributes and military 
conscriptions, the mass were permitted to retain their local customs and ethnic 
minorities their language and religion (Gachechiladze 1995: 22). 
A close look at this pre-modern ideology shows the link between an 
ethnicity and a nation. It is an ideology designed to create an ‘imagined 
community’ through linking a dominant ethnie and its interests to a state, which is 
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possible if a common language exists. Eriksen (2002: 99) notes that according to 
most nationalisms, political unity should be ethnic in character because it 
represents the interests of a particular cultural group. This must be a wider group 
than a kinship-based community. In the Georgian case on the élite level this 
ideology represented everybody’s interest and, as shown above, the minority élites 
were not denied access to power if they accepted the Georgian language as their 
own official and sacred language. Through the language of education, prestige and 
power, Georgia was able to develop harmony among those ethnic élites and 
offered a membership into a new kind of group – not just kinship, but a political-
cultural identity which resembled national identities of the modern era.  Thus, the 
term Georgian acquired the sense of a cultural and political identity of a 
community. 
Many modernist theorists of nationalism, such as Gellner and Anderson, 
stress that nations are ideological constructions seeking to forge a link between a 
(self-defined) cultural group and a state (Eriksen 2001: 99), but they diminish the 
historical depth of such constructions. They do not recognise the ideologies of pre-
modern times as nationalist, although in some cases (among them in Georgia), the 
ideology of an educated élite aimed to create a nation whose main referents are 
similar to those of modern times. A. D. Smith (1991: 78) identifies the sentiments 
and aspirations that nationalist ideology evokes: territory, history and community. 
The community in Georgia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was a community 
united by the elements of national identity identified by A.D. Smith (1991: 13-14): 
‘[t]hey include the idea that nations are territorially bounded units of population 
and that they must have their own homelands; that their members share a common 
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mass culture and common historical myths and memories.’ There is no clear 
evidence that the whole population of Georgia of the time felt, or did not feel, that 
they belonged to a nation. What is clear is that Georgia was a territorialised 
sovereign community, whose élite and at least a part of whose middle class had a 
clear, cultivated sense of collective identity vis-à-vis others. This brings us back to 
the problem of defining the concept of the nation and the question of ‘when is a 
nation?’. A.D. Smith argues that the modern nation and nationalism are recent 
phenomena, but he argues for the need for a historical analysis of specific nations. 
Such analyses reveal that certain processes and characteristics of modern nations 
could be found in the Middle Ages among specific communities. For example, 
during the zenith of the Georgian empire, the educated elite saw the kingdom as 
the true successor of ancient Israel and viewed kartveloba as a culturally unique 
community of common descent attached to the royal family. Here, we cannot 
speak of a modern nation, but we certainly can find a community of law and 
language, providing the conditions for the emergence of modern nations. First of 
all because, standardised laws and uniform legal institutions are crucial for the 
formation of nations for they provide a ‘roof of unity and solidarity among group 
members (A.D. Smith 2008: 39). Second, because, later in history, nationalists 
speak of the ages when the community was prosperous and glorious, cultivating 
this ‘golden age’, which becomes the cultural foundation of the modern nation. 
This implies that the category of the nation emerged over the longue durée and the 
concept of the nation should be separated from the concept of the nation-state. 
Hastings (1999a: 25) rightly notes that for a nation to exist it is not necessary for 
everyone within it to be fully conscious of it. He cites examples of early modern 
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Europe where many of the peasantry had little sense of being part of a nation, as 
well as the American nation which, coming into existence in 1776 did not include 
black slaves or offer them a sense of belonging. Recalling the definition of a 
‘nation’ suggested in chapter 2, it is clear that at the zenith of feudal development, 
the Georgian community was not a community of legally equal citizens as in the 
case of modern nation-states.  Nor did mass literacy exist in this period, but all 
other elements of a nation were present. It was a different, older type of nation, 
where the bond among the ethnically heterogeneous population was derived from a 
common religion, language, written history and rich literature, and subjection to a 
king who exercised consolidated political power over a well-demarcated territory. 
It is not a modern secular western nation, but what A. D. Smith calls an aristocratic 
(élite or middle class) nation ‘with a distinct public culture, a historic sense of 
homeland, shared myths and memories, a clear self-definition, and standard laws 
and customs’ (A. D. Smith 2004b: 207). 
 In the eleventh-thirteenth centuries, language and religion in Georgia stood 
for a political community and most notably, language became the basis of a 
medieval nation. It was a Georgian world defined by a common language as a 
common feature of all groups in this land. The language was a distinctive 
characteristic of this population, which united and, at the same time, distinguished 
them from others. It was inclusive of different ethnicities and in this way it 
resembles the modern conception of nation in its efforts to find common cultural 
ground for nationhood. This is an idea voiced by Merchule: a lingua sacra is the 
foundation of political legitimacy. 
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Leading modernists, such as Gellner and Hobsbawm, maintain that ‘the 
idea possessing a distinctive language entails having a common collective identity 
is not present before modern times’ (Hutchinson 1999: 393). The Georgian case, 
however, confirms otherwise: the Georgians in the high feudal period constitute a 
collectivity of people whose sacred and cultural language is Georgian. At the same 
time, the Georgian language employs the symbolic role of distinguishing us from 
them. It is important because the national collective identity is constructed vis-à-vis 
others. Merchule gave language the emotional power, binding people to the 
territory which soon after Merchule’s time became known by a new name.  
Considering this meaning, the new name of the state Sakartvelo – ‘place for 
Georgians’ – was a place of all ethnic and religious groups who lived in this state 
(Muskhelishvili 1993: 373). If a century ago the Georgians claimed political unity, 
in the eleventh century the political entity by its name claimed unity among all 
residents. Despite such a political claim, the medieval Georgian nation can be 
called a cultural or linguistic nation, since its creation is largely founded upon 
language. 
Many modernists maintain that nationalism is a political ideology which 
‘emerged in early modern Europe because of a growing chasm between society 
and the modern state’ (see A. D. Smith 1996c: 447-448). They treat culture and old 
ethnic ties as secondary in the nation-building process. Ethnosymbolism sees 
nationalism more as a cultural phenomenon than as a political ideology. For 
example, according to A. D. Smith (1991: 99), ‘as a doctrine of culture and 
symbolic language and consciousness, nationalism’s primary concern is to create a 
world of collective cultural identities or cultural nations.’ Roshwald (2006: 11) 
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notes that claiming some form of cultural or political-territorial self-determination 
is the essence of nationalism and ‘wherever one finds a nation one is likely to find 
nationalism’. What does this mean? Can an ideology of the Middle Ages be 
considered nationalism? 
The ideology behind those claims is more than ethnic ideology, first of all 
because Merchule’s definition demarcates national boundaries: while ‘[e]thnic 
boundaries are not necessarily territorial boundaries’ (Eriksen 2002: 39), national 
boundaries are associated with territorial ones. Moreover, in his definition, 
language is not a marker of ethnic identity, but a marker of national identity. 
According to Joseph (2004: 162-3), the difference between these two kinds of 
identity is that ethnic identity focuses more on common descent than on political 
aspirations, whereas ‘national identity is focused on political borders and 
autonomy often justified by arguments centred on shared cultural heritage, but 
where the ethnic element is inevitably multiple’. And this is exactly what Merchule 
focuses on. Of course it is not a national identity in the modern sense of the term, 
since there was no idea of citizenship or conception of equal duties and rights; 
education was class-divided. But the unity was both political and cultural, and 
language defined the borders of the state.  Language was a cultural means of social 
life, therefore, a part of the claim of nationhood. Anderson (1983: 133) has 
emphasised the capacity of language to generate ‘imagined communities’ and build 
in effect particular solidarity as the most important thing about language. People 
totally unknown to each other imagine a community through language. Without a 
need to know everybody individually, language becomes a symbol of solidarity. 
The illiterate mass heard liturgy and prayer in Georgian and this played a crucial 
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role for producing ties beyond personal experience and formed an ‘imagined 
community’ of the Georgians. 
The ideology behind the assertion that language is a culturally, territorially 
and politically integrating force could be considered to be the pre-modern 
equivalent of linguistic/cultural nationalism or ‘early language ideology’, because 
it draws on the same kind of thought as the thought of Romantic thinkers who put 
forward standard German, the territorial spread of which demarcated the borders of 
Germany, as the binding element of the German nation (Kamusella 2001: 238). 
A. D. Smith (1991: 85) argues that it is extremely difficult to define not 
only what nationalism is, but also when this ideology emerged, therefore he 
concentrates ‘on the rise of nationalist concepts, language, myths and symbols’, 
finding ‘a growing interest in the idea of “national character”’ in the seventeenth 
century among small European educated classes. He brings the example of Lord 
Shaftesbury’s high opinion of British attainments and Jonathan Richardson’s 
comparison of the English with the ancient Greeks and Romans. Section 3.1.1 
discussed similar sentiments related to Georgia and the Georgian language in the 
Middle Ages. Especially Giorgi Mtatsmindeli’s words about the Georgians as 
guardians of the Orthodox faith express the early idea of ‘national character’ and 
assert the sense of national superiority. In general, the role of the intellectual élite 
in generating ‘national character’ and cultural identity, thus forging the process of 
nation-formation, cannot be overestimated, but as A. D. Smith (1991: 95) rightly 
concludes, such skills of intellectualism are not specific to the epoch of 
nationalism. The assertion that ‘we are who we are because of our historic culture’ 
(A. D. Smith 1991: 97) – culturally we are equal to Greeks, but morally we are 
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superior (Mtatsmindeli, Zosime) – are found in Georgia much earlier than 
modernity, as well as narratives of common origin, memories and traditions 
(Mroveli) and the claim to national territory and common culture (Merchule). 
This is not to claim that by the twelfth century the Georgians formed a 
nation in the modern understanding of this word, but the roots for national identity 
were put down. The ideology of political rulers and cultural figures in Georgia of 
that time might be the first example of culture manifested for political purposes. 
Later, after A. D. Smith’s three revolutions occur (1991: 61), the territorialisation 
of shared memories, myths and symbols became widespread and marked 
kartveloba in the modern era, when the nation gathered around the Georgian 
aristocratic ethnic core and incorporated the middle and lower classes. Which 
ethnic groups were incorporated and who were considered to be Georgians in the 
epoch of nationalism will be discussed in the next chapter. Before then, however, 
summarising the discussion, it is possible to conclude the following. 
By the twelfth century a Georgian aristocratic nation emerged. The 
population existed within a clearly demarcated territory and was the subject of a 
unitary administration. The pre-existing Georgian ethnie with its durable history, 
memories and myths of origin and election, as well as symbols, such as language, 
religion and territory, were key components of the pre-modern nation. However, 
the community of the Georgians did not coincide only with the Georgian ethnie. 
The claim of territorial, religious and linguistic unity, voiced by Merchule two 
centuries before, could be made by different ethnic groups. They were all 
Georgians territorially, religiously and linguistically. Unlike in Western Europe, 
where territories were divided along linguistic lines and language had little 
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political significance (Calhoun 1993: 120), in Georgia, language was a tool of 
ethnic inclusion. This continued in later centuries (discussed in the next section) 
when Georgia was no longer bounded politically, territorially and religiously. Then 
the myth of chosenness, which meant seeing the glory not only in the past, but also 
in the future, through the language, helped kartveloba to survive. When Georgia 
was struggling over external and internal boundaries politically, territorially and 
religiously and when there was a challenge to cultural identity, greater emphasis on 
common identity was needed to save the collective consciousness. Language saved 
the sense of unity, which was forged through the linguistic dimension. The 
boundaries of kartveloba were changing in the Middle Ages and chapter 4 
examines more changes to the meaning of being a Georgian, but despite all those 
changes in different epochs, kartveloba always implied a linguistic element. After 
Georgia’s political disintegration, discussed in the next section, when historical 
territory and Orthodox faith could no longer play a unifying role (since they did 
not coincide with each other and with political unity), language remained a feature 
which differentiated all Georgians from all others. 
The second main point to note is that the history of Georgian identity 
challenges the modernist understanding of nations and nationalism. While different 
from modern types of nationalism, pre-modern Georgian ideology was nonetheless 
nationalistic in the sense that some practices and ideas (for example, spreading a 
common language and culture as an integrating force) were similar to modern 
ideologies. Without understanding the subjective components of kartveloba over 
more than two millennia it is impossible to explain the important political 
consequences they had later. These components engendered the national self-
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assertion of Georgians, provided a foundation of the modern nation and 
contributed to the development of modern nationalism.  
While modernists are sceptical about using historical materials as evidence 
of the existence of pre-modern nations, they fail to explain the date of the 
emergence of nations and the nature of ethnic and national ties. Obviously, one 
case study will not stop the debates around the issue of proto-nations, but it may 




Language and identity in Georgia under Russian rule 
 
The nineteenth century, the epoch of the emergence of modern nations and 
nationalisms in Europe, also signalled a new stage in the development of 
kartveloba (Georgianness). Notably, the first steps towards becoming a modern 
nation were made. This social change in Georgia was in line with the secularisation 
of public life taking place everywhere in Europe. Influenced by European 
nationalist ideas and the ‘spring of nations’,26 it was also caused by the particular 
circumstances in which Georgia found itself.  
  Nationalism in the empires of Western and Eastern Europe emerged 
differently (see section 2.2.2). In Western Europe, it was a product of the 
Enlightenment, ‘which emphasized rational thought and civic duty to the state’ 
(White 2000: 252) and presupposed independence. In Eastern Europe, where 
nations found themselves within empires, nationalism was a response to 
colonialism and concentrated around ethnic and cultural elements. Likewise, 
Georgian nationalism was a response to a domineering colonial regime where 
national leaders faced the challenge of preserving kartveloba by codifying national 
identity around an ethnic core. Although European ideas of the Enlightenment 
reached Georgia in the eighteenth century (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 167), there 
                                                          
26
 ‘Spring of nations’ is a term in nationalism studies which refers to series of revolts in various 
parts of Europe against monarchical rule in the nineteenth century (e.g. Bailey 1991). 
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was no strong tradition of individual rights in Georgia; nor was there a strong 
imperial state, which could be redefined as a nation-state. Instead, over centuries of 
disintegration, Georgia was struggling to unite again. In the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Georgia was annexed by the Russian empire. Owing to the late 
development of capitalism and colonial policy, the resources usually used to 
engender a sense of national identity and mobilise people around the idea of 
nationalism were not easily accessible. Institutional russification led to a decline in 
kartveloba and caused a conflict between the newly educated élites and their 
rulers. 
 The historian Stephen Jones (2005: 9) describes the Russian empire as ‘a 
police state’ which ‘exiled dissidents, spent a minimal amount on educating its 
subjects, and discriminated against national and religious minorities on a daily 
basis’. Nevertheless, since Russia had closer ties with the West, one of the indirect 
cultural consequences of annexation by Russia was Georgia’s opening to the 
modern West. The Georgian people, now given peace from Muslim invaders, were 
able to communicate with the wider world and receive a Europeanised education. 
In Russian universities, Georgian students were exposed to the ideas of modern 
nationhood and, as shown below, in the second part of the nineteenth century, 
nobles and ordinary people developed a sense of common identity. Georgia did not 
have its own ruling class or native bourgeoisie, but it could refer to a long history 
of statehood and linguistic traditions. The nation-building project could exploit a 
considerable and well-documented past (see section 2.2.3). While these pre-
modern cultural and political traditions served as building blocks for a modern 
national project, they had to be re-constructed and re-interpreted.  
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This chapter examines the origin of modern Georgian nationalism, the 
keystone of which was the Georgian language. It shows how Romantic views on 
language and history enabled Georgian nationalists to ‘awaken’ the nation by 
reaching back into the Golden Age, and by reinterpreting the past in such a way 
that the country could identify itself in terms of a common language, religion and 
territory, thus emerging as an ethno-linguistic nation.  
4.1 Language and colonialism in Georgia 
After briefly reviewing Georgia’s history before the Russian annexation, this 
section uses primary and secondary sources to look first at the establishment of 
colonial policy and then at its intensification aimed at the assimilation of 
Georgians with the Russians by means of policies of russification and ‘divide and 
rule’. 
4.1.1 Language and identity in Georgia before the incorporation into the 
Russian empire (1801) 
The Mongol domination (1236-1327) led to the decline of the centralised power. 
Although there were several unsuccessful attempts to restore real power, Georgia 
had fragmented by the end of the fifteenth century. From the sixteenth century, 
Transcaucasia became a bone of contention between the Ottoman and Iranian 
empires. Completely surrounded by the Muslim world, Georgia was cut off from 
Europe (Gachechiladze 1995: 23). In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire 
incorporated parts of Georgia and converted their population to Islam, although 
Georgian as a colloquial language was preserved. By the eighteenth century the 
country was divided into several independent kingdoms and principalities (Kartli, 
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Kakheti, Imereti, Samtskhe, Samegrelo, Abkhazeti, Guria and Svaneti), over which 
the monarch had at times only symbolic rule (Suny 1998: 41).  Suny (1998: 55) 
describes Transcaucasia of this period as ‘a mosaic of kingdoms, khanates and 
principalities under either Turkish or Iranian sovereignty but actually maintaining 
various degrees of precarious autonomy or independence’. Despite a large territory 
occupied by the people who spoke a common language, largely shared a religion 
and possessed a common culture and history, it was no longer possible to speak of 
a united kartveloba, but there was a basis for its future emergence as a nation. A 
vague awareness of a unique common identity and shared history was maintained 
through the church, popular traditions, folklore and, most importantly, language. In 
the period of disintegration, the Georgian Orthodox Church continued to function 
almost everywhere in the Georgian language and was a symbol of common 
identity (Alasania 2006: 126). Based on such shared cultural markers, in 1790 a 
military agreement was reached between the Eastern Georgian kingdom, the 
kingdom of Imereti and the principalities of Guria and Samegrelo to fight jointly 
against foreign invaders. Interestingly, Abkhazia did not participate in this alliance. 
The text of the contract explained: ‘All the Iverians (that is ‘Georgians’) inhabiting 
the kingdoms of Kartli, Kakheti, Imereti, Samegrelo and Guria have the same faith, 
are born from one Church, speak the same language, experience love towards each 
other like blood relatives, and are related to each other’ (1790 treaty: 46). 
Obviously, Abkhazians were not considered Georgians at this time and kartveloba 
was an ethno-linguistic identity. 
Despite being weakened, cultural life continued in Georgia, especially in 
Tbilisi, which was still a regional centre for education and science (Narkvevebi III 
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1979: 819). Cultural renaissance occurred in the eighteenth century under King 
Vakhtang VI (1675-1737), who established a printing house producing Georgian 
books. Between 1709 and 1722, more than twenty titles were printed, mostly in the 
liturgical khutsuri script. Two books, Vakhtang VI’s own edition of Rustaveli’s 
Knight in the Tiger Skin and a small encyclopaedia, were printed in Mkhedruli 
(Rayfield 2010: 747-748). Vakhtang VI also inspired the revision of the historical 
and juridical works and set laws of feudal Georgia (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 
155). He collected old Georgian manuscripts and created a library. After Vakhtang 
VI moved to Russia in 1723, the Georgians continued his efforts uninterrupted 
until the Persian invasion of 1795. There were several attempts by Georgian 
princes to revive Georgian printing and establish a public library, but these never 
came to fruition (Jersild & Melkadze 2002: 41). Only in 1846 did the Russian 
viceroy Vorontsov establish the first public library and purchase several thousand 
books (see section 4.1.2).  
In the eighteenth century, Georgia was developing a modern intelligentsia 
influenced by the Enlightenment, with an interest in liberal thought. Contemporary 
scholars and public figures (such as Aleksandre Amilakhvari and Ioane 
Batonishvili) underlined the importance of education, science and economic and 
commercial development and respectful treatment of peasants. At the same time, 
they devoted their attention to restoring kartveloba by emphasising common 
cultural characteristics and a shared history. For example, Vakhushti Batonishvili, 
who showed great interest in the history and ethnography of the Georgians, argued 
that kartveloba as an identity was not eradicated and that any Georgian in different 
parts of the former kingdom, if asked about their origin, would ‘reply 
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instantaneously: Georgian’ (Batonishvili: 1973: 291). At this time, the word 
‘Georgian’ was synonymous with ‘Georgian Orthodox’ (Alasania 2006: 126). 
Vakhushti Batonishvili notes proudly that in all parts of the former kingdom, 
educated people speak and write in Georgian. He emphasises that the Abkhaz 
aristocrats also know Georgian (Batonishvili 1973: 785-786).  
One of the signs of common identity among intellectuals was an attempt to 
revive ethnonyms and toponyms pointing at the former unity: Iveria/Iberia as a 
name for Georgia in Parnavaz’s time (see section 3.2.1). Beri Egnatashvili’s book 
The New Life of Georgia (1940) is especially important in this regard. Speaking 
about different parts of the former kingdom, he uses the term sakartveloni (literally 
‘Georgias’), probably meaning that Georgia was not made up of components alien 
to each other, but of many little ‘Georgias’. Children were still taught literacy in 
monasteries and at home, but also visited schools set up by Catholic missionaries 
(see section 3.1.2). In the sixteenth-seventeenth century, Georgian literature was 
revived with new national-patriotic motifs in the works of poets, many of whom 
were kings (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 151-152). 
Despite fragmentation, the Bagrationi dynasty was able to unite most of 
eastern Georgia under King Erekle II (1720-1798). His kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti 
became the dominant power in Transcaucasia and northwest Iran. However, 
according to Parsons (1987: 26), Kartl-Kakheti was rather more pan-Caucasian in 
character than Georgian and contained a mixture of ethnicities, religions and 
languages. Erekle II did not feel secure facing the rival khanates and increasingly 
powerful Lezgin tribes who frequently attacked the kingdom from north-east 
Caucasia (Parsons 1987: 15-16). In order to achieve peace and stability, in 1783, 
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Erekle II signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Catherine II of Russia, who was 
seeking greater political influence in the Black Sea region. Russia gained control 
of Georgian foreign relations and was obliged to protect Kartl-Kakheti from any 
foreign aggression, but promised the continuity of the royal Bagrationi (Bagratid) 
line. The kingdom was to remain independent in internal affairs (Silogava & 
Shengelia 2007: 166). Russia did not fulfil its promise of protection and left 
Georgia unprotected on several occasions. During the period when Kartl-Kakheti 
was under Russian protectorate, the population declined by half (Parsons 1987: 
18). In 1795, the Persian warlord Agha Mohammed Khan (1742-1797) attacked 
the Georgian kingdom. The Russians arrived only after the Georgian army, greatly 
outnumbered by the Persian army, was defeated in an unequal battle and Tbilisi 
was razed to the ground. 
4.1.2 The establishment of colonial policy 
In 1801 Russia under Tsar Paul (1796-1801) violated the treaty with Georgia, 
occupied the weakened Kingdom of Kartl-Kakheti, incorporated it into the empire 
and removed the Bagrationi dynasty from the throne. The Georgian state was 
abolished and declared a province (gubernia) of Russia. Later, the western 
Georgian principalities were also annexed and the last Bagrationi ruler, King 
Solomon II of Imereti, was forced into exile to the Ottoman Empire. The 
remaining principalities had no other choice but to enter the empire.  Russia feared 
a Georgian resistance movement (Lominadze 2011: 402) and therefore decided 
upon a process of step by step colonisation. 
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The system of measurements for colonisation started with the deportation 
of members of Bagrationi dynasty, who were active in anti-Russian movement 
(Akty II: 65). The next step was the abolishment of the autocephaly of Georgian 
Orthodox Church in 1811 and the imprisonment of Georgian archbishops. This 
step seemed necessary, since traditionally the Georgian Church played a great role 
in strengthening Georgian statehood. The Georgian church was subordinated to the 
Russian synod and a Russian exarch, unfamiliar with Georgia, became head of the 
Georgian church (Werth 2006: 84). Traditional Georgian social relationships were 
replaced by Russian ones. For example, the Georgian feudal system was 
transformed along the lines of the Russian system. Several rights were taken away 
from the privileged Georgian aristocracy, but other new rights were granted (e.g. 
more control over serfs, compensation for destroyed property, etc.).  
After Georgia’s occupation, the goal of the Russian government 
(understanding that many other countries – Iran, Turkey, France, and England – 
had interests in the Caucasus and specifically in Georgia) was to establish its 
power in the country and use it as a reliable bridgehead for further expansion of the 
empire and for pacifying the highlanders. The Caucasus became a military 
springboard and was to be ruled by military people. A governor-general was in 
charge and ethnic Russian military officials were responsible for maintaining law 
and order. Until 1840 all ten Russian governors were military people with no 
experience of civic administration.
27
 Therefore, the government in Georgia had a 
                                                          
27
 These were Knorring (1801-1802), Tsitsianov (1802-1806), Gudovich (1806-1809), Tormasov 
(1809-1811), Paulucci (1811-1812), Rtishchev (1812-1816), Ermolov (1816-1827), Paskevich 
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strongly military-occupational character and was based on the Russian army. 
‘Lazy, corrupt, ignorant and arrogant’ officials and mainly uneducated clerks, 
distinguished by low morality and rudeness, would get drunk, wander in the streets 
and get in fights’ (Rayfield 2000: 139). As governor Gudovich admitted himself in 
his rapport to the Russian authorities, he was obliged to assign night guards to the 
Russian officials in order to prevent drinking and force them to execute their duties 
(Akty III: 23).  
Before the Russian occupation, Georgia was governed by the Code of Law 
of Vakhtang VI. Russia imposed its own rules and excluded the Georgians from 
executive and judicial affairs, but let them be advisors to the Russian 
administrators. The working language of the administration was Russian. But due 
to the lack of knowledge of the language and of Russian laws, Georgian advisers 
kept mostly silent (N. Berdzenishvili 1965: 266-267). New taxes were imposed 
upon serfs, who were obliged to billet Russian soldiers, provide horses, build 
roads, and maintain bridges. A passport system introduced in 1830 restricted serfs’ 
mobility (Jones 2005: 5-7). 
Georgian nobles were outraged by the corrupt Russian bureaucrats. 
Governor Tsitsianov (a Georgian by origin) realised the danger inherent in the 
overly rapid russification of administrative and judicial systems in Georgia. Since 
few in Georgia knew Russian and ethnic Georgians often lost their court cases just 
because of not knowing Russian (Akty II: 46), he asked the central authorities in 
                                                                                                                                                                




Russia to allow, at least partly, the use of Georgian there. In a petition dating from 
1806, the Georgian aristocracy also asked the Tsar for the right to chose judges 
‘who will judge in the Georgian language’ (Lominadze 2011: 112-113). Since the 
Russian government was more interested in the decay of Georgian, these requests 
were refused. The administrative reform initiated by Governor Paskevich in 1830 
openly stated its goal ‘to rally Transcaucasia with Russia by civic and political ties 
in a comprehensive whole and force locals to speak, think and feel in Russian’ 
(Patrushevsky 1936: 280). 
The policy of russification was in force also in the education system. The 
number of Georgian schools decreased; Tbilisi and Telavi religious school were 
abolished. Instead, in 1802, a Russian school for nobles was opened. In a letter to 
the Minister of Education, the governor of Georgia at the time, Tsitsianov, set out 
the function of the school: to establish a strong foundation for the Russian 
language in judicial proceedings (Akty II:195-7).  Since the money dedicated to 
the school was misappropriated by the administrator, it soon closed (Kipiani 1990: 
137). In 1804, a school for nobles opened. It taught the Georgian language to 
ethnic Georgians, but for one purpose only: to raise future bilingual employees. 
Children of Russian administrators did not have to study Georgian (Archive, fond 
440, case 5, 213). Later, the teaching of Georgian even to the Georgians became a 
pure formality and soon disappeared completely (Chumburidze 2008: 303).  
When the Treaty of Georgievsk was signed, the shared religion (Eastern 
Orthodoxy), as well as the strong memory of struggle with Islamic empires, was 
considered a basis for unity. The treaty said nothing about language, which is 
surprising considering that the Georgian language had served as a main marker of 
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kartveloba for centuries. Evidently this was not fully realised in Erekle’s time, but 
Russia sensed that the relationship between the Georgian language and faith was a 
fundamental component of kartveloba and, therefore, started using language as a 
tool for separation (see section 2.4.3). 
Considering the Georgian Church to be the main obstacle to assimilation, 
the Russian government was especially interested in training priests who could 
help with the task. For this purpose, in 1817, a Russian religious school opened in 
Tbilisi, followed by similar schools in other places. Predictably, these schools 
adopted the Russian education system, including the use of the Russian birch as a 
means of punishment (Kokrashvili 2008a: 48). After the conspiracy aimed at the 
restoration of the Georgian kingdom (see below), the government realised that 
nationalist ideas were nurtured in private and church schools, and, therefore, closed 
the few which still existed (Chumburidze 2008: 306). The Documents Collected by 
the Caucasian Archeographical Commission (Akty) (1866-1904) contain materials 
about the misdemeanours of Russian teachers, many of whom were drunkards. 
Therefore, the results of their instructions were poor. In 1829, dissatisfied with 
students’ achievements in the Russian language, a director of the school of nobles 
Gruber advocated the opening of a boarding school, since in his opinion the main 
obstacle to russification was the fact that students spoke Georgian at home (Akty 
VII: 67). 
The oppressive regime was accompanied by numerous clashes and wars 
with the rulers of local principalities and large peasant uprisings in many parts of 
the country. They were soon cruelly suppressed. The first uprising occurred in 
1802 in eastern Georgia and was followed by other, poorly organised riots in 1804, 
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1812, 1819-1820, 1841 (Suny 1998: 70; Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 175). The 
rebels demanded the observation of the Georgievsk Treaty (1783), according to 
which Russia was not allowed to interfere with Georgia’s internal affairs. Rebels 
were strictly punished and their children were sent to military orphanages in Russia 
(Akty VI 1874: 36). The Russian military historian Dubrovin (1866: 351) quotes 
Governor Tsitsianov’s order during the riot of 1804: ‘Chop and hack to pieces 
rebels mercilessly; destroy their villages. […] when entering their houses do not 
show any mercy.’ According to the same Dubrovin, besides more or less organised 
riots, many small clashes occurred frequently, mostly provoked by the 
discrimination of ethnic Georgians in the courts on language grounds. Thus, the 
uprising had a permanent character.  
 A conspiracy, aimed at the restoration of monarchy, was planned in 1832 
by the Georgian educated élite. It was the last noble-led revolt, which, like 
previous insurrections, was suppressed. The leaders were punished with 
imprisonment and exile (see section 4.2.1).  
The peasant revolts and the 1832 conspiracy demonstrated the hostilities of 
Georgians towards the Tsarist regime (Suny 1998: 72). According to the Russian 
language newspaper Tiflisskiye vedomosti (1830, 15 November), even after 30 
years of Russian rule, Russian officials knew nothing about Georgians and their 
culture and this fact was seriously damaging Russia’s reputation. The Russians 
realised the necessity of a more flexible approach in order to fully absorb Georgia. 
Therefore, they softened exploitation and became more careful and sensitive to 
local customs and traditions. Certain laws of Vakhtang IV were restored and all 
Georgian nobles were made equal in privilege and status to the Russian 
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aristocracy. A governor was replaced (1844) by a viceroy (namestnik) whose goal 
was to gain the support of the locals.  
The first viceroy was Mikhail Vorontsov, a powerful and independent 
figure in the imperial administration (Jersild & Melkadze 2002: 31). Well-
acquainted with Georgia, he was very successful in finding a common language 
with the Georgian aristocracy and in making them loyal servants of the empire 
(Antelava 1964: 46). His palace became a centre of brilliant social and cultural life 
(Hosking 1997: 20). 
Russia provided contact with the Europeanised Russian intelligentsia and 
helped the Georgian nobles to collect taxes. Now their wives could follow 
European fashion and their children could go to schools where local administrative 
intelligentsia could be educated. Many were eager to take advantage of the 
privileges and found employment in Vorontsov’s administration, thus becoming 
involved in the realisation of a colonial policy. As Jones (2005: 22) states, 
Vorontsov ‘charmed away what was left of Georgian resistance to integration’. 
Brought up in London, Vorontsov saw Russia’s role in Georgia not only as an 
exploiter of local resources, but the developer of European civilisation (Suny 1998: 
93). Some Georgian nobles were quite comfortable with career opportunities for 
their family members. Encouraged to speak Russian even amongst themselves, 
they showed a readiness to accept cultural assimilation (Parsons 1987: 212) and 
sent their children to Russian-language schools (Jones 2005: 8). Many entered the 
Russian military, often reaching the highest ranks.  
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Vorontsov promoted art and more liberal education. In order to entertain 
Russian administrators and military officials culturally, he took great interest in 
transforming Tbilisi into a European city, with theatres, an opera house, a library, 
museums, numerous educational institutions, magazines and newspapers. Both the 
Georgian and Russian intelligentsia over the years donated books to the library, but 
it had few Georgian books. For example, in 1848, the number of volumes in 
Georgian amounted to just four, compared with 1488 Russian titles. In 1853, the 
numbers were ten and 2634 respectively (Jersild & Melkadze 2002: 45-48).  Most 
books were in Russian, French, German and English, although Latin, Greek, 
Polish, Armenian, Azeri, Czech, Turkish, Arabic and Persian were also 
represented. 
Vorontsov funded publication of magazines and journals, among them the 
first journal in the Georgian language, Tsiskari, on condition that it would not 
write about politics (Kikvidze 1954: 238). Instead, Tsiskari published articles 
about Georgian culture, literature and old Georgian manuscripts, and, despite the 
strict censorship, was able to spread European ideas. Along with the newspapers 
Droeba and Iveria, founded a little later (1866 and 1876 respectively), it 
encouraged the development of Georgian culture. Although Vorontsov’s new 
policy gave more freedom to the national-cultural revival of Georgians, his 
sophisticated methods still undermined Georgian identity perhaps more effectively 
than the old policy.  
For all his deeds, some Georgians were grateful to Vorontsov, but others 
understood his actions as means of soft russification (Rayfield 2000: 164). Indeed, 
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besides Westernisation, Vorontsov had also another ambition: to further acquaint 
Georgians with the Russian language and bring them closer to Russian culture, in 
order to finally russify them according to the formula ‘Russian soul, Georgian 
body’, voiced by Catherine II as far back as 1770 in a letter to count Nikita Panin, 
an influential Russian statesman and Catherine’s political mentor (Tsagareli 1891: 
156). Vorontsov himself unveiled his goals on repeated occasions. For example, 
commenting on the opening of the theatre in Tbilisi in 1852, he underlined its 
importance for the gradual confluence of the locals with Russians (Akty X: 881). 
In his letter to general Chernyshev about reforms in the educational sphere, 
Vorontsov expressed his wish to improve the teaching of Russian, but also 
advocated the teaching of the local language in order to ensure a pool of reliable 
translators in the future (Akty X: 126). 
4.1.3 Intensification of linguistic russification  
From the second part of the nineteenth century the policy of russification became 
more systematic. The word ‘Georgia’ was prohibited in print (Suny 1998: 140). 
The Georgian language was extirpated from schools (Archive, fond 422, case 
8813, 60). One Russian official stated in 1872 that he saw no need for teaching 
Georgian, which ‘makes children stupid’ and advised Georgian families to adopt 
Russian as a home language (Droeba, 1872, 3 November: 2-3). At the same time, 
in order to undermine the unity of Georgia, Russia forbade the teaching of 
Georgian in Samegrelo and Svaneti, and created for Svan (1864) and Megrelian 
(1899) alphabets based on the Russian alphabet (Kokrashvili 2008b: 281).  
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The Russian-language press regularly ridiculed Georgian culture; these 
actions were meant to strengthen Russian culture, which, the Russians hoped, 
would be ‘stronger than the local one’ (Khundadze 1951: 91). Russification 
intensified also in the Church. All exarchs were Russian; Georgian was excluded 
from church administration, and Georgian frescos were whitewashed. Georgian 
monks were ousted from monasteries, which made it easier to rob church treasures 
and sell centuries-old collections of books to foreign collectors (Durnovo 1907: 
32-34). The Russian clergy regarded Georgians as ‘wild’ people and described 
their language as a ‘language of dogs’, while calling Georgian traditional church 
polyphony ‘barking’ (Werth 2006: 84; Durnovo 1907: 53). In Samegrelo and 
Svaneti, they tried to establish a liturgy in Megrelian and Svan, but the Georgians 
succeeded in undermining the policy. Afterwards it was suggested to using liturgy 
in Old Slavonic in Samegrelo and Abkhazia (Archive, fond 422, case 5402, 122). 
This did not work in Samegrelo; in Sukhumi (Abkhazia), however, Russian was 
established as a language of religious service despite the fact that three quarters of 
the population was Georgian (Durnovo 1907: 52). An officer of the Caucasian 
viceroy, Weidenbaum, advocated only Russian language education in Abkhazia: 
‘It is clear that the role of champion of cultural ideas […] must be played not by 
Georgian, but by the Russian language’ (translated by Gachechiladze 1995: 30). 
The first Abkhazian alphabet, based on Cyrillic, was created in 1862 by the 
Russian general and linguist Uslar. Uslar admitted that the Georgian alphabet, as 
the most perfect alphabet among the existing ones, would be best not only for 
Abkhazian, but for all Caucasian languages, even if this would not serve the 
interests of the Russian Empire (Uslar 1887: 48).  
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Later, after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, the government 
adopted even harsher reforms in all spheres, including the church and education 
system. All progressive Georgian and Russian teachers were evicted from schools 
and replaced by reactionary teachers (Kokrashvili 2008b: 277). According to the 
new curriculum, children studied the Russian language in year one and all subjects 
in Russian from year two (Uchebnyi plan 1881). The salary of Georgian teachers 
was lower than that of other teachers (Chumburidze 2008: 317). Later Georgian 
was completely excluded from civil schools, but was permitted in some religious 
schools. Others, instead of the Georgian language and history of the Georgian 
church, taught Greek and Latin for twelve years (Droeba 1879, 5 October: 1-2). It 
was forbidden to speak Georgian even during breaks. In 1893 the students of 
Tbilisi religious school organised a protest about discrimination against the 
Georgian language and demanded that the language, literature and history of 
Georgia be taught. The Tbilisi gendarmerie brutally dispersed their demonstration 
and expelled 67 Georgian students (Gvantseladze et al. 2001: 96-97). In the same 
year, a director of public schools in western Georgia, Levitskii, expressed his 
opinion that it was impossible to attain the religious/spiritual unity of Georgians 
and Russians while they prayed in different languages (Archive, fond 422, case 
5402, 50). The following year he demanded a decrease in the teaching of Georgian 
in public schools and an increase in the number of hours devoted to Russian 
(Archive, fond 422, case 8813, 28). 
In 1902, the Holy Synod issued an order forbidding the teaching of 
Georgian in the Samegrelo region on the grounds that it was not the locals’ native 
language. It had to be replaced with Russian, but Megrelian would also be 
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accepted as a medium of instruction (Kokrashvili 2008c: 296). The order was 
never realised, thanks to vigorous resistance from the local clergy and noble élite, 
as well as from nationalist leaders in Tbilisi (Broers 2004: 92). In 1904, in a public 
speech, a supervisor of religious schools, Vostorgov, strictly opposed the teaching 
of Georgian to Abkhazians, Ossetians and Megrelians. He accused Georgians of 
attempting to georgianise these peoples by forcibly imposing the Georgian 
language upon them (Werth 2006: 91). In 1909, the Holy Synod criticised the 
Georgians for their efforts to depict themselves as a homogenous group and to 
attempt to include other Kartvelians in their nation (Cadiot 2005). Similar policies 
were carried out in Adjara, which, after three hundred years, was recovered from 
Turkey in 1878 (Suny 1998: 134). Ossetians living in Georgia used Georgian as 
their literary language. Many of them were fully georgianised and used Georgian 
as an everyday language, but from the 1860s the teaching of Georgian to Ossetians 
was replaced by that of Russian and Greek (Chumburidze 2008: 319). In general, 
colonial demographic and ethnic policy was such that it broke the centuries-old 
natural process of integrating minorities into kartveloba. In order to avoid teaching 
Georgian in most places, Russia divided Georgians into eleven smaller ethnicities 
according to their respective provinces (Jones 2005: 16). For example, a director of 
Gori school maintained that Georgian should not be taught since it was a native 
language of only thirteen students out of fifty when, in fact, thirty-one were 
Georgians from different provinces (Chavchavadze 1997: 62). 
At the same time, with the aim of aggravating the demographic situation, 
Russia started settling different ethnic and religious groups on Georgian territory. 
As a part of an earlier colonial policy, Germans, Greeks and Estonians were 
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already moved to Georgia in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the second 
half, however, the process of demographic change was intensified: Bulgarians, 
Moldavians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Finns and Avars were resettled in Georgia. A 
new wave of Armenians, refugees from the Ottoman Empire, was moved to Black 
Sea towns (Shavrov 1911: 59-60; Durnovo 1907: 37). By the end of the nineteenth 
century, they made up 10.46 percent of Georgia’s population (compared with 4.71 
percent in the beginning of the century when their migration began) (Antadze 
1973: 89). Russians and other Slavic people, mostly religious minorities (such as 
Molokans, Dukhobors, Raskolniks, Old Believers and Skoptsy), migrated in 
significant numbers from the inner Russian provinces by court decision or their 
own accord, faced with the choice of accepting Orthodoxy or resettlement 
(Antadze 1973: 129; Narkvevebi V 1970: 122). As a result, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, Russians constituted more than four percent of the civilian 
population (Antadze 1973: 89). Many Russians were settled in Abkhazia, while 
almost half of the Abkhazian population was forced to move to Turkey 
(Songhulashvili 2005: 38). The Russian government persuaded the Georgian 
Muslim population to leave those territories which had been recovered from the 
Ottoman Empire. Pro-Russian ethnic groups, such as Armenians, Greeks and 
Russian sectarians, were settled there. For those Georgian Muslims who did not 
leave the territory they opened Turkish language religious schools and forbade the 
teaching of Georgian (Kokrashvili 2008b: 284). Georgians, however, welcomed 
their Muslim brothers, hoping to bring them back into the Georgian cultural 
environment. Shortly after the incorporation of Adjara, Ilia Chavchavadze, leader 
of nationalist movement, wrote: ‘Our brothers in blood, the nest of our heroes, the 
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cradle of our civilisation, our ancient Georgia, has been united with us’ (Iveria #1, 
1879). Perceived as a lost region, Adjara had to be brought back despite religious 
differences: ‘Neither unity of language, nor unity of faith and tribal affiliation links 
human beings together as much as unity of history’ (Chavchavadze 1987b: 7). But 
the majority of Adjarians decided to seek refuge in Turkey, which promised them 
exemption from taxes and military service (Pelkmans 2006: 98). This came as a 
shock to Georgian nationalists, who blamed the authorities for treating the native 
population poorly. 
In contrast to the Russian authorities, a small number of progressive 
Russian teachers opposed the colonial language policy. They demanded that 
Russian teachers learn the Georgian language, literature, traditions, etc. One such 
teacher was Stoianov, a principal of Kutaisi gymnasium. In 1880 he wrote: 
In my opinion, the teaching of the Georgian language must 
increase [...] I have a particular opinion about the subject and I am 
ready to defend it everywhere. Georgian is a native language. 
Primary schools must function in Georgian and further teaching 
also must continue in the mother tongue. Therefore, teachers must 
be either Georgian or those Russians who have mastered this 
language. The children of Russians who graduate from 
gymnasiums, universities work in Georgia, but do not know the 
language and customs of Georgians. Englishmen who worked on 
the construction of the Poti-Tbilisi railway learned Georgian in 5-6 
months. Whereas Russians, despite being in Georgia for more than 
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a half a century, do not know a word of Georgian. The teaching of 
Georgian needs to be obligatory. (Narkvevebi V 1970: 653) 
Stoianov was criticised for his views and was dismissed soon after. 
In concluding this section, it must be said that many Georgian historians 
and politicians consider a step undertaken by Erekle II as a fatal mistake 
(Chkhartishvili 2009b: 60), as it eventually ended Georgia’s independence. But, 
some Western scholars, such as Parsons (1987) and Jones (2005), view the results 
of Erekle’s decision to seek protection from Russia differently: although Georgia 
was subordinated to Russia, it was more united than it had been for centuries. 
Some of the obstacles threatening security and unity, as well as economic and 
social integration, were removed (Parsons 1987: 65). Jones (2005:12) notes that 
‘[i]ronically, the Russian Empire reignited a sense of national unity’ by annexing 
almost all territories of medieval Georgia’. Incorporation into the Russian empire 
had a positive impact on economic relations too. Although Russia was a backward 
state in terms of capitalist development, economic links between regions deepened 
and favourable preconditions for the establishment of in-group solidarity were 
created, especially after British engineers built a railway link between eastern and 
western Georgia in 1872 (Jones 2005: 12). 
4.2 The emergence of the modern Georgian nation 
The modern Georgian nation emerged as a result of a national-cultural movement, 
which was influenced by several factors: Romanticism, Russian colonial pressure 
and Armenian economic dominance. As seen in chapter 3, the communicative and 
symbolic role of language in Georgia shaped the relationship between different 
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ethnic groups and caused Georgia to emerge as a pre-modern nation. The medieval 
sense of national community was partly carried over into the modern epoch. When 
modern nationalism emerged, once again language was chosen to define a nation 
by élites as a crucial marker, this time, of the modern nation. This process was 
similar to ‘vernacular mobilisation’ in Western Europe. 
Language policy and planning (LPP) became an important part of the 
nation-building process in Western Europe. Each state wanted a new shared 
standard language as a symbol of national identity. At the same time, a shared 
language could facilitate greater economic and political cooperation. The theory 
developed by German Romantic thinkers, according to which language was an 
essential characteristic of a nation, became very influential in Eastern Europe too. 
Following Herder and Fichte (see section 2.4.2), who mentioned that only through 
communication in an agreed code was it possible to develop a sense of common 
identity, language was singled out as an essential element of national movements 
during the ‘spring of nations’. As the idea of a national language spread widely, 
nationalist scholars began to engage in ‘vernacular mobilisation’, rediscovering the 
ethnic past through linguistics, philology, archaeology and history. In Georgia, too, 
language reform was not just exploited by nationalist leaders, but their movement 
became essentially a language movement. However, this ethno-national movement 
did not demand political independence because it could not challenge the imperial 
resources of the state with regard to communication, finances, and foreign affairs. 
The political demands were limited to cultural autonomy within Russia. 
Independence was a declared aim of Georgian Marxists, who, although having 
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strong ethno-national roots, brought an alternative ideology of nationalism to 
Georgia.  
4.2.1 Searching for the new boundaries 
One of the earliest manifestations of Georgia’s opening up to Western thought was 
Georgian Romanticism. The decline of old patterns of life and the imposition of 
colonial rule fostered a nostalgic mood; combined with pride in Georgia’s Golden 
Age, as well as hope in a better future, this led to Romantic patriotism. In the 
nineteen century, an egalitarian setting for literature termed the ‘literary salon’ 
appeared in Georgia. National solidarity was first renewed in such salons among a 
small group of Georgian intellectuals. Writers, critics and editors translated 
European works with the ideas of national freedom, then gathered in aristocratic 
families and expressed their patriotic aspirations and anti-Russian sentiments, 
longing for Georgia’s glorious past (Jones 1987: 62). Their nationalism was not 
extended to popular sovereignty and, essentially, was an élite nationalism. 
Georgian romantic poets cared about language, but their language could not 
become the marker of a common culture or influence a largely illiterate population, 
since these poets wrote in the artificially ‘high’ style of Anton I (see section 3.1.2). 
Their style resulted in the inevitable conflict between two generations (an old 
aristocratic élite and a young educated élite) in the second part of the nineteenth 
century (see below).  
Most of these upper-class representatives, together with the intelligentsia of 
non-aristocratic origins, conspired against Russian rule in 1832 (see section 4.1.2). 
The idea for the conspiracy came from the grandsons of Erekle II living in Russia 
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(Suny 1998:71). Although the conspiracy wanted to restore the Bagrationi dynasty, 
some favoured more democratic government (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 172). 
Among them, the commoner Solomon Dodashvili was the most prominent. He was 
also one of two participants who died in exile. Others were eventually pardoned 
and reconciled themselves to Russian rule. Among them were the ‘father’ of 
Georgian Romanticism, a son of the former Georgian ambassador to Russia, 
Alexandre Chavchavadze, and a future Governor-General, Grigol Orbeliani. Their 
biographies illustrate the transformation of the Georgian aristocracy from 
Romantic rebels into loyal servants of Russia. The failure of the conspiracy left its 
mark on Georgian society, noticeable in Georgian Romantic poetry. Hope of 
restoration of the monarchy and the dream of independence was soon forgotten.
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The Georgian élite accepted their political future within the boundaries of the 
Russian state (Jones 2005: 2-6).  
Despite its failure and restriction to the aristocracy, the conspiracy marked 
the emergence of the Georgian nationalist intelligentsia. While nothing was done 
to develop social equality, love for Georgia, expressed by Romantic poets, had a 
clear influence on the views of the next generation, educated in Russian and 
European universities. Old and new generations viewed Georgia’s future within 
Russia. Although they dreamed about Georgia’s glorious past, defended the 
Georgian language and Georgia’s interests, they believed that Russia’s protection 
was vital for Georgia’s survival. 
                                                          
28
 Later, Stalin (1954a) called the conspiracy of 1832 the first stage in the development of national 
consciousness in Georgia (see section 2.3.3). 
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In the early 1860s, a new generation of Georgian intellectuals had returned 
home. Many of them belonged to leading aristocratic families and had received 
their education in Russian universities, thanks to the education policy of Alexander 
II, which granted stipends to Georgians. They established the Georgian press and 
several cultural societies (Jershild & Melkadze 2002: 39) and engaged in 
reinventing and clarifying the boundaries of kartveloba through a search for pre-
colonial culture based on language, homeland and history.  
  The major difference between old and new generations, known as ‘fathers’ 
and ‘sons’, was that the former dwelled on Georgia’s past; the latter, however, was 
more concerned with the contemporary situation: poor education, economic 
underdevelopment, social backwardness and isolation from the civilised world. 
Contrary to their fathers, the sons considered Georgia’s social development as an 
important component of their movement. One of the nationalist leaders, 
Gogebashvili (1984: 76), wrote: 
Nobody dreams of restoration of the old Georgia, which belongs to the 
past and cannot be returned. It is the new Georgia that is the subject of 
our dreams and aspirations: Georgia should look ahead towards 
Europe and not back towards Asia. It is from the West that we should 
learn education, scholarship and import the best of social structures. 
The future-oriented rather than past-glorifying nationalism of ‘sons’ was also a 
fundamental difference between Georgian nationalism and Russian nationalism, 
which looked at everything European with disdain and dreamed about the epoch of 
Peter the Great. Although the process of vernacular mobilisation around the ethnic 
195 
 
core often involves dwelling on past glory, Georgian nationalist leaders directed 
their efforts at awakening Georgians. Sharing their fathers’ love of Georgia, they 
rejected non-productive backward-looking nationalism of their ‘fathers’ and did 
not look back nostalgically, but appealed to past national heroes as an ideal for 
contemporary community, setting continuity between the past and the present. 
According to A. D. Smith (1996a: 584), modern nationalists promise renewal, 
reintegration and restoration to a former glorious state: ‘[j]ust as “our ancestors” 
created a great culture of civilization, so surely can “we”, runs the leitmotiv. This 
is important, exactly because most nationalisms, viewed from inside, start out from 
a sense of decline, alienation and inner exile’. Georgians had a well documented 
ethno-history with more than one Golden Age, and even if sometimes they were 
exaggerated and idealised, they provided a sense of collective destiny. If the 
Romantic poets yearned for a distant past, the generation of ‘sons’ wrote literature 
about the real specific problems of Georgian society at the time (Parsons 1987: 
218). The ‘sons’ are known also as tergdaleulni: those who drank the waters of the 
Terek, the river on the border with Russia. The Terek (Tergi in Georgian) 
functioned not only as the geographical and cultural boundary between Russia and 
Georgia, but also became a symbolic national identity boundary for those returning 
from Russia. In their search for a new Georgian identity, the tergdaleulni 
overturned the old élite nationalism with ideas of equal rights and scientific 
progress (Jones 2005: 35).  
 The nationalist agenda of the tergaleulni was cultural and linguistic revival 
(see section 4.2.2), rather than centring on independence. Political demands were 
limited to cultural autonomy within Russia and schooling in the Georgian 
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language. They aimed at the preservation of kartveloba in the face of threats from 
russification. Influenced by democratic movements in Europe and by the strong 
spirit of patriotism of the previous generation, they actively supported the abolition 
of serfdom and called for national unity across social classes. The problem was 
that the Armenian bourgeoisie were not interested in the national idea of the 
Georgians.  
Historically, the Armenians represented a permanent challenge for Georgian 
identity. The construction of identity requires the existence of ‘others’, because an 
in-group needs the sense of an out-group. The sense of otherness is especially 
acute when countries are neighbours and culturally close. As two neighbouring 
peoples of old cultures, the Georgians and Armenians viewed each other as an out-
group and their identities were forged in competition and sometimes even lethal 
violence (Chkhartishvili 2009b: 110). The Armenian Church’s rejection of 
Chalcedon and subsequent ecumenical councils made it possible to develop a sense 
of unique faith among the Armenians. A sense of uniqueness was developed 
among Georgians as well, since the same event made them the only Orthodox 
people in the Caucasus. The Armenians, who lost their kingdom in the eleventh 
century and were under pressure from the Muslim world, looked for shelter in 
neighbouring countries, and many settled in Georgia. Before the Russian 
annexation Armenians already constituted 4.71 percent of Georgia’s population. In 
1829-1831, after Russia supported their mass migration to Georgia, the percentage 
increased to 9.88 (Antadze 1973: 110). Before Georgia’s incorporation into Russia, 
the Armenians living in feudal Georgia had no political or social ambitions. 
However, under the Russian policy of accommodation (see below), the wealthy 
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Armenian bourgeoisie gained a new social status and the urban community of 
Tbilisi Armenians played an important role in the city’s life. Some Armenians tried 
to assume Georgian identity, spoke Georgian at home and georgianised their 
names (Cornell 2002a: 197), but the process of georgianisation amongst 
Armenians was slow and the two communities remained segregated 
(Chkhartishvili 2009b: 123). 
For centuries, the core of Armenian identity was religious and the Georgian 
word somekhi (Armenian) pointed to religious affinity. In the nineteenth century, 
however, somekhi became an equivalent of ‘merchant, money-lender’. 
Psychological borders between the Georgians and Armenians were formed long 
time ago, and were so strong that it was, and still is, very difficult to conceptualise 
Armenians in the Georgian nation. Armenians were and are particular ‘others’ for 
Georgians; therefore, they were not invited to the Georgian in-group 
(Chkhartishvili 2009b: 121). After Georgia’s annexation, the Russian government 
tried to intensify tensions between Georgians and Armenians, engaging some 
Armenians in suppressing rebels during the 1812 riot, although many showed 
loyalty to Georgia (Proneli 1907: 129-130). 
Jones (2005: 8), Suny (1998: 95) and others note that merchants were the 
only class that benefited from Russian economic policy. The class of merchants 
was dominated by Armenians, since involvement in trade was considered 
demeaning among Georgians (Parsons 1987: 104). The Russian administration 
provided a stable economic climate, a new internal market, promoted foreign trade 
and freed merchants from serfdom, military recruitment, the poll tax and corporal 
punishment. Such treatment of the Armenians intensified the ethnic and social 
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class antagonisms that already existed between the Georgian nobility and 
Armenian bourgeoisie (Parsons 1987: 32-33, Suny 1998: 95). Ethnic and social 
antagonism between the two communities became even more bitter following the 
abolition of serfdom (1964), when the largely agrarian Georgian population began 
migrating to Tbilisi and Armenian demographic dominance over the city began to 
diminish (Suny 1998: 116). But Armenians continued to maintain control over the 
economic and political life of the capital and Georgians, a minority in the city 
council, were not able to participate actively in municipal affairs (Suny 1998: 141). 
As A. D. Smith notes (1998: 27), conflict between waves of newcomers and 
urban ‘old-timers’ was usually social, but it could also be ethnic when these groups 
were ‘visibly different, had entirely different belief systems and customs, or spoke 
a different language’. Although, it must be noted, truly ethnic conflict did not 
break out between the Georgians and Armenians. Inter-ethnic marriages were 
common, since the Georgian aristocracy wanted rich dowries and the Armenian 
merchants wanted their children to acquire a noble title (Gachechiladze 1995: 29). 
At the same time, the nation-building era forced Armenians to reconsider the 
markers of their identity. Taking into account the importance of territory and 
cultural artefacts for nation-building, it is not surprising that Armenian scholars 
started focusing on the territorial marker of their identity and included Georgian 
lands and monuments into their project. Georgian nationalists identified the 
Armenians as a main threat to Georgia’s historical past and cultural heritage by 
falsifying history. For example, one of the leaders of the tergdaleulni, Ilia 
Chavchavadze, in his polemical essay Lament of the Stones (1899) fiercely 
criticised Armenian historical scholarship, accusing Armenian scholars of 
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falsifying history and calling for the defence of national dignity (Chavchavadze 
1987a). 
As noted in the academic literature (e.g. Özkirimli 2000: 197; Judge 2002: 
48), in the epoch of nationalism, when certain groups do not share the feeling of 
national identity with the majority and produce their own historical narratives, 
conflict is inevitable. Both Armenians and Georgians felt a need to rethink their 
own ethnic boundaries and distinguish themselves from each other. Georgians 
viewed Armenian economic control as an obstacle on their path towards nation-
formation (Jones 2005: 68). When the Armenians were preoccupied with their own 
project of redefining national identity and could not play the role that the 
bourgeoisie played in western countries, there was no other way than to mobilise 
the Georgian people around the ethnic core and exclude foreign elements. National 
identity is forged and defined through a dual process of stressing the similarities of 
the in-group (the ‘self’) and its differences with those outside the community (the 
‘others’). The need to define the in-group as different becomes more compelling 
when the significant ‘other’ denies the right of the community to form a nation. 
According to A. D. Smith (1999a: 197), this process tends to single out an ‘alien’ 
minority (non-members of the historic cultural community) and views it with 
suspicion and hostility.  For obvious reasons, Armenians were identified as the 
‘alien’ minority. 
Nevertheless, most nationalist leaders advocated a non-confrontational 
approach and repeatedly emphasized that fairness for Georgians must not be 
achieved at the expense of others. For example, the most nationalistic paper Iveria 
wrote: ‘Self-government based on democratic foundations treats all citizens 
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equally and does not differentiate among religions and ethnicities’ (Iveria, 1905, # 
38: 1). Nationalist leaders repeatedly stressed that they especially appreciated 
friendship and unity with Russians and found common ideals with young Russia. 
One of the leaders of the tergdaleulni, Akaki Tsereteli (Klde #66, 1913), wrote: 
We greatly appreciate brotherhood, unity and friendship with the 
nations of Russia. It is true that among Russia’s people there are many 
who hate our brotherly relations, but there is also a young Russia, with 
which we want to walk holding hands in order to realize not only 
national, but also common human ideals, called brotherhood, unity, 
equality. 
Unlike the assimilationist policy during the zenith of Georgia’s statehood 
(see section 3.2.3), in this period, due to the increased competition between 
national groups and the fact that the Armenian bourgeoisie could not play the role 
of nationalist leader, the Georgian intelligentsia adopted a differentialist policy and 
concentrated on the ethnic core. They had to establish the boundaries of collective 
identity and define a common purpose for the emerging nation.  
4.2.2 Georgia’s cultural and linguistic resistance to russification 
Cultural and linguistic resistance to colonial oppression started very slowly in the 
first half of the nineteenth century among intellectuals. They published their 
original and translated works in the Literary Supplement to Tiflis Bulletin 
(established in 1832), edited by Dodashvili. Previously, two Georgian-language 
newspapers had existed. The first one, The Paper of Georgia, appeared in 1819, 
but was soon renamed The Georgian Paper in order to ensure that the word 
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‘Georgia’ was not in official use anymore. The paper was written first in Russian 
and then translated into Georgian. The language and style of translations, as well 
as the punctuation, was so poor that it was sometimes impossible to make sense of 
the texts (Botsvadze 1976: 8-9). Therefore, the paper lacked subscribers and soon 
folded. The second paper, The Tiflis Bulletin (1828), was an improved version of 
the former and published articles about Georgian culture. Its editor was the same 
Dodashvili under whose lead the Literary Supplement to Tiflis Bulletin later 
became very active in intensifying national consciousness and attempting to defend 
the status of the Georgian language. Dodashvili’s journal, in fact, became a 
political organ of the failed conspiracy of 1832. As seen in section 4.1.2, under 
Vorontsov Tsiskari appeared, which was bitterly attacked by the tergdaleulni for 
using archaic literary language (Jones 2005: 36). Ilia Chavchavadze (Tsiskari, 
1961, April issue: 26-27) wrote: 
 We have three divine treasures from our ancestors: homeland, 
language and faith. If we will not take care of them, what would we 
tell our descendants? We cannot speak of others, but we will not 
allow even our fathers to humiliate our language. A language is a 
divine thing, a public property. A man should not touch it with a 
sinful hand. 
In this triad ‘homeland, language and faith’, the order was changed to 
‘language, homeland and faith’, at the end of the twentieth century (see section 
5.2.3). The nationalist leaders adopted it as their slogan and presented it as the 





 As A. D. Smith (2009: 31-32) notes, nationalist élites often had to 
carefully select/alter the range of ethnic symbols and memories if they were to 
carry the population with them. Historical memories, especially myths of war and 
ethnic resistance are particularly effective in creating the consciousness and 
sentiments of mutual dependence, which reinforces the shared culture and identity 
(A. D. Smith 2009: 28). Ilia would not risk losing non-Orthodox Georgians by 
stressing religious unity. In his famous article ‘osmalos sakartvelo’ (‘Ottoman 
Georgia’), to welcome Adjarians back to Georgia, he even argued that unity of 
faith was not as important as unity of shared history (see section 4.1.3). As 
mentioned in section 4.1.1, ‘Georgian’ was synonymous with ‘Georgian 
Orthodox’, however, Ilia Chavchavadze and his followers tried to find ways to 
incorporate Muslim Georgians into their secular nation-building process, but they 
were particularly concerned with social division (Parsons 1987: 272) and wanted 
also to incorporate all social classes into national unity. However, strangely 
enough, Ilia’s other triad from the poem achrdili – ‘brotherhood, unification, 
liberty’ – was never used by the nationalist leaders of either Soviet or post-Soviet 
periods. When Ilia mentioned those three treasures left to the Georgians by their 
ancestors, he did not mean the reconstruction of those concepts as markers for 
national identity, but he clearly understood the role of faith, as well as that of a 
territory and language, in the historical formation of kartveloba, although Ilia was 
not aware of Merchule’s definition of Georgia (see section 3.2.3). 
                                                          
29
 Unfortunately, along with Georgian nationalist historians of the twentieth century, some Western 
scholars, obviously not having read Ilia’s works and having no idea what the context of this phrase 
was, repeatedly present this triptych as a motto of Ilia’s movement. 
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In order to foster internal solidarity in a colonial country that lacks control 
over its territory, a ‘returning intelligentsia’ often chooses the route of ‘vernacular 
mobilisation’ as a guardian of self-preservation and self-redefinition (A. D. Smith 
2009: 55). The creation of an independent territorial nation out of the multi-ethnic 
colony was impossible in the tergdaleulni’s times, when political routes were 
blocked. Therefore, it was not set as a goal for the movement. Unlike political 
nationalists, who aimed to secure an independent, sovereign state for their nation, 
Georgian cultural nationalists aimed for the moral regeneration of their 
community. The first goal was survival, and then entry to the modern world 
through secularisation and Westernisation. The tergdaleulni encouraged Georgians 
to combine inherited values and traditions with Western ways and ideals. For this 
purpose, they had to investigate and reinterpret ethnic markers over the longue 
durée, on the one hand, and show ‘maps’ for a new destiny of the nation on the 
other. Following the principles of Romantic nationalism, they sought to employ 
history, archaeology and philology in this process of vernacular mobilisation. 
Vernacular culture, such as language, customs, art, folklore and ethnic history 
could provide powerful means for the mobilisation of the masses. Recalling great 
events and heroes of the past, an image of an aristocratic warrior society 
surrounded by the Muslim world and fighting to preserve Christianity, reminded 
people of their ancestors’ uplifting struggles. Although the tergdaleulni were 
fighting to establish a secular nation, they viewed Orthodoxy as a factor in 
historical solidarity. There was the question of how to reach ordinary people, 
separated from the national agenda by élite nationalism. In the early 1860s, the 
idea of a modern nation did not stir the emotions of the majority of Georgia’s rural 
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population. But there was a strong correlation between religion and language; it 
was therefore possible to mobilise people around their culture, language and faith. 
Afterwards, however, it would become possible to focus on social, economic and 
political aspects, thus to achieve ‘all the attributes of fully-fledged nation’ (Hroch 
1995: 66).  
 A brief look at Georgia’s history suggests that Georgians fought for their 
religion, rather than language. But the confrontation with the Greek Church, as 
well as the definition of Georgia by Merchule and Georgia’s holy mission as 
identified by Zosime (see section 3.2.2), illustrates the importance of linguistic 
identity. Obviously, the Georgian language was a relevant issue and Georgians 
were defending Christian doctrine being preached in Georgian. Fighting for faith at 
the same time was fighting for language. Ilia Chavchavadze (1984: 608) wrote: 
For us, Christianity is more than living according to Christ: it means 
our motherland, Georgia; it means that we are Georgians. Today all 
Transcaucasia makes no distinction between the Georgians and 
Christianity — they are one and the same thing. Instead of saying that 
someone became a Christian, they say, we say he became a Georgian. 
Our clergy knew only too well that fatherland and nationality, united 
by faith and conjoined with it, are an invincible weapon and shield in 
the face of the enemy. All sermons were designed to uplift the 
meaning of fatherland and nationality to the height of faith so that all 
people might serve these three intertwined, sacred and great objects 
with the utmost dedication.  
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Ilia’s linguistic movement started as language reform (see below) and 
continued as a fight for the right to use Georgian, in particular in the church and in 
education: 
In Russia, all non-Russian peoples are independent when it comes to 
administering their churches. The Armenians, Muslims, Jews, etc. are 
free in their religious affairs; they have religious schools of their 
own, in which children are taught in their native tongues and where 
much attention is paid to studying everything that is relevant to them. 
And their own clerics are administrating these schools independently. 
Strangely enough, only the Christian Orthodox Georgians are 
deprived of this right as though they are being punished for being 
Orthodox Christians. (Chavchavadze1984: 678) 
Educational reform is central to nation formation, which requires mass 
literacy and turns language into an effective boundary marker (A. D. Smith 2009: 
82). Georgian could not compete with Russian unless it was modernised and used 
in different spheres. The tergdaleulni repeatedly demanded the development of a 
literary language closer to the spoken language of the ordinary people. Unlike most 
colonised people in Eastern Europe, Georgians already had a ‘high’ culture in the 
form of literary tradition and ecclesiastical language, but it was restricted to the 
élite (Broers 2004: 90). It had to be transformed into a vernacular-based secular 
culture to gain the support of the masses. Therefore, the tergdaleulni standardised a 
‘low’ style and used it in literature and the printed media, introducing a style of 
narrative prose, the ethics of debate and reporting (Rayfield 2000: 179) and, based 
on a new standard, they created a modern, secular culture. Such use of language is 
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identified by Anderson (1983) as the crucial point in the creation of national 
identities. The tergdaleulni went through all the steps of language planning (see 
section 2.4), including graphization, unified orthography and corpus planning. 
One of the challenges faced by the nationalist leaders was the diversity of 
Georgian identities since the fragmentation of the country until the Russian 
annexation, especially in places where the primary language was not Georgian but 
other Kartvelian languages. To overcome the language barrier, leaders needed not 
only unifying ideas, but also effective institutions and domains, where the 
language could be used. Promoting Georgian as a mother tongue was the main goal 
of the Society for the Spread of Literacy among Georgians (established in 1879). 
The Society taught Iakob Gogebashvili’s deda ena (Mother Tongue), a systematic 
Georgian grammar for children (Jones 2005: 41). Literacy among the Georgians 
increased significantly thanks to the efforts of the Society, which sent textbooks 
and teachers to different parts of Georgia. This was especially important in 
Samegrelo, where the government started introducing Megrelian as a medium of 
instruction (see section 4.1.3) and in Adjara, where there was much anti-Georgian 
propaganda. The activities of the society went beyond the limits suggested by its 
name (Parsons 1987: 268). Through private donations, it supported libraries, 
collected old manuscripts, recorded folklore and trained teachers and, most 
importantly, fought social and provincial divisions by promoting Georgian as a 
national language. Its achievements earned it the name ‘school of the Georgian 
nation’ (Reisner 2004).  
Despite strict censorship, the Georgian press and theatre also served as 
regular promoters of the Georgian language and Georgian national and civic 
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consciousness (Jones 2005: 34). Iveria (1882, #11: 90) emphasised the role of 
Georgian theatre in strengthening national consciousness. This was a period when 
the contemporary Russian administration, unlike Vorontsov, considered Georgian 
theatre as ‘dangerous’, as it increasingly stood for the cultivation of Georgian 
identity, and the administration stopped supporting it financially. The theatre’s 
building was confiscated and strict censorship was established over its repertoire. 
Nevertheless, the Georgian theatre continued to perform. Theatres opened in other 
big cities, too. Most popular were patriotic plays. A Georgian writer, Ekaterine 
Gabashvili (Klde #7, 1913), recalls an event in 1882: during the premiere of a 
patriotic show: ‘The old Georgian flag was brought to the stage. The whole 
audience stood up in front of this symbol of Georgia’s independence. Some people 
cried.’ This event outraged the Russian administration.  Russian journalists tried to 
make fun of it and advised Georgians: ‘Don’t show this flag again. Sell it to the 
circus to cover the theatre’s expenses’ (Droeba 1882, # 10).  
 Droeba and Iveria regularly alerted their readers to events in Europe and 
national-liberation movements in various parts of the world, although the 
tergdaleulni’s movement sought the regeneration of the historic and linguistic 
community rather than independence. Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
overestimate the tergdaleulni’s role in shaping modern Georgian identity. As Jones 
(2005: 31) states, they were a vital link to Georgia’s Social Democrats, who 
combined the tergdaleulni’s ideas with socialist ideas (see next section).  
In this respect Georgian Social Democrats or Mensheviks (see section 
2.3.1), who were also nationalist (Jones 2005: 2), shared the concerns of the 
tergdaleulni, considering cultural autonomy the best way to secure national self-
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determination. Before the October Revolution (1917) no single party in Georgia 
supported political autonomy. Nevertheless, shortly after the Revolution, the head 
of the Social Democrats, Noe Zhordania, led the country to independence (Jones 
2005: 234-266). 
4.2.3 Independent Georgia 
The tergdaleulni movement was challenged by a younger educated generation of 
the Marxists in the beginning of the twentieth century. The formation of different 
political parties in Georgia was a natural consequence of capitalism, which 
progressed slowly. After almost a century of Russian rule, roads remained unpaved 
and impassable in winter. The first hospital was built only in 1872 (Jones 2005: 
12). The building of factories was restricted, since Russia viewed Georgia as a 
mere supplier of raw resources and a market for Russian goods. By the beginning 
of the twentieth century, there were only about thirty factories in Georgia 
(Gachechiladze 1995: 28). Nevertheless, the political culture of the population was 
growing and several political parties emerged. Among them, the Social Democrats 
were the largest and most popular among Georgians. Drawing on Caucasian 
traditions of coexistence and cooperation, the Georgian Social Democrats were 
able to develop an appealing ideology of class unity across ethnic lines instead of 
seeking independence over nationalist opponents (Jones 2005: 16-17). In 1908 
Zhordania wrote:  
[T]he Georgian people […] want national schooling, national theatre 
[…] they thirst more for Georgian literature and culture today, but 
nationalist politics they reject as before […] Georgian Social 
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Democracy demands cultural autonomy […] not political autonomy. 
(Zhordania 1922: 58) 
The Social Democrats were the first Marxists to show that nationalism did 
not contradict socialism. They filtered Marxist ideas through the Georgian culture 
(Jones 2005: 29; 47). They saw this as a way of retaining power. Later they started 
identifying themselves more with nationalist ideas and declared independence on 
26 May 1918. 
During its short existence (1918-21), the Democratic Republic of Georgia 
established state borders, carried out juridical reform, created a regular army, 
confiscated land from landlords and sold it cheaply to peasants, and declared 
Georgian a state language (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 208-213; 223-230). 
Despite a difficult economic and financial situation, many reforms were carried out 
in the spheres of education and culture: for instance, the university and 
conservatoire were established, the first Georgian opera was staged and thousands 
of Georgian schoolbooks were printed (Gachechiladze 1995: 33). 
At the same time, Russia and Turkey were encouraging separatist 
movements on Georgia’s territory. Turks occupied south and south-eastern 
Georgia, but abandoned the territory following their defeat in WWI. Social 
Democrats viewed the middle class as the core of the nation. The Bolsheviks, the 
only party who did not support independence, considered the middle class the 
major enemy of the ‘world revolution’ and organised uprisings in Shida Kartli 
against the new European-style government (Gachechiladze 1995: 31). In March 
1918, Abkhaz Bolsheviks demanded unification with Soviet Russia, whose 
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soldiers had entered Abkhazia. Armenia also had territorial disputes with Georgia 
demanding the lands in Javakheti, Adjara and Kartli and attacked Georgia in 
December 1918 (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 215-216). Despite such a difficult 
military-political situation, the Democratic Republic of Georgia was able to 
maintain its territorial integrity and statehood. The Georgian army was able to 
make the Russian and Armenian armies withdraw, restoring its jurisdiction on 
respective territories.  
The Georgian government, confronted by mutual antagonisms between 
different ethnic groups, had to elaborate ethnic policy. The Act of Independence 
(26 May, 1918) stated that within its boundaries, the Republic guaranteed equal 
civil and political rights to its citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, religion, sex 
and social status (The Act of Independence 1992: 4). The members of the newly 
elected National Council (later renamed Parliament) included not only Georgians, 
but also Russians, Armenians, Azeris, Abkhazians, Ossetians and Jews (Silogava 
& Shengelia 2007: 208). Records of the sessions of the Constitutional Commission 
(formed on 12 March, 1919) reveal the plans of the government for establishing a 
nation-state. The head of the Commission said: ‘Nowadays our duty is to create a 
whole firm national body [...] [T]he minorities must acknowledge that our republic 
is their homeland too’ (Archive, fund 1833, description 1, cases 180-181: 177, 
180). 
The Constitution was adopted (21 February 1921) and it was one of the 
most democratic constitutions of the contemporary world. According to article 107 
(Constitution of Georgia 1992: 30), autonomy was granted to Abkhazia, Adjara 
and Saingilo (currently in Azerbaijan). It must be noted that following the 
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withdrawal of the Russian army, Abkhazia was governed by the democratically 
elected government, which in 1919 adopted the Act of Abkhazian Autonomy 
within Georgia (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 214). As for Adjara, once the Turks 
had left, its Muslim population demanded reunification with Georgia in 1920. 
Articles 129-137 (Constitution of Georgia 1992: 34-36) dealt with ethnic minority 
rights and stated that all ethnic minorities had a right to free socio-political and 
cultural development and education in their own languages, as well as to form 
ethnic unions. The local governments had to operate not only in Georgian, but also 
in ethnic minority languages in places where the population of a minority exceeded 
20 percent of the population. Parliamentarians who had not mastered the Georgian 
language well enough to deliver speeches in Georgian could do so in their native 
language. 
Although the Constitution of Georgia was never implemented, as the Red 
Army annexed Georgia and later incorporated it into the Soviet Union (see chapter 
5), it still played a significant role in Georgia’s history. Together with the Act of 
Independence, it served as a basis for the struggle for independence in the 
following decades and the restoration of independence at the end of the twentieth 
century (see chapter 6). 
4.3 Conclusion 
Despite political differences, various nationalist groups in Georgia were all 
forward-looking, pushing for progress and Western-style democracy. They 
regarded national and social issues as intertwined. The combination of the ideas of 
social democracy and nationalism made it possible to lead Georgia towards 
212 
 
independence. While the liberal Marxism of the Social Democrats attracted the 
Georgians with their ideas of ‘human emancipation’ and liberation, deriving its 
value from fundamental goals of humanity, rather than ‘narrowly nationalist’ 
movements, the lack of political continuity in the history of Georgia could have 
become an obstacle to sovereignty. But continuity of culture, and most importantly 
that of the language, compensated. This chapter showed the ways in which 
language was conceptualised by nationalist thought as it attempted to mobilise the 
masses and create common identity. The tergdaleulni changed the meaning of 
language as a modern symbolic phenomenon and as a bond between different 
social groups. Thanks to their efforts, an ‘imagined community’ of Georgians 
gradually took form. The Georgian language served not only as a medium for 
social integration, but also, thanks to its symbolic significance, weakened the 
dialectical barriers, thus, turned into a national language.  
In the period of independence, the Georgian state tried to implement a 
pluralistic policy towards its multiethnic population and gain back the hearts of 
historic minorities that had been alienated through colonial policy. But to counter 
this, the ethnic conflicts inspired by the Bolsheviks during the short existence of 
independent Georgia provided a narrative of oppression of minorities, as well as 
the narrative of disloyal ethnicities. These narratives were used extensively by the 




Language and identity in Georgia under Soviet rule 
 
Language policy was central to Soviet nationalities policy, the ostensible goal of 
which was to build a supranational, classless society. The Bolshevik Party 
programme, adopted in 1903 and proclaiming the belief in the equality of nations, 
promised equal rights to all nationalities, including education in their own 
language and the right to secede from the Russian empire (see section 2.3.2). After 
the Revolution, the Bolsheviks found themselves confronted with the practical task 
of gaining the support of the non-Russian population and controlling the former 
multi-ethnic empire. Nationalities policy, with its key focus on language, was 
viewed as an instrument for fulfilling this task. The Bolsheviks believed that by 
supporting and encouraging national languages and cultures they could gain the 
loyalty of local leaders and populations. Later, when all peoples of the Soviet 
Union reached the level of development of Great Russians, the Bolsheviks would 
have the opportunity to abolish national boundaries. The erosion of national 
consciousness and the emergence of proletarian consciousness would contribute to 
the unity of the world — the universal civilising mission of the Russian people: to 
design a truly international and attractive model of the state with a single Soviet 
identity. 
Therefore, in the early Soviet years, the Bolsheviks supported the 
development of officially recognised nationalities that were identified with a single 
language and territory. However, this practice, instead of contributing to the 
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creation of a homogeneous nation and a single Soviet identity, in reality resulted in 
ethno-national identities becoming the most important identities for Soviet citizens. 
This threatened the realisation of the goal of the Socialist Revolution. For decades, 
the Soviet leadership and scholars were vigorously changing the implementation of 
the policy, adjusting it to the needs of holding the state together, simultaneously 
denying the existence of national aspirations. But the last decades of the Soviet 
regime showed national tensions and the USSR became a ‘volcano of nations’ 
causing explosive realignment of social and political forces (Brzezinski 1989: 1). 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of analyses of Soviet 
nationalities policy have appeared in the West. Much of the literature focuses on 
the contradictory and experimental character of the policy. It increased the 
potential for ethnic conflict among groups whose national aspirations were 
ignored, then suddenly emerged and consequently led to the collapse of the empire, 
a conquest which went largely hand-in-hand with armed conquest of independent 
states. The general accuracy of the detailed interpretations presented and shared by 
many academics, such as Suny (1993; 1998), Kaiser (1994), Brubaker (1994; 
1996), Pipes (1997), Laitin (1998), Martin (2001), Beissinger (2002), J. Smith 
(2005) and Hirsch (2005), is not in question, but it is important not only to 
acknowledge varying top-down processes towards different groups, but also to 
distinguish them from bottom-up policies. After giving an overview of Soviet 
language policy in the larger context of the nationalities policy (section 5.1), the 
chapter then discusses the nationalist aspirations of the Georgians under Soviet 
rule and shows how the Georgian language gradually became a key element in the 
struggle for independence (section 5.2). 
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5.1 Top-down policy 
Before the Revolution, Lenin had declared that the Bolsheviks supported national 
self-determination not per se, but for pragmatic reasons, to mobilise the support of 
ethnic minorities, and that secession would be opposed if it was against the 
interests of the proletariat (see section 2.3.2). After the 1917 revolution, the right to 
secede was realised in the cases of Finland, the Baltic states and Poland. The 
independence of Georgia was also accepted, but the country was later annexed (see 
section 5.2) and in 1922, the Soviet Union was established. Before splitting in 
1936, the three Soviet Socialist republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
formed the Federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia (J. Smith 
2005: 199). They were declared to be sovereign states with the right to secession, 
but this right was primarily symbolic (Coppieters 2002: 91). Granting 
‘sovereignty’ was determined by the practical need to overcome hostility towards 
the Soviet regime, a hostility common not only in Georgia, but also in many other 
places sovietised by force. Taking into account that the spread of the October 
Revolution — created in Russia by Russians and therefore really a Russian 
revolution — was bitterly opposed in many of the places that gained independence 
after the October Revolution (for example, in Georgia), and considering that their 
nationalisms were still very powerful, the Soviets had to win non-Russians over to 
the side of the Revolution (Haugen 1985: 12). Collaborating with the national 
leaders of borderlands meant attempting to sideline the national-political 
aspirations of formerly independent states but allowing their cultural development. 
Their consciousness had to be not political, but historical and cultural — the goal 
to be achieved by nationalities policy in the transitional period from capitalism, 
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and in many cases from feudalism (see section 2.3.3), to socialism. Local 
nationalisms could interfere with the Bolsheviks’ main plan, and the Soviets 
decided to neutralise national élites and gain their trust by involving them in the 
building of a socialist society. In order to reach local audiences and overcome 
distrust towards Great Russians, it seemed necessary to grant those regions the 
right to some kind of self-determination – formal recognition of the independence 
of the union republics, a declaration on the equality of all ethnic groups and their 
languages, and the granting of the right to cultural freedom. The Soviet Union, the 
first state in history to place the national principle at the base of its federal 
structure (ignoring Switzerland), gave no real political sovereignty for its 
nationalities. Cultural, ethnographic, but not political or intellectual diversity was 
accepted. A constitutional recognition of the multinational character of the Soviet 
population and the establishment of fifty-three national-territorial units with 
official status, including the right to self-determination (secession for the union 
republics), created the psychological illusion that the peoples had some kind of 
control over their own destinies. The Bolsheviks still opposed any attempt at 
decentralisation in the economic and political sphere, but thought that granting 
cultural privileges and freedom to local national leaders who had previously fought 
the Bolsheviks could overcome their bourgeois mentality and secure their political 
loyalty. The task was not easy and comprised two main aims: as true Marxists, the 
Bolsheviks had to fight against the bourgeois ideology, that is nationalism, and, at 
the same time, to promote and encourage the national consciousness of diverse 
ethnic groups, as a transitional stage to the supra-national state, again in 
accordance with Marxism (see section 2.3).  The approach to this dual task was 
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later formulated by Stalin, in 1928: the state was to be ‘national in form, socialist 
in content’ (see section 2.3.3). 
Since the ethnic groups of the Soviet Union varied in their level of 
development according to Marx’s historical timeline (see section 2.3.1), policies 
towards them also differed. Soon after the Revolution, Lenin (1965: 195-196) 
explained that ‘different nations advance in the same historical direction, but by 
very different zigzags and by-paths [...] [M]ore cultured nations obviously proceed 
in a way that differs from that of the less cultured nations [...] [W]e must not act in 
a stereotyped way’. Well aware of the difficulties faced by the new regime in terms 
of national policy during the transitional period of overcoming bourgeoisie 
nationalism, Lenin was in favour of special measures for some nations. These 
measures would not be necessary if people had no specific national features. But, 
in Lenin’s opinion, there were no such people, and socialist society could be built 
only by helping all ethnic groups reach the next stage of their development (Lenin 
1965: 195-196). Taking into account the nationalisms of ‘cultured nations’, such as 
that of the Georgians, who after the Revolution formed independent states and 
threatened to run counter to the establishment of socialism (G. Smith 1996: 4), the 
goal of communism had to be reached step by step. The first step was to use the 
local élite for transmitting the universal doctrine of communism to local people in 
their native tongues. In this way, communism would not seem like an alien 
ideology imposed by the Russian authorities, but rather would make Soviet power 
seem internal and native. As Stalin, People’s Commissar for Nationalities, 
explained in 1920, making Soviet power ‘near and dear’ required ‘that all Soviet 
organs in the border regions should as far as possible be recreated by local people 
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acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs, and language of the native 
population’ (Stalin 1953a: 370). 
5.1.1 Language and the construction of nationalities 
National development implied several measures, including the creation of 
administrative units based on ethno-linguistic affiliations; reinforcing (in some 
cases, inventing) ethno-national identities through the manipulation of census data, 
languages, alphabets and history, and creating social conditions which would 
preserve old and newly established and officially recognized nationalities. In some 
places, particularly in Central Asia, new nations were artificially created (Mirsky 
1997: 2). As Roeder (1991: 205) observes, ‘[t]he indigenous cadre was given an 
institutionalized monopoly of the public expression of ethnic identity, that is, it 
defined the ethnic markers that distinguished the nationality [. . .]. In the extreme, 
the markers identified by these élites defined new ethnic groups, such as Tajiks, 
that had not previously been communities with which élites and the masses had 
identified’. The local cadres were given the power to monopolise the mobilisation 
of resources for large-scale political action, i.e. they were assigned the role of 
gatekeepers, determining when an ethnic group could mobilise politically, since all 
the means of communication (print and broadcast media in local languages) and 
access to public places (halls, auditoriums, squares) were in their hands. The role 
of gatekeeper was to pursue the instrumental strategy of social transformation 
intended by the central government and, in return, local cadres were rewarded with 
a privileged position, as well as with material rewards (Roeder 1991: 206). 
Therefore, they were holding on to their status by being reliable servants of 
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socialism and played a critical role in the realisation of the Bolsheviks’ plans – to 
remove political agendas from national movements and the political power needed 
for nationalism, that is, to encourage the building of nations which would later be 
referred to by Stalin as ‘socialist nations’ (see section 5.1.2), and which constituted 
titular nations of the union republics. There were fifteen of them by 1945. The 
titular populations of the union republics, even those who previously enjoyed 
political sovereignty, had to be satisfied with self-determination within their 
historical homelands, the borders of which were drawn in an ethno-federation of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The nation-builders were encouraged to 
think of their homeland as the identity-marker of the ethno-republic and ethno-
nation (G. Smith 1998: 6). The titular groups did not have to do anything to belong 
to the nations in which they were born. Their membership in respective ‘imagined 
communities’ was not only guaranteed, but even forced, through the strategy 
accomplished by national cadres. These cadres were assigned to create a new, local 
educated élite of professionals and intelligentsia which could take pride in 
enjoying privileged conditions within designated areas, where they had their own 
academies of science, universities, theatres, opera houses and so on. These nations 
considered their respective republics to be their exclusive homelands, and ethnic 
minorities were not considered part of them. The titular nations of each union 
republic took full advantage of their privileges. For example, by 1970, while 67% 
of the whole population of Georgia belonged to the titular nation, 83% of all 
university students were ethnic Georgians (Roeder 1991: 207). 
Besides the titular nations, in each union republic there were ethnic 
minorities which, according to their level of development, did not attain the status 
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of a nation. Many of them were granted the status of autonomous republic (twenty 
in total), autonomous district (eight in total) or autonomous area (ten in total), but 
over fifty ethnic groups received no official status at all. Within such 
administrative units, many ethnic minorities were treated as ‘guests’ or non-
indigenous settlers after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Independence did not 
provide them with equality (see section 6.2.1). For example, in 1991, president 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia told foreign journalists that Ossetians are unwanted guests in 
Georgia and they should ‘go back’ to North Ossetia (Brook 1991). 
The ranking of national-territorial units had nothing to do with population 
size. Some larger groups had lesser status than some smaller groups. Granting 
some kind of autonomy to those ethnic groups which had already developed 
national consciousness could be explained by the Bolshevik belief that this could 
help gain the hearts of non-Russians. But it does not explain the reason for 
granting autonomy or enforcing ethnic consciousness on the groups where it was 
not strong or previously did not exist at all. There were other reasons behind each 
case and the three territories within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia which 
were granted autonomous status (the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ossetian 
Autonomous District), are good illustrations of some of those reasons. The titular 
nationalities in the Abkhazian and Ossetian autonomies were in the minority, but 
the Soviets needed to recompense them with autonomous status, because they took 
the Bolshevik side in the civil war and were expecting a reward for their support. 
The creation of the Ajarian ASSR, however, had foreign policy reasons behind it: 
to satisfy the demands of Kemalist Turkey (J. Smith 2005: 55). The fact is that 
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Ajarians were Georgians who converted to Islam when they came under Ottoman 
rule in 1614-1878 (Hirsch 2005: 133). The paradox was in designating the Ajarian 
autonomy as a religious enclave in an officially atheist state. 
Each administrative unit was based on its language and culture and, in this 
way, as A. D. Smith (1991: 147-148) explains, the whole population was organised 
into recognisable ethnies by ‘selecting, fusing, even inventing appropriate 
languages and ranking them all in a hierarchy of ethno-national size and strategic 
importance. Thus small groups like Udmurts and Evenki were classified as 
peoples, while much larger and more developed communities, like the Georgians 
or Uzbeks, were treated as nations with their own sovereign territorial republics, 
administrations, party organizations, languages and cultures’. National 
development and the rediscovery of national cultures and languages among groups 
with their own administrative units were to be promoted by the new administration 
and new cultural élite. This élite emerged mainly from the working class and 
peasantry after the execution during the terror years of the old national 
intelligentsia (educated in the Tsarist period and therefore not to be trusted). They 
were used to the Bolsheviks’ own advantage, to become new national leaders and 
promote a culture – national in form – under complete equality and brotherhood, 
unlike western nations, whose national consciousness evolved in contexts of 
inequality and mutual enmity.  
Under the state-sponsored policy of korenizatsiia (see section 2.3.3), the 
stated goals of which were to eliminate the economic and cultural backwardness of 
some peoples of the former Russian empire, to bring them to the same level of 
bourgeois development as some of the advanced nations of the country and to 
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harmonize their development with the Soviet regime, the new élite, known as 
‘national cadres’, would keep alive historical memories and further develop 
national consciousness by promoting distinctive national identities of non-Russian 
peoples as represented by history, folklore, music, costumes, etc. (Martin 2001:13). 
But the main focus was on national languages, following Stalin’s idea that to make 
non-Russian peasants feel Soviet power as natives, they must function in their 
native language.  
In each national territory the language of the titular nationality had to 
become an official language and be used in all areas of modern life: local 
administration, press, education, science, etc. The practical difficulty of fulfilling 
this task lay in the fact that most languages did not have scripts and had never been 
standardised and the population was largely illiterate, approaching 100% in some 
places (Kirkwood 1991: 62). The selection and codification of languages in such a 
linguistically heterogeneous country required an enormous effort from scholars. 
The first thing to decide was which script to adopt. Cyrillic was rejected for 
ideological purposes, as it was associated with Tsarist imperialism and Great 
Russian chauvinism (see section 2.3.2). The Arabic script used by Muslim groups 
was also undesirable, as the influence of Islam was to be contained. Gradually 
Latin gained favour as a neutral script. All the old writing systems, except 
Georgian and Armenian, were latinised. The new written languages used the Latin 
script (Martin 2001: 185), only to be cyrillicised in a few years when the policy of 
russification started (see section 5.1.2). This process of graphisation went hand in 
hand with the eradication of illiteracy under the slogan ‘Down with illiteracy’. 
Literacy centres, reading libraries and other cultural organisations were established 
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everywhere. The mass eradication of illiteracy was one of the greatest 
achievements of the Communists. According to Kurganov (1951: 256), by 1939 
the number of literates for the whole country had reached 81.2% of the population. 
After graphisation, the next practical tasks for scholars were 
grammatication and lexicalisation of new official languages in order to enable 
them to be used in public life and education and to reflect the new political and 
social reality brought about by the Revolution. At the same time, the whole process 
of codification (graphisation, grammatication and lexicalisation) had a hidden 
agenda: to segregate related ethnic groups from each other and establish distinct 
national identities, as demonstrated by the Moldavian example in section 2.4.1. 
Political factors also contributed to the standardisation of languages in Central 
Asia, where different standards were developed for mutually comprehensible 
Turkic dialects, creating languages maximally distinct from each other (Grenoble 
2003: 138). Language also became a tool for defining a nation as it happened in the 
case of Belorussian nation in spite of the weakness of the Belorussian identity. 
Stalin, who was accused of artificially cultivating Belorussian nationality, 
maintained that indeed there was a Belorussian nation and it could develop only in 
its own language (J. Smith 2005: 27).  Many smaller groups did not have any 
national consciousness, despite Lenin’s (1965: 196) opinion that there were no 
groups without national features. According to the 1923 census data, many 
answering the census question about nationality described themselves as Muslims, 
peasants or named the village or town they were from. As part of their 
development, people unaware of their identity had to be told who they were (White 
2000: 253). Thus, the population of the USSR was classified not only according to 
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territorial factors (different levels of administrative units), but also based on 
language and cultural similarities. 
Besides using language for controlling national identities and, in case of the 
absence of such, creating them and organising people into nationalities, other 
measures were also taken. Soviet internal passports had a fixed, biologically 
defined, single, formally unchangeable ethnicity called ‘nationality’.30 It was 
transmitted by descent and officially recognised. Unlike the English term, 
‘nationality’ in the Soviet context did not describe the relationship between a state 
and an individual and had nothing to do with citizenship. Soviet citizens belonged 
to various officially recognised nationalities based on Stalin’s definition of a 
‘nation’ (see section 2.3.3) which suggested the unity of territory, language, shared 
history and culture. The list of nationalities of Soviet people was created for the 
All-Union Census (1926) questionnaire, in which the most important question was 
about mother tongue. The questionnaire was elaborated by the experts together 
with central administrators and local leaders. There were debates about 
establishing an official vocabulary of identity categories, conscious that the 
adoption of particular terms could influence the census results, which then would 
influence many other decisions concerning borders disputes, national education, 
the distribution of land, etc. Many suggested using the Russian narodnost’ (people) 
instead of the foreign word natsional’nost’ (nationality). Georgian participants 
opposed this suggestion, insisting that Georgians already were a developed nation 
and did not want to be categorised as a people. They also complained about a 
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 Except for the offspring of interethnic marriages, who could choose either of the parents’ 
nationalities when they received their passports at the age of 16 (Brubaker 1996: 31). 
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number of peoples designated as separate nationalities, such as Megrelians, Svans, 
Laz, Bats and Ajarians, maintaining that they were just religious or tribal 
subgroups of the Georgian nation. Having them on the list of nationalities was 
understood as an attempt to undermine the Georgian nation and a continuation of 
the colonial politics of ‘divide and rule’. It turned out that more than fifty percent 
of Megrelians registered themselves as Georgians. Later Georgians maintained that 
more of them would have registered as Georgians if census takers had not insisted 
that they were Megrelians (Hirsch 2005: 132-133).  
The final list of Soviet nationalities identified 172 peoples. In Georgia this 
list included Georgians, Turks, Armenians and Russians, whereas Laz, Megrelians 
and Svans were listed as part of the Georgian nation. From now on, the term 
‘nationality’ included nations, peoples, national groups and ethnographic groups. 
Nations were defined as peoples making up the main population of union and 
autonomous republics. Peoples were the main population of autonomous districts 
and regions, as well as the big groups living compactly in defined regions and 
having literacy in their own language. Ethnographic groups included peoples 
representing ‘the remainders of different tribes’. National groups included those 
peoples whose main mass lived outside the USSR (Hirsch 1997: 272-274), such as 
Germans, Poles, Finns, Chinese and others.  
After coming up with a list of official nationalities, Soviet policy makers 
needed to match former linguistic diversity with nationalities. In order to do so, 
they either differentiated closely related language varieties, as in the 
abovementioned example of Turkic dialects of Central Asia, or consolidated 
mutually incomprehensible languages into one national language (Grenoble 2003: 
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47). Languages were ranked according to a hierarchy of nationalities and the 
degree of development. Educational policies towards different groups were 
influenced by this hierarchy and varied from one year of schooling to a university 
education. Some languages (among them Georgian) had the necessary 
terminology, textbooks for various fields of science, highly qualified 
teachers/professors, the media, etc., whereas in many new literary languages it was 
impossible to teach various subjects because specialized vocabulary was lacking.  
Instead of elaborating scientific terminology for these languages, the language of 
instruction in national secondary schools was changed to Russian. Such a language 
shift made it easier to assimilate and russify the minorities. In some cases, turning 
to Russian as a language of instruction would happen earlier – even in the second 
year of primary school – because some languages had a limited vocabulary. As a 
result, such groups (for example, Abkhazians) became more fluent in Russian than 
in their mother tongue. Although russification was censured and rejected by the 
state, the role of lingua franca was reserved for Russian. The Russian language 
still opened more opportunities for social mobility. This was especially true for 
populations in places where national consciousness was weak and/or the degree of 
language development was low.  
Even only one year of schooling required alphabets and standard language, 
therefore a wide range of languages underwent varying degrees of language 
planning, facilitating the development of a national literary culture. This supported 
Stalin’s assertion that proletarian culture does not cancel out native culture (see 
section 2.3.3), which remains ‘national in form’. National languages and cultures 
would bloom in the period when socialism was not yet established. The Bolsheviks 
227 
 
predicted that when socialism triumphed throughout the world, nations would 
merge and form a single proletarian society, which presumably would require a 
common culture and a single common language. This language would be neither 
Great Russian nor German, but something new, since languages would have 
opportunities ‘to enrich one another on the basis of cooperation’. Stalin wrote: 
Firstly, Lenin never said that national differences must disappear and 
that national languages must merge into one common language within 
the borders of a single state before the victory of socialism on a world 
scale. On the contrary, Lenin said something that was the very 
opposite of this, namely, that "national and state differences among 
peoples and countries [. . .] will continue to exist for a very, very long 
time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established 
on a world scale. (Stalin  1955: 374) 
Stalin foresaw the process of assimilation later, on a voluntary basis. Therefore, in 
the first phase of language planning and policy no attempts were made to establish 
a single language, despite the demands of some Bolsheviks. Imposing a single 
universal language was considered an expression of Great Russian chauvinism and 
therefore attacked by Stalin. In one of his speeches, he emphasised: 
Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a single 
universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the 
period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-
embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather 
than for such a theory. Until now what has happened has been that the 
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socialist revolution has not diminished but rather increased the 
number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest sections of 
humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, it awakens to 
new life a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. 
(Stalin 1954c: 141) 
The outcome of supporting the development of small nationalities and their 
languages was a great step forward in the sphere of education in general, and in 
promoting small languages in particular. Another, although unintended, result of 
such a policy was that the ethnic identities of those nations which had an official 
homeland in the Soviet Union were significantly strengthened, where otherwise, at 
least in some places, they could have disappeared. But this policy of pluralism and 
linguistic federalism did not last long. It changed in the 1930s, when Stalin 
declared the victory of socialism in the USSR and no longer deplored the idea of a 
world language (Goodman 1956: 86). Nationality and language policy changed 
according to Stalin’s reversed view, more focused on russification. 
5.1.2 Russification 
The nationalities policy of the transitional period, with the help of language policy 
and census mechanisms, effectively taught Soviet citizens who they were. They 
were supposed to define themselves as representatives of one of the official 
nationalities. After the 1926 census, nationality became a major marker of identity 
in the Soviet Union, mainly according to the mother tongue as an obligatory 
marker of national identity. Even peoples who previously had not shown any level 
of national consciousness started describing themselves as members of 
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nationalities and used this term to claim their political and economic rights (Hirsch 
2005: 145-146). This led Stalin to write the article ‘The National Question and 
Leninism’ in 1929 (see section 2.3.3), in which he concluded that, following the 
defeat of capitalism in Russia, new so-called ‘socialist nations’ had emerged to 
take the place of ‘bourgeois nations’. The major difference between ‘bourgeois’ 
and ‘socialist’ nations was that the former were aimed against Great Russian 
chauvinism as a form of racial discrimination practised by Russians against 
minorities, preventing nations from merging into a single union, whereas with the 
establishment of ‘socialist nations’, there was no longer a need to fight against 
Russians, and the situation reversed to fighting against ‘local nationalisms’ (see 
section 2.3.3), as ugly forms of anti-Russian movements. 
The fight against ‘local nationalisms’ was intended to suppress political 
identities which might compete with communist ideology. It was therefore 
accompanied by the extermination of nationalist élites (especially in 1936-38). 
Everyone associated with nationalist ideas was labelled ‘counter-revolutionary’ 
and either killed or sent to the Siberian camps. Survivors were terrorised. At the 
same time, some nations whose main mass lived outside the USSR (see section 
5.1.1) were declared ‘enemy nations’ because they were believed to have ties with 
foreign nation-states, which could be used against the USSR. They were therefore 
subjected to ethnic cleansing (Martin 2001: 311). They could no longer be listed 
among official nationalities of the Soviet state. Accordingly, their national schools 
were abolished, and a few years later mass terror started against them, including 
arrests, deportation to remote areas and imprisonment in concentration camps, as 
well as the execution of almost one million individuals. During WWII, five 
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republics (the Volga German ASSR, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the Balkar 
Autonomous District, the Karachai Autonomous Region and the Autonomous 
Socialist Republic of Kalmykia) were abolished after their populations were 
accused of collaborating with the Germans (Hirsh 1997: 307, footnote 122). This 
discriminatory policy was extended to so-called ‘indigenous’ nationalities (among 
them Meskhetians from Georgia) as well. In the early 1930s, for political and 
economic reasons, the Soviet government decided to reduce the number of official 
nationalities by consolidating smaller groups into larger national-territorial units 
(Hirsh 1997: 273).
31
 The process was accompanied by the eradication of 
traditional, sometimes ancient, institutions in order to speed up evolution. Many 
village and district-level ethnic units were abolished; minority political and cultural 
leaders were accused of nationalism and repressed during the Great Terror of 
1936-1938. 
Thus, fear of Russian chauvinism shifted to fears of local nationalisms. 
Correspondingly, with regard to nationalities and language policies, the emphasis 
shifted from pluralism to centralism (Haugen 1985: 12). In 1938, the government 
of the USSR decreed the teaching of Russian obligatory in all national schools. 
The vocabulary, grammar and alphabets of national languages were subjected to 
alterations: numerous non-Russian peoples switched from the Latin to the Cyrillic 
alphabet between the end of the 1930s and the early 1940s and the Latin alphabet 
was declared ‘anti-proletarian’ (Ornstain 1959: 2-3).  The growing campaign to 
replace latinised alphabets with alphabets based on the Cyrillic script was officially 
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 The list was reduced again to 104 in the 1970 census. 
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explained as a response to the democratically expressed wish of the Soviet people 
and was justified in terms of ensuring access to Russian culture (Komunisti, 1938, 
8 February) and language for Soviet citizens. Russian was declared an instrument 
of the ‘most advanced culture in the world,’ from which the national languages of 
the USSR draw a ‘life-giving elixir’ (Goodman 1956: 93) and it was necessary to 
be acquainted with this language in order to share Russian civilisation. According 
to the central newspaper Izvestiya (1938, 14 April) and the Georgian newspaper 
Sabchota mastsavlebeli (15 January 1939), Russian had to be dominant, since this 
was a language in which Lenin and Stalin wrote their ‘incomparable’ and 
‘immortal’ works. As Kirkwood (1991: 63) observes, ‘[d]e facto if not de jure 
Russian was thereby acknowledged as being of more importance than other Soviet 
languages’. On 13 April 1938, the People’s Commissariat issued a resolution 
ordering the teaching of Russian in the non-Russian schools of Georgia from the 
third grade and obligatory Russian courses for three years in all universities 
(Komunisti, 1938, 15 April : 1). The Ministry of Education of the Georgian SSR 
offered two explanations for the low level of Russian instruction: it blamed 
‘people’s enemies’ working in the sphere of education, on the one hand (Sabchota 
mastsavlebeli, 1938, 21 April: 1; Komunisti, 1938, 8 February: 2), and a shortage 
of time, qualified teachers and schoolbooks, on the other (Sabchota mastsavlebeli, 
1939, 21 August: 2). 
Despite repeated directives by the Party and the government to 
improve the teaching of Russian in Georgian schools, this subject is 
still not taught properly. Enemies in the Peoples Commissariat of 
Education have prevented our schools from teaching the Russian 
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language suitably […] The method for teaching this language has not 
yet been elaborated. (Sabchota mastsavlebeli, 1938, 15 April: 3) 
In 1939, the Ministry selected the best teachers of Russian and gave them 
additional training (Sabchota mastsavlebeli, 1939, 24 June: 3), simultaneously 
increasing hours of Russian instruction in schools. The results of these measures 
were evaluated as partly fruitful a year later (Sabchota mastsavlebeli, 1940, 11 
December: 3) and mostly successful by the beginning of 1950s (Sakhalkho 
ganatleba, 1951, 8 August: 2). 
The theory of the Great Russian language being a world language was 
developed by the Georgian linguist Niko Marr, whose ideas dominated Soviet 
linguistics in 1930s and played a key role in the development of Soviet language 
policy (Grenoble 2003: 55). According to Marr’s linguistic theory, all languages 
could be divided into four types according to the level of their development.
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Languages develop in a sequence of stages corresponding to the development of 
the economy. The highest type includes Indo-European (inflexional) languages, 
among them Russian (Marr 1935: 23-24). In Marr’s view, only these languages 
had a future and a chance to contribute to the future language of the world which 
would come to existence once world socialism had been established. In order to 
reconcile his theory with Marxism, Marr declared language to be a manifestation 
of class. According to Marxism, there was a certain relationship between society 
and language, namely, the economic structure of society was the ‘basis’ of the 
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 Marr's theory was delivered as a series of lectures at the State University of Azerbaijan in Baku 
in 1927 and published in 1928. See Marr 1934: 3-126.) 
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political, artistic, legal, philosophical and scientific views of society, which was 
referred to as ‘superstructure’. Marr considered language to be an element of 
Marxist superstructure, based on the economic structure of society: ‘Language is 
genetically connected with society, and not only the concepts expressed by words 
but the words themselves and their forms, their actual appearance, issue from the 
social structure, its superstructural worlds, and, through them, from economics, 
from economic life’ (Marr 1936: 46-47). According to him, in a classless society 
based on a common economic structure, in other words, where there exists a 
common ‘basis’, there will be only one common superstructure, or a single unified 
language. Thus, when all nations of the USSR merged, their languages would also 
merge and would probably resemble Russian. In Marr’s thinking, the economic 
basis could be changed by force; therefore it was possible to accelerate the process 
by imposing one language, which seemed like a process naturally coinciding with 
socialist development (Grenoble 2003: 57). 
Since Marr was considered to be the father of Soviet linguistics, his views 
encouraged other linguists to start the systematic glorification of Russian and 
maintain its future as a world language. The logic was such: if Latin was the 
language of the ancient world and the early Middle Ages, French became the 
language of the feudal era and international diplomacy, then English became a 
language of capitalism, looking to the future it was obvious that Russian would be 
the language of the new socialist world (Zaslavsky 1950). The director of the 
Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences, Viktor Vinogradov, published 
a book entitled The Great Russian Language in which he glorified Russian as a 
great medium of communication among Soviet peoples and as a servant of 
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communism. He wrote: ‘The Russian language as a language of high culture is the 
ideal and pattern for the languages of the other nationalities. From it they derive 
the vocabulary and phraseology relating to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and to 
the process of Socialist construction’ (translated by Ornstain 1959: 5). Vinogradov 
inspired many linguists and non-linguists alike to praise Russian. In 1950 the 
newspaper Literaturnaya gazeta published an article by Stalin’s assistant 
Zaslavsky under the title ‘The Great Language of the Epoch’, which claimed that 
‘[t]he Russian language is the first world language of international significance, 
which rejects sharply the destruction of character by cosmopolitanism [. . .] 
Nobody can regard himself as educated in the full sense and true sense of the word, 
if he does not understand Russian and cannot read the creations of the Russian 
mind in the original language’ (translated by Roucek 1960: 21).  
Marrists considered the borrowing of Russian lexical, grammatical and 
phonological patterns to be natural, logical, necessary and positive processes. For 
example, regarding the Komi language, they praised the fact that ‘as a result of 
contact with Russian, prepalatal affricates have lost their affrication’, thus bringing 
‘the phonological systems of the Komi and Russian languages closer together’ 
(Ornstain 1959: 8-9). In this way, small languages with little linguistic resistance 
were heavily penetrated by Russian. Extensive and enforced borrowings from 
Russian, referred to as ‘enrichment’, modified their phonology, morphology and 
syntax.  
The pressure for russification intensified in the 1950s, despite Stalin’s strict 
criticism of Marr’s linguistic views. Inspired by the writings of another Georgian 
linguist, Marr’s greatest opponent, Arnold Chikobava, Stalin accused Marr of 
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vulgarising Marxism in his 1950 article ‘Marxism and Problems of Linguistics’ 
(see section 2.3.3): ‘Spare us from Marr’s Marxism. N. I. Marr really wanted and 
tried to be a Marxist, but he could not become one. He was only a simplifier and 
vulgarizer […] I think the sooner our linguistics frees itself of Marr’s mistakes, the 
sooner we can lead it out of crisis’ (Stalin 1950: 30-32). 
Despite Stalin’s condemnation of Marrism, russification became even 
stronger with the policy of internationalisation, creating circumstances where 
everybody needed to use Russian in order to communicate. After the Second 
World War, reconstruction in different parts of the Soviet Union required the 
migration of populations. The Soviet regime started promoting the coming together 
of young workers and specialists of different nationalities in various projects, such 
as the exploitation of virgin lands, military service, etc., justifying this move in 
terms of economic needs. Not only young people, but whole families (mainly 
Russians) were selected to work outside their home republics. More than forty 
million Russians moved to the union republics (Brzezinski 1989: 6), creating 
interethnic collective farms, factories and plants where the use of Russian became 
a necessity. Upward mobility in political, military and scientific spheres also 
required fluency in Russian. Many parents, having the right to select either a 
national or Russian school for their children, chose Russian schools in order to 
provide their children with a better future. The need for any language other than 
Russian was questioned (Grenoble 2003: 57). The government encouraged this 
tendency at all levels of education. 
The conditions requiring better knowledge of Russian stimulated 
significant changes in the education system: in many autonomous republics 
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national schools were closed; the number of schools which started teaching 
Russian from the first grade increased; secondary schooling was reduced from 
eleven to ten years, reducing the number of hours spent on native language, 
literature and history. As a result of such changes, many more people became 
fluent in Russian, but linguistic assimilation did not imply a change of ethnic 
identity. Many Russian-speaking minorities continued to identify themselves as 
members of certain ethnic groups. For example, while almost 70 % of Udmurts 
claimed Udmurt to be their native language in the 1979 census, only 15% of them 
actually spoke it (Drobizheva 1985: 7). This can be explained by the fact that the 
census question asked respondents to name their native language rather than the 
language they spoke primarily. Moreover, the language question immediately 
followed a question on nationality, prompting respondents to correlate ‘native 
language’ with nationality. In reality many respondents were linguistically 
assimilated, because there were no resources for native language education, and 
because material incentives motivated people gradually to assimilate. 
Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964), continued and 
strengthened the policy of russification. In 1961 the Party adopted a new 
programme called the ‘Communist Manifesto of the Present Epoch’, which was 
launched at the twenty-second Party congress.
33
 Khrushchev emphasised a great 
achievement in the field of national relations (namely, the fact that the boundaries 
of the Soviet Republics, which were erected on the foundation of nationalities, 
were rapidly losing their significance), and threatened those who demonstrated 
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 This title was used by Khrushchev in the Report on the Program of the CPSU October 17, 1961. 
See Pravda, 1961, 19 October: 1-10. 
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even ‘the slightest vestiges of nationalism’ (Khrushchev 1961: 7). Considering 
reactions to the Party Programme, it was obvious that any desire to preserve 
national cultures and languages would be understood as an expression of 
nationalism and would be eradicated with ‘uncompromising Bolshevik 
determination’ (Khrushchev 1961: 3-4 ). Unlike Stalin’s formula of ‘national in 
form, socialist in content’, this policy demanded the elimination of barriers 
separating nationalities and the development of common characteristics, i.e. loss of 
national identity. According to Khrushchev, the development of national languages 
to some degree led nations away from each other instead of helping them to ‘come 
together’ (Khrushchev 1961: 7). Russian had to unite them. Khrushchev referred to 
the Russian language and culture as ‘the key to life’ (Khrushchev 1961: 3-4) and a 
bridge between national cultures and world cultures. Unlike the transitional period 
from capitalism to socialism under Stalin (see section 5.1.1), a new transitional 
period was beginning: socialism was giving way to communism. Now the Party 
had a duty to create the necessary conditions for the fusion of all nations into a 
single one. In the interim period, however, the Soviet nation would consist of 
bilingual people who would regard Russian as the most important language and 
would be loyal to the broader Russian community and leadership (Vardys 1966: 
324).  Khrushchev also banned the writing of history which idealised the past and 
the cultivation of national heroes which could arouse a feeling of national pride 
running counter to assimilationist policies. 
Khrushchev’s attempts to eradicate linguistic and ethnic diversity provoked 
strong dissident movements (with regard to Georgia, see section 5.2.3), showing 
that national aspirations were only temporarily silenced by Stalin’s repressions. 
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Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982), suggested that the Party 
did not expect nationalities to abandon their separate identities, but to work more 
closely together and be more aware of each other’s cultures (Hosking 1990: 429). 
He nonetheless underlined that any attempts to restrain the process of 
rapprochement or artificially to strengthen national distinctions would not be 
tolerated (Olcott 1985: 104). 
The new constitution, adopted under Brezhnev’s rule in 1977, did not differ 
greatly from the old one except with regard to language use. The use of one’s 
mother tongue was considered a general rule in the old constitution, but only as an 
‘opportunity’ in the new one. Article 45 (Constitution 1977: 23) stated that 
‘[c]itizens of the USSR have […] the opportunity to attend a school where 
teaching is in the native language’. Brezhnev’s ideas were reflected in language 
policy by a greater pressure towards russification, starting from the pre-school 
level. The number of schools offering intensive Russian and providing language 
laboratories and Russian audio-visual materials increased. As the language of 
Lenin and of the Great Russian people, reflecting the most highly developed 
culture, Russian was discussed at the 1979 Tashkent (Uzbekistan) conference in 
which the Georgian delegation did not participate (Bilinsky 1981: 318). 
Nevertheless, in the early 1980s, 10 500 four-year-olds in Georgia were already 
being taught Russian three times a week, for thirty minutes each lesson (Bilinski 
1981: 322). 
The assimilationist policy was not abandoned under the next Soviet leader, 
Yuri Andropov (1982-1984), who advocated the study of Russian in order to 
enable Soviet citizens to read the works of communist leaders, such as Brezhnev. 
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Andropov supported making ethnic groups equal in order to diminish the gap 
between modernized groups and those who were still ‘backwards’. Since Slavs 
were considered the most advanced groups of the Soviet Union, equalisation meant 
catching up with them. But, as Jones and Grupp (1984: 159) note, ‘for those 
minorities who have historically led the Slavs in the modernization process or in 
access to high status roles, for example, the Jews, Armenians, and Georgians – 
equalisation meant a gradual erosion of their relative advantage’. Nevertheless, the 
union republics had the most extensive networks of ethnic institutions (such as 
Georgia) and were thus less vulnerable to assimilation than populations of 
administrative units at lower levels in the hierarchy (Gorenburg 2003: 32). As a 
result of russification, many small ethnic groups gave up their own languages for 
Russian. The effect of russification also depended on the location of the ethnic 
population. Ethnic institutions operated only locally, within designated homelands 
and those who lived outside ethnic territories mostly became assimilated. The role 
of Russian as a second language for Soviet citizens increased especially in Central 
Asia, Ukraine and Belorussia. In other Republics the growth of Russian was not so 
rapid and in Estonia it was even in decline. The policy was least successful 
amongst Georgians, who had a strong sense of national identity, an old and rich 
culture, and a written language; they were thus able to resist russification, as 
discussed in detail in section 5.2.1.  
Although before and after the Revolution communist leaders spoke about 
the merging and fusing of nations, this never happened, probably because it was 
never intended to organise the Soviet Union as a nation-state (Martin 2001: 15). 
The USSR was supposed to be a supra-national state. The model of assimilation of 
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minorities within the union republics was also rejected, even if such assimilation 
was completely voluntary (Martin 2001: 32). In order to prevent the establishment 
of civic nations and to keep ethnic minorities isolated, the Bolsheviks implemented 
a language policy which prevented ethnic minorities from knowing the national 
languages of the union republics and effectively excluded them from the nation. 
Unlike a civic attitude to a nation, which views national affiliation as 
something that can be acquired and, therefore, as a matter of choice, it was not a 
matter of choice in the USSR. Nationality was registered in internal passports and 
other official documents and was transmitted by descent.
34
 The union republics 
only superficially resembled nation-states with their constitutions, flags, anthems, 
national heroes, and anniversaries of great historical events and achievements; the 
lack of a common language for the whole population could not produce solidarity 
and a common national, cultural or even territorial identity. Being a citizen of a 
union republic had no significance. Shanin (1989: 415) cites an interesting 
example of the homeland perceptions of Soviet nations: ‘answering the question 
“what land do you call motherland?”, the majority of Georgians living in Georgia 
answered “Georgia”, while the majority of non-Georgian residents answered “the 
USSR”.’ 
Titular nations viewed the union republics as their possessions and treated 
other ethnicities with discrimination. In some places the struggle for equality of 
rights within individual republics was dominated by historical and cultural claims, 
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 When the system of internal passports was first introduced in 1932, nationality was registered by 
self-designation, but later became dependent on parental nationality. 
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as well as by language debates, causing nationalisms of subordinated ethnic groups 
to coexist with nationalisms of dominated groups. By the late 1980s, top-down 
policy reinforced by the titular nationalities of the union republics was an 
equivalent of the central policy: if the Russians had the dominant status of ‘first 
among equals’ in the USSR, titular nationalities had the same status within their 
respective homelands. Local academics engaged in politicised history writing and 
linguistic research (discussed in section 5.2 with regard to Georgia) and explained 
the origin of every nationality in the USSR in a way that created only local 
loyalties (Tishkov 1992: 378). Primordial identities were constructed, fetishised 
and nurtured through the teaching of history (often overlapping national claims in 
time and space), through linguistic research and through the census. This set ethnic 
groups within union republics against each other, making for potential conflict, 
which later became a reality.
35
 The various communities of union republics 
organised popular fronts to protest against nationality policies, resulting in 
demonstrations of hundreds of thousands. In some places, local authorities had 
close ties with popular fronts (Lapidus 1988: 101-102) and made a series of 
tactical shifts towards the position of the nationalists. For example, in 1989, the 
Georgian Supreme Soviet, with the approval of the first secretary of the Georgian 
Communist party, Givi Gumbaridze, adopted the right to veto all-Union laws. In 
1990, it declared ‘the restoration of independence’ as the party’s main goal (Suny 
1998: 323). 
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 From the very beginning the claims of ethnic minorities were deliberately aggravated by the 
central authorities in Moscow, who needed their support in order to retain control over the union 
republics (Gachechiladze 1997: 52-53). 
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In order to maintain the integrity of the Soviet Union, the last leader of the 
state, Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991), was ready to sacrifice many aspects of the 
nationalities policy. He tried to find a non-imperial legitimising principle to hold 
the USSR together. By declaring glasnost (‘openness’) and perestroika 
(‘restructuring’), he hoped to preserve the power of the Communist Party, but 
instead created the conditions for nationalist movements. Georgia was a good 
illustration of what had gone wrong with the nationalities policy of the Soviet 
Union (discussed in detail in the next section). Popular discontent over language 
policy emerged as a dominant issue in nationalist movements within all republics 
at the end of the 1980s. These movements wanted to raise the status of national 
territories and languages. The nationalisms of Soviet nations resembled the 
linguistic nationalisms of small nations in the nineteenth century. The reason for 
this resemblance lies in the lack of civic education and political experience among 
the Soviet nations, for whom civic nationalism was incomprehensible, whereas 
understanding linguistic demands was easy. After the disintegration of the empire 
these movements resulted in the increased segregation of ethnic groups within the 
former Soviet republics in the name of ethno-national purification. In contrast to 
Soviet policies, nationalist movements in the union republics were focused on 
developing the use and authority of the native languages. The next section looks at 
bottom-up and top-down policies within Georgia. 
5.2 Bottom-up policy 
Georgia was annexed by the Bolsheviks against the wishes of Lenin, who, worried 
about the national sensitivities of the Georgians, wished to establish a coalition 
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government with the Mensheviks in power in Georgia at the time (see section 
4.2.3). Stalin, however, justified the annexation by noting that the Soviets were in 
favour of an autonomy where power would be in the hands of the workers and 
peasants. In his view, since only Bolsheviks could represent the interests of 
workers and peasants, power must be in the hands of their party and nobody else 
(Cvetkovski 2001). With such an approach Stalin and his supporters ignored 
Lenin’s desire to act cautiously towards Georgians, and in 1921 the Red Army 
invaded Georgia. The Menshevik government fled to France and a new Bolshevik 
government was installed in Tbilisi (Suny 1998: 209). The Georgians vigorously 
resisted Bolshevik rule and remained hostile to the Soviets for years. For example, 
1924 was marked by an anti-communist rebellion in Georgia. The uprising 
collapsed after a few days, the leaders of the revolt were executed and the 
sovietisation of Georgia was accomplished.  
In the Soviet period, Georgian national identity was consolidated around 
the myths, traditions, poetry, historical memories and symbols of the past. As 
shown in previous chapters, Georgia had many sources from which it could create 
and re-create historical narratives. The myths of election, myths of Golden Age 
and language myths which had helped the Georgians survive over many centuries 
were revived. Several generations of Georgian intellectuals had no other choice but 
to remain largely apolitical, return to cultural resources and take advantage of the 
mass education system and cultural institutions to voice national feelings. The 
writing and teaching of history was dominated by the themes of heroism and 
sacrifice, ancestry and rights to territory. Ethnic symbols and traditions were also 
celebrated by artists, who gave ‘palpable “substance” or “body” to the national 
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idea’ (A. D. Smith 2009: 96). One of the most popular themes in poetry was the 
Georgian language. Linguistic research and language planning also served the goal 
of strengthening Georgian national identity. On the positive side, all of these 
aspects strengthened kartveloba (Georgianness) and prevented the russification of 
the Georgians. On the negative side, however, Georgian nationalism during the 
Soviet period gradually became ethnocentric as expressed by a sense of 
superiority, once again through the Georgian language. Before discussing 
Georgian ethnocentrism in section 5.2.2, section 5.2.1 looks at language planning 
under Soviet rule. 
5.2.1 The impact of Soviet language policy (bottom-up policy versus top-down 
policy)  
The historical experiences of Soviet ethnic groups varied; language policy towards 
them was differed correspondingly, depending on many factors, among them the 
stage of nation-formation, the number of Russian speakers in the area, the 
linguistic differences between Russian and the local language, the status of the 
latter and its importance for its speakers, etc. As shown in previous chapters, the 
Georgian people had a well-established sense of national identity, based mainly on 
their language with its historical prestigious status as a lingua sacra, its literary 
traditions and its unique alphabet. The status of Georgian was strengthened during 
the existence of the independent state in 1918-1921, when it was an official 
language (see section 4.2.3). It was taught as a mandatory subject in nationalised 
primary and secondary schools as well as at the newly established Tbilisi 
University. By the time of the Revolution, Georgia had very high literacy rates 
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(Grenoble 2003: 116). According to the 1926 census, 53% of Georgians aged 
between 9 and 49 years were literate (this number increased to 89.3% by 1939 and 
99% by 1959) (Jaoshvili 1968: 61). Therefore, Georgia did not undergo linguistic 
korenizatsiia (‘nativisation, indigenisation’). Georgian was declared the official 
language of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia in 1924. The Soviet 
authorities did not challenge the use of the Georgian alphabet and supported the 
development of the language, which quickly assumed a hegemonic position 
(Martin 2001: 77), dominating in education, the mass media and book publishing 
throughout the existence of the republic. For example, in 1929, 71% of all books 
published in the republic were in Georgian (Broers 2005). By 1970, Georgian was 
the first language of 98.4% ethnic Georgians, including Svans and Megrelians 
(Grenoble 2003: 117; Zisserman-Brodsky 2003: 209), and by 1989, 94% of 
Georgian children were enrolled in Georgian-language schools (Enokh 1998: 134). 
The 1989 census listed 3 981 045 Georgians in the USSR, of whom 3 787 000 
(98.2%) lived in the Georgian SSR (Zisserman-Brodsky 2003: 209). 
Furthermore, among the major Soviet nationalities, ethnic Georgians were 
the most concentrated (95%) within their homeland (Gachechiladze 1997: 55). By 
the end of the Soviet period, Georgians were one of the least russified titular 
groups in the Soviet Union. Knowledge of Russian was somewhat higher among 
males who through obligatory military service were exposed to the need to learn 
Russian,
36
 but among women, especially in villages, it was very low (Chinchaladze 
& Dragadze 1994). Altogether, proficiency in Russian among Georgians by 1989 
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 Unlike the Tsar’s army, the Red Army dispersed non-Russians among Russian recruits. 
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stood at 32% (Broers 2005). It can be argued that there was no real threat of full 
russification, especially taking into account the relatively small-scale migration of 
skilled Russian-speaking labour to Georgia (Parsons 1982: 551) and the low 
representation of Russian technocratic and management élites (Broers 2005). 
Nevertheless, Georgians felt their native language and national identity were 
threatened throughout the existence of the Soviet regime, especially after the 
proposal in 1978 to remove Georgian as the state language from the constitution 
(see in details in section 5.2.3). 
In terms of language planning, several important steps were made during 
the Soviet period. These included the creation of a central committee for 
terminology at the Commissariat of People’s Education in 1925; the opening of the 
Department of Scientific Terminology in 1936; the publication of eight volumes of 
the Georgian dictionary between 1950 and 1964; of the Collected Norms of the 
Georgian Language in 1970; and of various explanatory, orthographic, bilingual 
and many other kinds of dictionaries at various times (Tabidze 1999). Kartvelian 
languages became the object of study at the Institute of Linguistics at Tbilisi State 
University and in Georgian language departments of other universities. In the 
1980s a special commission was established to improve the teaching of Georgian 
in schools and universities (Grdzelidze 1980: 164). 
Despite these steps and despite Georgian having the status of official 
language, the influence of Russian in Georgia continued to be significant. Russian 
left its mark on Georgian vocabulary, syntax and stylistics. A simple comparison 
of Orbeliani’s Georgian dictionary (1725) (see section 3.1.2) and the dictionary of 
1950-1964 reveals that in the latter approximately 120 words were borrowed 
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directly from Russian and more than 700 words via Russian from other languages 
(Chanturishvili 1980: 79). In the beginning, the editors of the latter dictionary tried 
to create a new technical terminology based on Georgian roots, but after a special 
conference organised by the Institute of Linguistics in Moscow (1959), these 
attempts were condemned and even those words which were borrowed from 
foreign languages before the nineteenth century were altered to resemble their 
Russian equivalents (Chanturishvili 1980: 83). 
The Soviet policy of assimilation through language provoked strong 
resistance in Georgia. One of the expressions of such resistance was linguistic 
purism, based on a belief that the Georgian language had to return to its original 
form and provide a direct link to the glorious past. Georgian was not only worth 
preserving, but also possessed special, unique qualities. Teachers, journalists, 
writers and poets propagated language myths. The most prestigious poets (e.g. G. 
Leonidze, L. Asatiani, I, Abashidze, A. Kalandadze, M. Machavariani, P. 
Khalvashi, I. Noneshvili) dedicated many poems to their native tongue, 
intensifying national feelings and inspiring people to love their great ancient 
alphabet and language. These poems often either underlined the importance of 
language as a marker of kartveloba (Georgianness) (e.g.: ‘If a Georgian true you 
are/ And speak the language of your land….’ by Irakli Abashidze, ‘Can you ever 
forget?’; ‘Is Georgian only a language?/ No, it is the religion of Georgians.’, by 
Mukhran Machavariani, ‘The Georgian language’), or stress an autochthonous 
character of Georgian. For example: 
In Georgian mounts you were created, 
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Language of love, song and blessing. 
From pre-historic tribes descending, 
Torrential waterfalls, white dashing, 
Ice-bound peaks eternal melting, 
Soft, magnificent and flashing.  
 ‘The Georgian Language’ by Lado Asatiani. Translated by V. Urushadze 
(1958: 229) 
Scholarly investigations often supported the propagation of language myths 
and the cult of language. According to Abrahamian (1998), ethno-genetic 
reconstructions and linguistic theories in the Soviet Union often served nationalist 
ideas. Since both language and territory were important markers of a nation 
according to Stalin’s definition, stressing the autochthonous character of the 
language was an additional argument for claiming the right to a territory. Together 
with the doctrine of autochthony of the Georgian ethnic group in the South 
Caucasus, territorial claims became a source of conflict between Georgian and 
Abkhazian scholars (discussed in section 5.2.2). Linguistic theories served other 
goals as well. For example, in the 1980s, the ideas of the German Romanticists and 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis were used to maintain that bilingual education had a 
harmful impact on a child’s world perception. Such arguments sought to counter 
accelerated attempts to assimilate through the teaching of Russian (see section 
5.1.2). Finally, some linguistic theories were used to maintain the superiority of 





 claiming that Kartvelian languages, together with Sumerian 
and Basque, were the core of the major language families of the world. Although 
his theory was denounced in the 1950s, Marr’s views remained widely held among 
the general public (Law 2000: 178). Georgian nationalists sought to demonstrate 
the superiority of Georgian, which in the 1980s resulted in the linguistic 
messianism articulated by the future president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
and became an essential means of ethnic mobilization in the struggle for secession 
from the USSR (discussed in detail in section 5.2.3). 
Although the Georgian language was used in all domains, except in 
military service, Georgians were concerned over its failure to fulfil the role of a 
lingua franca within the republic. Consequently, the hegemony of Georgian within 
its ‘own’ social and political environment was perceived as incomplete (Broers 
2005). Therefore, the bottom-up policy in Georgia had two aspects: one was 
directed against the russification of Georgians and the other sought the 
georgianisation of those ethnic minorities which Georgia considered as its historic 
minorities (Abkhazians and Ossetians) and whose segregation from the Georgians 
was in Moscow’s but not in Tbilisi’s interest (see also section 4.1.3). Thus, as a 
top-down phenomenon, georgianisation was an assimilationist policy and opposed 
a differentialist policy directed towards other minorities (such as Russian, Azeri 
and Armenian). The next section looks at Georgia’s top-down policy towards its 
minorities. 
 
                                                          
37
 For detailed analyses of Marr’s linguistic theory, see Thomas (1957). 
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5.2.2. Top-down and bottom-up policies within Georgia 
All languages of the Soviet Union except Russian were minority languages, 
including the titular languages of the union republics, among them Georgian. The 
authorities of the republic had to communicate with Moscow in Russian; PhD 
dissertations could be written in Georgian, but had to be submitted in Russian as 
well; and the study of Russian was compulsory in Georgian schools, while the 
study of Georgian in non-Georgian schools was not (Arutiunov 1998: 102).  
Altogether only 5.7% of non-Georgians knew Georgian fluently and 2% 
considered it to be their native language, whereas almost 50% did not know it at all 
(Grdzelidze 1980: 108, 155 and 160). 
While Georgian was a minority language in the USSR, it was a majority 
language within the Georgian SSR. Linguistic minorities in Georgia included 
indigenous groups, none of which had written traditions before the Revolution: 
Megrelian, Svan, Abkhazian and Bats, as well as non-indigenous: Armenian, 
Russian, Ossetian and Azerbaijani. Megrelian and Svan survived over the centuries 
without any institutional support, using Georgian as a literary and sacred language. 
During the Soviet era, there was an attempt to establish print media in Megrelian in 
1930-1935 (kazakhishi gazeti ‘Peasant’s Paper’) and Georgian/Megrelian in 1936-
38 (komunari ‘Communard’) (Grenoble 2003: 120). This attempt was greatly 
supported by some Bolsheviks, but failed. As a result of Megrelians and Svans 
being considered sub-groups of the Georgian nation (see section 5.1.1), the use of 
their languages and their local consciousness declined. In the 1926 census, 243 000 
people stated their ethnicity as Megrelians and 132 000 as Svans, whereas the 1959 
census reported only 11 Megrelians and 9 Svans (Grdzelidze 1980: 109). As 
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discussed in section 3.1, Megrelians, Laz and Svans consider themselves 
Georgians and perceive the Georgian language as their second native language. In 
the diglossic situation which exists, their native tongues have L-status and 
Georgian has H-status (see section 2.4.1). There is a debate whether genetically 
related Georgian, Megrelian and Svan are separate languages or dialects of the 
same language (see sections 2.4.1 and 6.1.3). 
Diglossia exists also among Bats, a North Caucasian language spoken in 
Eastern Georgia by only 3 000 people and considered to be endangered. Its 
speakers are integrated into the Georgian nation and are not perceived as a 
different ethnic group, either by themselves or by other Georgians (Koch-Kobaidze 
1999: 155). In the Soviet period, speakers of Kartvelian languages and Bats used 
Georgian as their literary language, their children went to Georgian schools and 
their cultural georgianization was completed during the Soviet era. The Soviet 
authorities did not interfere with this state of affairs. 
By contrast, central and local policies towards other minorities were 
different. Moscow was interested in the segregation of ethnic minorities from the 
titular nation, continuing the policy of ‘divide and rule’ started by Tsarist Russia 
(see section 4.1.3). Georgia’s policy towards its non-indigenous ethnic groups 
(Armenians, Azeri-speaking Greeks, Azeris, etc.) was one of exclusion in places 
where they outnumbered the Georgians (e.g. Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda, Tsalka 
and Marneuli). These minorities had neither the opportunity nor the need to learn 
Georgian. They preferred to go either to their national or Russian schools. Their 
lack of knowledge of the Georgian language became a reason for discrimination: 
they could occupy only subordinate positions, while Georgians had all kinds of 
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privileges and prestigious jobs (Suny 2001). The elements of Georgian national 
chauvinism witnessed in the nineteenth century (see section 4.2.1) were present 
also in the twentieth century and were encouraged by Georgian political and 
intellectual élites. National chauvinism, together with the Soviet policy of ‘divide 
and rule,’ prevented the integration of ethnic minorities into the Georgian nation. 
The language barrier between ethnic Georgians and these groups, and the resulting 
non-integration of the latter into socio-political life, was maintained after the 
collapse of the USSR and will be discussed in chapter 6. 
As for those groups which Georgia considered its historic minorities 
(Abkhazians and Ossetians), there was an attempt to restore and maintain cultural 
influence over them. During korenizatsiia (‘indigenisation’), the Latin script was 
assigned to the Abkhazian and Ossetian languages (Komunisti, 1922, 20 October: 
2; Komunisti, 1927, 25 May: 4). Unlike other languages, whose Latin-based scripts 
were changed to Cyrillic in 1938 (Zarya vostoka, 1938, 4 August: 2), the 
Abkhazian and Ossetian (in Georgia)
38
 languages adopted the Georgian alphabet 
the same year: this alphabet remained in use until 1954 (Grenoble 2003: 119). The 
authorities justified this shift by making reference to the phonetic consistency of 
these languages, but had as a political motivation — the georgianisation of Abkhaz 
and Ossetians. The georgianisation policy was accompanied by the closure of 
Abkhazian and Ossetian schools in 1944-1953, and, in Abkhazia, by the 
manipulation of demographics, namely by an increase in the numbers of 
Georgians, Russians and Armenians (Coppieters 2002: 92). The Abkhaz 
                                                          
38
 Ossetian in the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic within Russia switched from Latin to the 
Cyrillic alphabet in 1938. 
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interpreted this process as a Georgian attempt to colonise Abkhazia and responded 
by repeating their demands for secession from the Georgian SSR. The historical 
memory of these events, together with other factors discussed in the next section, 
acted as a catalyst for separatist movements in Georgia in the 1980-1990s and 
resulted in military clashes. 
After Stalin’s death in 1953, with the increasing policy of russification (see 
section 5.1.2), the Georgian script was replaced by Cyrillic and the Ossetian and 
Abkhaz schools were reopened. Despite their status as a literary language and in 
the case of Abkhazian, as an official language within the Abkhazian ASSR, where 
Abkhaz was spoken by less than a fifth of the population (Tishkov 1993: 7), these 
languages did not have technically enough vocabulary to handle the concepts of a 
modern society. The policy of creation of new words from their own sources was 
discouraged (Comrie 1981: 34) and they were forced to borrow words from 
Russian. These new words had to be taken in their Russian orthographic form and 
were to be pronounced in the Russian way. Phonological changes had far reaching 
influences on morphology and syntax as well (Sankoff 2001: 651). Thus, phonetic 
and grammatical features of Russian entered these languages. 
Since Abkhaz instruction was restricted to primary school, after which 
instruction was in Russian (Grenoble 2003: 120), Abkhazs fluent in the dominant 
language would often switch to the language of wider communication. After 
Stalin’s death, proficiency in Russian as a second language among Abkhazians 
increased significantly and reached 81.5% by 1989 (Broers 2005). In South 
Ossetia, too, instruction in local language schools was mainly in Russian and the 
native language played essentially a symbolic role. Moreover, native language 
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education was entirely absent outside the autonomous units, despite the fact that 
more ethnic Ossetians resided in other regions of Georgia (Tishkov 1993: 7). 
National minorities preferred to concentrate on Russian in national schools rather 
than on Georgian, the teaching of which, together with republican languages other 
than Russian, was only a formality. For decades, national minorities preferred to 
send their children to Russian schools, which offered a better chance of upward 
mobility (Safran 1992: 403). When in 1988 Georgia tried to strengthen the status 
of the Georgian language by introducing it as a compulsory subject in non-
Georgian schools and universities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the local 
population resisted (Kokh-Kobaidze 1999). As a result, by 1989, only 1.6% of 
Abkhazians and 13.8% of Ossetians were proficient in Georgian within their 
autonomies (Broers 2005). 
Georgia’s top-down policy towards its historic minorities, justified by the 
prestige and literary tradition of Georgian as a symbol of high culture during 
medieval statehood, was reflected in historiography. The ideas of autochthony and 
exclusive claim of the territory has been the source of conflict between Georgians 
and Abkhazians since the middle of the 1950s (Broers 2005), when the Georgian 
philologist and historian Pavle Ingoroqva published a book (1954) denying 
Abkhazian autochthony in the South Caucasus and asserting that the Abkhazians 
migrated from the North Caucasus in the seventeenth century, while the term 
‘Abkhazian’ mentioned in historical sources referred to one of the Georgian tribes: 
It turns out now that that the Abkhazian region is an ancient 
Georgian land, which was inhabited by the Georgians from ancient 
times. The population of the Abkhazian region was Georgian not 
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only in antiquity, but also in the Middle Ages. […] It was inhabited 
by three Georgian tribes: Meskhs (the same as Abkhazians), Kolchs 
(Megrelian-Laz) and Svans. (Ingoroqva 1954: 188 and 294) 
This claim meant that the Abkhazians did not have the right to a territorial 
autonomy. Ingoroqva’s view was adopted by other Georgian intellectuals and led 
to protests among the Abkhazian élite, which addressed Moscow with a request to 
join the Russian Federation. Their request was refused, but Georgia was pressed to 
distance itself from Ingoroqva’s thesis (Coppieters 2002: 93). In the late 1960s 
similar views were voiced resulting in a renewed Abkhazian request for secession. 
The Abkhazian historical narrative described an independent Abkhazian state 
going back thousands of years. While the majority of Georgians did not question 
the autochthony of Abkhazians, they supported the idea of cultural rather than 
political autonomy, considering Abkhazia a Soviet political construct. In order to 
avoid further tensions, Georgia gave Abkhazia more cultural freedom, including 
autonomy in the media and education (Coppieters 2002: 96). However, the 
scholarly debate between incompatible positions and versions of history about the 
origins of the Abkhazian community continued. Expressing their confidence in the 
conflicting interpretations of historical sources, archaeological findings and 
linguistic data, both Georgian and Abkhaz academics abused scientific tools and 
used ethnogenetic mythology to legitimise claims for territory, political status and 
cultural domination, destroying the historic unity of the two communities. Abkhaz 
historians maintained that in the distant past their territory was inhabited 
exclusively by Abkhaz-speaking people and that Abkhaz was one of the oldest 
languages in the world, while Georgians asserted the linguistic and cultural 
256 
 
unification of the two communities a thousand years ago under Bagrat III 
(Rouvinski 2007) (see section 3.3.2). Similar disagreements about history existed 
between Georgian and Ossetian scholars. 
By placing the principle of the first-settlers and the postulate of the 
continuous use of language on a given territory, Soviet academia allowed 
conflicting ethnic historical narratives and contributed to the post-Soviet Abkhaz-
Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian conflicts. As Broers (2005) notes, ‘[q]uestions of 
language, and wider questions of membership in the Georgian nation and state, 
continue to be dominated by a series of mutually exclusive dogmas, axioms and 
myths of ownership rooted in characteristically Soviet categories and conceptions 
of history’. When radical Georgian nationalism emerged in the 1980s with the 
slogan ‘Georgia for Georgians’ (see section 5.2.3), Abkhaz and Ossetian 
intellectuals started mobilising their communities in the defence of their rights. 
Eventually the likelihood of armed conflicts, fuelled by ethnic mobilisation on both 
sides, increased significantly (see section 5.2.3). 
In general, the Georgian SSR was a unique case in terms of privileged 
access of the titular nation to high administrative positions and the highest level of 
national self-determination within the Soviet Union (Christophe 2002: 153-154). 
Georgians enjoyed an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the republic’s 
high-ranking political posts and higher education institutes (Broers 2005). Unlike 
in other union republics (with the exception of Armenia), in Georgia the first party 
secretary was a titular national (Martin 2001: 87). Only since 1956, following the 
demonstrations against Khrushchev, was an ethnic Russian the second party 
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secretary. However, he knew no Georgian, and the controlling influence assigned 
to him was a fiction (Parsons 1982: 553-554). Georgians continued to increase 
their domination of the party, although it must be noted that the representation of 
Azeris, Abkhaz and Ossetians also increased, especially after Shevardnadze was 
appointed as leader of the Republic in 1972. Shevardnadze devoted more attention 
to the needs of ethnic minorities and considerably increased the amount of media 
in their languages (Parsons 1982: 554 and 562). Under Shevardnadze, the Central 
Committee of the Communist party of Georgia adopted an important resolution in 
1983 to improve the teaching of Abkhazian (Sabchota apkhazeti, 1983, 22 
January: 1). At the same time, he tried to accommodate both the Georgian and 
Russian languages: ‘Special attention is reserved for Russian, the language of 
international communication. The question may be put thus: together with their 
native language, each inhabitant of the Republic must have a perfect knowledge of 
Russian – the language of the brotherhood of Soviet peoples, of October, of Lenin’ 
(Shevardnadze 1981: 59). Despite his tactical accommodation of Georgian after 
the events of 1978 (discussed in section 5.2.3), Georgian intellectuals continued to 
worry about their language, which once again became a political issue. Georgian 
nationalism evolved to be indistinguishable from the struggle against potential 
russification (Toft 2002: 125) and maintained its traditional cultural and linguistic 
character.  
5.2.3 Georgia’s linguistic nationalism 
The promotion of Russian aroused opposition among Georgian dissidents who 
came onto the scene after the mass demonstrations calling for independence in 
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Tbilisi on 9 March in 1956. The Soviet army killed dozens of young people and 
wounded hundreds. These demonstrations were a message to the centre that the 
needs of the periphery were not being met and that cultural identification could 
lead to political mobilization. Several illegal organisations started a dissident 
movement and openly propagated the idea of independence. Despite the repressive 
measures against them (including forced placements in psychiatric hospitals, exiles 
and arrests), the dissident movement became more organized in the 1960-70s 
(Daushvili 2008: 460-463). During the 1960s, Georgia’s future president Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992), started publishing an illegal magazine, Sakartvelos 
moambe (The Herald of Georgia), promoting Georgian culture as a form of 
resistance against Russian domination. In the dissidents’ opinion, a suppressed 
Georgian collective consciousness had to be reawakened using ethnic roots, 
mythology, language and collective memory, in other words, through the markers 
of ethnic identity identified by A. D. Smith (see section 2.2.3). Their writing 
expressed nationalist sentiment, mostly focusing on Georgian culture, history and 
language, unlike the Russian dissidents whose focus was on human rights 
(Coppieters 2002: 108).  
Since the nationality-based federal structure of the USSR provided 
indigenous élites with the means to protect national interests and armed them with 
the Communist doctrine of developing the culture of every Soviet people (national 
in form), the local leadership often backed those interests. In this way they avoided 
direct confrontations with the public and actually worked on the forging of the 
nation (Gachechiladze 1997: 51-52). Considering that repression can have the 
opposite effect to what was intended, official responses to various manifestations 
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of national sentiments were no longer as brutal as in 1956. At the same time, the 
Georgian political élite realized that the need to avoid brutality had great 
bargaining power with the centre (Parsons 1982: 565). A good example of this was 
the decision to back down and restore the status of the Georgian language in April 
1978, when an attempt was made to remove Georgian as the state language from 
the constitution. Several hundred Georgian intellectuals addressed a letter to 
Brezhnev and Shevardnadze expressing their concern about the limitations 
imposed on the teaching of Georgian history and language – a regulation regarding 
that dissertations be submitted in Russian and the propaganda of bilingualism 
(Solchanyk 1982: 36). At the same time, more than thirty thousand people 
demonstrated in Tbilisi against such constitutional changes on 14 April 1978 
(Parsons 1982: 556). Rather than call in troops to suppress the demonstration, 
Shevardnadze restored the status of Georgian in the constitution (Shevardnadze 
2006: 98). Because of these events, 14 April was declared Mother Tongue Day.  
The events of 1978 led to wider resistance to russification. The Georgian 
media regularly published articles by representatives of the Soviet Georgian 
intelligentsia demanding the improvement of Georgian teaching and the use of the 
language in the press. For example, Shota Dzidziguri, Head of the Department of 
Modern Georgian language at Tbilisi State University, made recommendations on 
improving the teaching of Georgian and called for the involvement of the general 
public in the discussions (Literaturuli sakartvelo, 1978,  15 December: 2), while a 
professor of Russian language at the same university, Giorgi Tsibakhashvili, 
discussed the methods of teaching languages in general, emphasising the 
importance of the mother tongue for successful learning of all subjects (Komunisti, 
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1978, 6 July: 2). In 1979, one of the leading papers dedicated its editorial to the 
importance of one’s mother tongue (Literaturuli sakartvelo, 1979, 25 May: 1). The 
same year, professor Gogiberidze suggested establishing a date to celebrate the 
existence of the Georgian alphabet (Sakhalkho ganatleba, 1979, 6 April: 4). 
In 1981, the Georgian intelligentsia demanded the introduction of courses 
dealing specifically with Georgian history and language in schools and for all 
university students (Parsons 1982: 557). The demands were again met by the 
authorities: completely new textbooks were created for schools, a permanent 
commission on the norms of Georgian was established and the Georgian language 
became a mandatory subject in all universities. However, Gamsakhurdia, who at 
the time was a senior researcher at the Institute of Literature at the Georgian 
Academy of Science, continued to maintain that the Georgian language and culture 
were in danger. His propaganda was often supported by his own scholarly 
research, in which he discussed language myths and interpreted Zosime’s hymn 
(see section 3.2.2) as an expression of Georgia’s messianic mission and the moral 
superiority of the Georgians, thereby enforcing Georgia’s hegemonic position 
(Gamsakhurdia 1990). Gamsakhurdia’s linguistic-religious messianism was 
supported by the Georgian Orthodox Church and its leader Ilia II. The motto of the 
nationalist leaders ‘homeland, language and faith’ was presented incorrectly as the 
slogan of Ilia Chavchavadze (see section 4.2.2), whom Ilia II canonized as Saint 
Ilia the Righteous in 1987. Both, the Patriarch Ilia II and Gamsakhurdia were 
reinforcing the linkage between national identity, language, homeland and 
Orthodoxy. Their view about Georgia’s history was a typical example of 
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ethnocentrism (Ramet 1989: 8).
39
 Those who did not speak Georgian and could not 
share the holy mission of the Georgians became targets of suspicion and hostility.  
Despite the growing assertiveness of Georgian and other cultural élites 
demanding more cultural autonomy for their republics, the Soviet leadership 
nonetheless underestimated the potential of national aspirations until Gorbachev 
came to the power. He was the first Soviet leader to challenge directly the 
traditional approach to nationalities, but it was too late. Nationalism as a response 
to centralisation, cultural russification and the repression of non-Russians was very 
strong almost everywhere, especially in the republics which were independent 
before Bolshevik annexation, and Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost only unleashed 
the expression of their aspirations. 
From this period the bottom-up policy lost its dissident character and the 
so-called ‘red intelligentsia’ got involved in the national movement.40 In the late 
1980s, several Georgian intellectuals used the media to encourage the authorities to 
establish a society for the discussions of important cultural issues. The local party 
leadership supported this idea because calls for independence were heard in many 
places, illegal political parties were gaining popularity and the possibility of the 
end of the USSR was evident. The authorities wanted to court the intelligentsia and 
responded by creating a special organisational committee to supervise the 
                                                          
39
 Later Georgian ethnocentrists came to view the struggle for the church as a part of more general 
effort to preserve the Georgian nation, as discussed in chapter 6. 
40
 The dissident intelligentsia included a limited number of outspoken anti-Communists (like 
Gamsakhurdia), who called the creative and academic professionals the ‘red intelligentsia’ to stress 
their ties with the authorities.  
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establishment of such a society. The committee consisted of well-known 
representatives of the intellectual élite who were loyal to the Communists. The 
society was named after the great Georgian poet of the twelfth century, Shota 
Rustaveli. The committee was chaired by a senior party leader, indicating that the 
Rustaveli Society, officially established on 20 March 1988 (Komunisti, 1988, 20 
March), was initiated and controlled by the Communist Party of Georgia. 
The increased freedom of expression under Gorbachev’s policy led to the 
formation of groups that focused on linguistic issues. In November 1988, these 
groups organised demonstrations against russification in Georgia (Cook 2001: 
438), which again led to Abkhazian demands for secession. Georgians responded 
by organising mass demonstrations demanding the preservation of their territorial 
integrity and the restoration of independence. On the night of April 8-9, 1989, 
Soviet troops attacked peaceful demonstrators with spades and toxic gas, killing 
twenty people and injuring hundreds (Gachechiladze 1995: 38). After a few 
months, the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared the primacy of Georgian laws over 
those of the Soviet Union and asserted that Georgia was an annexed and occupied 
country.  
Quite understandably, ethnic minorities, who were referred to as ‘guests’ 
and whose presence in Georgia was viewed as a threat to the nation, felt 
increasingly insecure with Georgian nationalist activism and Gamsakhurdia’s 
election campaign, represented by the slogan ‘Georgia for the Georgians’. Even 
before the elections, violent unrest broke out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
1989. Abkhazians and Ossetians were accused of cooperation with the Kremlin. 
Indeed, by playing on interethnic conflicts in the non-Russian republics, the 
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Kremlin attempted to prevent union republics from leaving the USSR (Khazanov 
1995: 41). Gamsakhurdia’s presidency (October 1990 to December 1991) was not 
well received by Georgia’s ethnic minorities, who feared the return of the 
georgianisation policy. The potential for conflict was high, especially in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, which as autonomous units had the legal instruments to oppose 
Georgian policy. They had institutionalised leaderships which could mobilise their 
communities against the Georgians. Polarised ethnic identities enabled the 
mobilisation of the population by local political and intellectual élites. Both 
Gamsakhurdia’s aggressive attitude towards ethnic minorities and the radical 
leaders of the autonomous units contributed to the escalation of the conflict.  
Georgia is often presented as a particularly well-known example of 
discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities and was notable among the republics 
of the USSR for its ethnocentrism. However, several factors must be taken into 
account in order to explain Georgian ethnocentrism: Georgia had the most per 
capita autonomous units on its territory and was one of the most ethnically diverse 
republics; the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state and had little respect for human 
rights in general and minority rights in particular; decisions were taken in Moscow. 
Blaming local governments alone for the discrimination of entire groups is 
illogical (Cornell 2002b: 258). Finally, the ethnocentric vision of membership in 
the Georgian nation was largely a result of two factors: (a) the Soviet primordial 
approach towards nations and national identities which suggested that nations were 
historically formed cultural groups (see section 2.3) and which did not give 
minority groups a chance to become members of the Georgian nation (see also 
section 6.2.1); and (b) a confusion in terminology.  
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The confusion surrounding the Soviet terms denoting ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘nation’ was discussed in section 2.3.3. In the Georgian language, however, the 
confusion was even more far-reaching. The term ‘nation’ is translated into 
Georgian as eri.  Eri is a term which has undergone similar modification and shifts 
of connotations as the term nation in various European languages (see section 2.2). 
Originally eri denoted a social collectivity of people; in the Middle Ages, other 
terms, usually natesavi (see section 3.2.1), were used to indicate a group of people 
connected by blood ties, that is, an ethnic group. From the nineteenth century, eri 
replaced all other terms denoting ethnic groups. Since then, it has come to indicate 
Kartvelian groups in their entirety, i.e. Georgians, Megrelians and Svans. This 
semantic shift signalled a new stage of identity development among the Kartvelian 
groups. Although there was a belief in common origin amongst these groups, eri, 
unlike previous terms, did not emphasize genetic unity as a basis for existence, 
although it did not exclude it either. The middle of the nineteenth century saw 
another shift in the understanding of the term eri. This was related to increasing 
national awareness among Georgians and to the translation into Georgian of 
Renan’s essay ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?’ (1982). The French nation was 
translated as eri, which from this time was used interchangeably either as an 
equivalent to the European nation or for ethnicity/people, both by scholars and in 
general popular discourse. 
In the Soviet period, eri came to mean the same as the Soviet tern natsia 
according to Stalin’s definition (see section 2.3.3), which became classic in the 
Soviet Union. Although later editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia did not 
mention Stalin, they defined nation in the same way, stating that the only scientific 
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understanding of nation was developed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Georgian 
encyclopedias and academic works used the term eri with the same definition.  
Thus, the term described a collectivity which had nothing to do with 
citizenship; it did not describe the relationship between a state and an individual. 
Essentially, eri was the same as an ethnic group. The Georgian political and 
nationalist discourse implied that the ethnic Georgians, or eri, deserved an 
independent and indivisible state of their own. In order to break up the Soviet 
empire and exercise sovereignty, it was necessary to purify the eri, i.e. create an 
ethnic nation whose members shared the belief in linguistic-religious messianism, 
while excluding ‘outsiders’, ethnic minorities who were not considered a part of 
the sacred mission and therefore were to be expelled from the nation or, at least, 
treated as a second class citizens. However, according to A. D. Smith (1999a:196), 
the creation of ethnic nations not only leads to the break-up of empires, but also 
breeds ethnic tensions and conflicts. Indeed, Georgia experienced an unusual level 
of misfortune and suffering in the post-Soviet era, as discussed in the next chapter. 
To conclude, Soviet nationalities policy and language policy were the main 
contributing factors in the re-definition of kartveloba (Georgianness) as an ethnic 
nation in the twentieth century. These policies excluded ethnic minorities from the 
titular nationalities of the union republics. Therefore ethnic minorities were viewed 
as ‘outsiders’ and were denied the privileges that Georgians enjoyed. This was 
especially true for Abkhazians and Ossetians, who fought on the Bolsheviks’ side 
against the Georgians and were rewarded by autonomy, thus being shielded from 
Georgian cultural influence. The status of autonomy was a significant factor in the 
ethnic mobilisation of the respective communities and in the development of 
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national movements, as it provided institutions for strengthening identities as well 
as for getting external support in the case of conflict. At the same time, 
administrative élites in Abkhazia and South Ossetia used ethnic issues to their 
political and economic advantage. Thus the nationalism of the dominant group was 
opposed by the nationalism and eventually separatism of other groups. Both 
majority and minority nationalism were the result of efforts not only by 
administrative élites, but also by nationalist-minded intellectuals. Nationalist poets 
and writers cultivated a notion of sacred land and language, history and traditions. 
Scholars exaggerated the heroism of past ages and ancestral civilisation – at times 
















Language and identity in contemporary Georgia 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia began an extremely painful 
process of transition from totalitarian regime to democracy. The new political 
leadership, as well as ordinary people burdened with the Soviet experience, were 
unprepared for building an independent nation-state. The definition of citizenship 
in ethnic terms established by Soviet practice (see section 5.1.1) and the 
interpretation of kartveloba (Georgianness) offered by radical nationalists in the 
1980s (see section 5.2.3) effectively united Georgians against outsiders. The 
linguo-religious affiliation of Georgians over the centuries, described in previous 
chapters, became even more important after the disintegration of the USSR. 
The post-Soviet reality, marked by the lack of a free civic society and 
corresponding political culture, provided a fertile environment for reviving and 
strengthening ethno-religious myths and symbols, which defined the direction and 
the pace of the transition process. In the search for a new identity, religion often 
provides the value system (Weissbrod 1983: 189). Thus, reference to the messianic 
mission of kartveloba (discussed in section 5.2.3) was no accident. The myth of 
election through the Georgian language (see section 3.2.2) became part of the 
national value system and justified intolerance towards non-Georgian speakers. It 
became extremely difficult to separate secular values of nationhood from religious 
ones and, therefore, to separate the state from the church, as language was viewed 
as a core value for both. 
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The Georgian case demonstrates the difficulties of complete secularisation 
of national identity as shown below. However, this chapter argues that a sacred 
language which for centuries was used to differentiate insiders and outsiders could 
become a common basis for a new national identity: kartveloba can turn from 
ethnic belonging into citizenship. Following an analysis of official language policy 
in Georgia after the dissolution of the USSR, especially with regard to status 
planning and acquisition planning (see section 2.4), this chapter also examines 
language practices and attitudes among minority groups. Drawing on primary 
sources (such as government papers, laws and other documents, media 
publications, social surveys and interviews), as well as secondary sources, the 
chapter analyses Georgia’s reaction to its multicultural character under different 
governments. It also investigates the role of language policy in the process of 
nation-building and examines how language policy can help form a civic Georgia. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are excluded from the discussion, as these regions are 
de facto independent and thus unaffected by Georgian policies. In any case, they 
are inaccessible for the purposes of this study. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the Soviet language policy of forcibly 
unifying people through language was one of the factors which provoked the 
collapse of the USSR. In different republics, national élites including communists 
adopted the rhetoric of the nationalists and demanded greater economic, political 
and cultural autonomy. If the idea of independence was a national dream 
throughout the decades of Soviet rule, by the late 1980s many came to believe that 
it could be achieved in their lifetime. Calls for independence were heard in many 
places. In Georgia, nationalism manifested itself as a struggle against ‘foreign 
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occupiers’ (Brzezinski 1989). Shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(1991), Zviad Gamsakhurdia declared independence and became the first elected 
President of Georgia. Almost simultaneously with Georgia’s independence, a split 
among the political élites emerged against the background of ethnic tensions in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Gamsakhurdia’s opponents launched a violent coup 
d’état and overthrew the government on 6 January 1992.  
The same year, Shevardnadze gradually acquired power in Georgia, which 
by that time was on the verge of collapse. Although under Shevardnadze territorial 
conflicts developed into full-scale military actions resulting in the loss of control 
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the political situation stabilised and Georgia 
made some progress towards democracy and a market economy. But eventually 
Georgia’s former Soviet nomenklatura (Communist party secretaries, Komsomol 
leaders and red intelligentsia) returned to the political scene as governors, 
entrepreneurs and presidential advisers (Jones 2002: 264) and economic and 
democratic development slowed. Young pro-western politicians, who had 
previously joined Shevardnadze’s government, now emerged as his political rivals. 
Many of them were educated in the USA and were known as misisipidaleulni: 
those who drank the waters of the Mississippi river (compared to tergdaleulni: 
those who drank the waters of the Terek (Tergi) river (see section 4.2.1)). Their 
political struggle led to the Rose Revolution in November 2003, which brought 
Mikheil Saakashvili to power. 
Both Shevardnadze and Saakashvili distanced themselves from the 
ethnocentric nationalism of Gamsakhurdia, but did not abandon the national 
project and focused on the restoration of Georgia’s image as a multi-ethnic and 
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tolerant European nation. Such a goal required a national sentiment to be shared by 
the whole population, but the process of nation-building and reconstruction of 
national identity was a difficult task in view of the damage caused particularly by 
the radical Georgian nationalist rhetoric of previous years, but also by the 
destructive role of ethnic minority leaders. In both majority and minority national 
movements, friction over linguistic issues had played a mobilising role. Therefore, 
it was important to elaborate a language policy that would become a basis for the 
integration of all ethnicities into a multi-ethnic society. 
6.1 Language policy: top-down versus bottom-up 
Since language policies are strongly linked to political developments, and because 
historically the Georgian language had a dominant role in defining the Georgian 
nation, post-Soviet Georgia is a good case study of the interplay between language 
and politics. This section investigates how language policy in Georgia has been 
affected by political changes over the last twenty years. After discussing top-down 
policy, analysing legislation relative to language use and how comprehensively the 
laws were implemented under different regimes, it examines bottom-up reactions 
to the multilingual character of Georgia, as expressed in language perceptions and 
attitudes. 
When discussing such issues, emphasis is placed on Azeris and Armenians 
for three reasons. First, they make up the largest minorities (6.2% and 5.7% 
respectively) after Georgians (83.8%) (Census 2002: 56). Second, they are 
geographically concentrated in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti respectively, 
where in some districts they account for the majority. For example, Azeris make 
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up 83% of the population in Marneuli and up to 60% in Bolnisi and Dmanisi, 
whereas Armenians account for 94% and 95% of the population in Akhalkalaki 
and Ninotsminda respectively (Census 2002: 60-63). Third, there are specific fears 
and insecurities associated with Azeris and Armenians, as discussed in section 
6.1.3. 
6.1.1 Language policy before the Rose Revolution 
In Soviet times, several important steps were taken to develop the Georgian 
language: mass education began using the Georgian language; normative grammar 
and dictionaries were created; Georgian became a language of bureaucracy and 
scientific research; a large corpus of literature was created, etc. Nevertheless the 
Georgian élite kept pressing the Soviet government for more rights for their native 
tongue (see section 5.2.3). Bottom-up language policy was increasingly becoming 
a means of the expression for local sovereignty. Nationalist discourse linked 
Georgian to the survival of the Georgian nation and focused on presenting Russian 
as the language of colonialism and destroyer of Georgian culture.  
As a result of Soviet language policy, bilingualism was asymmetrical: 
while Georgians had to learn Russian, Russian-speaking migrants did not have to 
learn Georgian. Unlike other union republics, in Georgia there was no significant 
ethnic Russian minority. Russian speakers were mainly peripheral minorities (as 
were Armenians and Azeris) who were viewed as an instrument of colonial politics 
meant to undermine kartveloba (Georgianness). Nevertheless, despite being 
negatively viewed by many, Georgians still valued Russian as an instrument of 
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social mobility and as a language of wider interethnic communication during the 
Soviet rule (Chinchaladze & Dragadze 1994: 81). 
After Georgia became independent, Russian lost its official status. 
According to article 8 of the Constitution of Georgia (1995: 9), ‘[t]he state 
language of Georgia shall be Georgian, and in Abkhazia also Abkhazian’. But 
granting the Georgian language the status of a state language was not enough to 
resolve the problem of its real status. In the regions densely inhabited by 
minorities, the state was not able to implement this article. One of the biggest 
challenges facing the political élite was the fact that a substantial part of the 
population did not speak Georgian, and Georgian was not the language of 
interethnic relations or of the bureaucracy, a function still fulfilled by Russian. It 
was impossible to involve them in state life on an equal basis. The language barrier 
remained a serious problem between Georgian-speaking and non-Georgian-
speaking populations (especially in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, 
considering the higher proportion of Armenian and Azeri speakers respectively) 
and was one of the fundamental reasons for the low participation of ethnic 
minorities in socio-political life. In order to address this problem, Shevardnadze 
introduced several important measures, carefully avoiding the interethnic 
confrontation prompted by Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric (see sections 5.2.3 and 6.2.1). 
In particular, this applies to teaching Georgian to ethnic minorities. 
273 
 
The Georgian Law on Education adopted in 1997 (section 1.4) guaranteed 
the right of minorities to receive school instruction in their languages.
41
 Georgia 
thus continued the Soviet tradition of running ‘minority’ schools, a practice which 
had both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, children belonging to 
ethnic minorities had the opportunity to receive instruction in their mother 
tongue.
42
 On the other hand, this system reinforced existing segregation along 
ethnic and linguistic lines and prevented ethnic minorities from civic integration. 
The Russian government provided textbooks for Russian schools, which 
enjoyed high status among ethnic minorities and were attended not only by ethnic 
Russians, but also by Armenians, Azeris and others. This is not surprising, given 
that Russian was the lingua franca during the Soviet era. By the end of 
Shevardnadze’s era, there were 239 Russian schools, 153 Armenian schools and 
149 Azeri schools in Georgia (Korth, Stepanian & Muskhelishvili 2005: 33-34, 36-
38). The statistical yearbook of the South Caucasus (2002) listed 38,000 pupils 
enrolled in Russian language schools, 38,000 in Azeri schools and 26,000 in 
Armenian schools. 
The teaching of Georgian in minority schools (compulsory according to the 
Law on Education) was poor not only due to a lack of qualified teachers and 
adequate textbooks, but also to the absence of clear incentives, the minorities 
failing to see the benefit of learning Georgian. Even if they mastered Georgian, 
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 All laws and legal acts related to language can be found at: 
http://www.parliament.ge/LEGAL._ACTS/legi_in.html (accessed 31 August 2010). 
42
 It is estimated that 13% percent of the population does not speak Georgian as a first language 
(Buchmann 2006: 7). 
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they considered it of little practical use. Russian remained indeed the de facto 
language of local government and other local authorities despite article 12 of Law 
on Public Office (1998) requiring that civil servants know Georgian. Strict 
application of all the laws related to the language use would clearly discriminate 
against ethnic minorities in the places of their largest concentration. In reality, 
local administrators often did not and still do not know Georgian, but were and are 
allowed to keep their positions in return for supporting the centre (Interview with 
Kakha Gabunia from the Centre for Civic Integration and Inter-ethnic Relations, 
26 March, 2010). 
The standard of teaching in Georgian universities was so low that it did not 
satisfy the needs of employers: ethnic minorities preferred to obtain diplomas in 
Russia, Armenia or Azerbaijan. At the same time, many representatives of 
minorities interpreted calls for learning Georgian as either discrimination or 
justification of assimilationist policies (Crisis Group Report 2006: 22). All these 
factors have contributed to the further marginalisation of Georgian, slowed down 
the process of linguistic decolonisation, and led Armenians and Azeris to bond 
more closely with their respective historical homelands. 
Another measure introduced by Shevardnadze concerned the use of 
languages and alphabets in advertisements, inscriptions and signboards. It was 
regulated by the Law on Advertising adopted in 1998. Article 4 states: 
‘Advertising is disseminated all over Georgia in the national language’. But while 
in Tbilisi Russian signboards disappeared with the introduction of this law, they 
could still be seen in regions inhabited by ethnic minorities (Korth, Stepanian & 
Muskhelishvili 2005: 25). Other laws relevant to the official status of Georgian 
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include the Organic Law on the Common Courts of Georgia (1997), the 
Administrative Code (1999) and the Organic Election Code (2001). While the 
Organic Law on Common Courts states that ‘any individual in court proceedings 
who does not know the official language shall be provided with an interpreter at 
the expense of the state’ (article 10), the Administrative Code reads: ‘[i]f the 
application/statement or any other document presented by an interested party is not 
in the state language, the party shall present a notarized translation of the 
document’, implying that the ‘interested party’ is responsible for expenses. The 
2003 amendments to the Organic Election Code make provisions for voters who do 
not understand Georgian. Article 51 states that ‘[a] ballot paper shall be printed 
[…] in the Georgian language and, in Abkhazia, in Abkhazian, and if necessary, in 
any other language understandable to the local population’, but the same code 
(article 92.1) stipulates that those elected to parliament must know Georgian. 
Some noticeable changes in language use under Shevardnadze occurred 
within the media. Former Moscow TV and radio channels were replaced by 
various local Georgian language channels, although non-Georgian films on all 
channels were still in Russian. English eclipsed Russian to a certain degree with 
the development of the Internet. Some efforts were made to increase local media in 
minority languages, but minorities still felt they lacked first-hand information on 
Georgian internal affairs (Crisis Group Report 2006: 18). The situation was 
especially desperate among Azeris, who had only one weekly newspaper, while 
Armenians had several daily, weekly and monthly newspapers, as well as a local 
Armenian language TV and a news web site. Both communities relied on satellite 
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TV for international news (Interview with Yana Fremer, the producer of Italian 
courtyard, 31 March, 2010). 
In the last year of Shevardnadze’s presidency (2003), the Georgian 
Chamber of Language (established within the president’s office in 1997) drafted a 
language law, but it was not accepted by parliament, following criticisms by 
minority non-governmental organisations (Lezhava 2004: 211). Several issues 
were of concern. For example, article 11 of the draft law stated that every citizen 
of Georgia was obliged to know Georgian; however the law did not explain the 
legal consequences for those who did not. Nor was it clear how language 
competence would be measured. These points were not clarified in the second draft 
either (Korth, Stepanian & Muskhelishvili 2005: 27). 
Another issue which concerned ethnic minority representatives was related 
to terminology. The law subsumed ethnic minority languages under the term 
‘foreign’. In the second draft, this was replaced by the term ‘non-state languages’. 
Unlike Abkhazian, Armenian and Azeri were thus offered no official status. While 
the former was considered an autochthonous language, the latter were classed as 
immigrant languages. The classification of minorities as autochthonous and non-
native/immigrant is a product of the Soviet legacy and is still used largely out of 
fear (see section 6.3.1). Azeris and Armenians are mainly concentrated near the 
borders of their historic homelands. The fear among the Georgians is that they will 
seek unification with their kin states, hence the government is reluctant to give 
formal status to their respective languages. The fear is somewhat understandable, 
considering Abkhazian and Ossetian separatism, and the activities of some 
extremist organisations in Samtskhe-Javakheti (see section 6.3.1). 
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Besides status planning and acquisition planning, some efforts were made 
regarding corpus planning under Shevardnadze, especially concerning the 
normalisation of scientific and technical terminology, namely Georgian 
dictionaries of market economy, law, finance, foreign affairs and diplomacy, 
political science, climatology, geomorphology, veterinary, art and many others 
were published.
43
 In 1998-1999, public television broadcasted a programme 
entitled ‘Our Georgian Language’, which was aimed at eradicating grammatical 
mistakes from speech. 
In conclusion, it could be said that under Shevardnadze large parts of the 
ethnic population did not sufficiently participate in the state-building process and 
their knowledge of Georgian remained poor. Besides the common assumption of 
the majority that, if given linguistic autonomy, Azeris and Armenians might make 
separatist claims, and the lack of open discussion of language problems, poor 
Georgian skills resulted from the non-existence of a unified strategy for minority 
integration, the lack of incentives for learning the state language, the lack of 
qualified teachers and study materials, as well as the Soviet legacy, which created 
a ‘language barrier’ between the majority and the minorities by promoting Russian 
as a lingua franca. Another aspect of the Soviet legacy was the practice of running 
ethnic schools in order to preserve minority groups, while at the same time doing 
little to promote the state language. After the Rose Revolution, the new 
government decided to concentrate more on the promotion of Georgian, rather than 
the protection of minority languages. 
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 The list of scientific dictionaries is available at: 
http://www.nplg.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=32&lang_id=ENG (accessed 30 June 2011). 
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6.1.2 Language policy after the Rose Revolution 
Seeking to promote a civic, rather than ethnic identity, Saakashvili’s government 
decided to elaborate a unified policy for minority integration, in which language 
policy had central importance, although it remains a complex issue even now. 
Soon after being elected president, Saakashvili met with representatives of the 
Azeri population of Kvemo Kartli and in his speech stressed the importance of 
knowing Georgian: 
You are (among) the most hardworking citizens of our country […] 
Your children should learn the state language so that they have equal 
possibilities and equal rights to be promoted in the hierarchy of state 
structures [sic] (‘Saakashvili stresses importance of knowledge of 
official language’, civil.ge, 21 March, 2006. Accessed 25 May 2011). 
As a symbolic gesture, Saakashvili often starts his speeches in ethnic 
languages when addressing minorities (see for example, ‘Mikheil Saakashvili 
opens Samtskhe-Javakheti highway’, panarmenian.net, 2010, 15 November. 
Accessed 27 May 2011), frequently emphasising the multi-ethnic character of 
Georgia and the necessity of minority integration through language. However, the 
current government is often blamed by its opponents for ignoring Georgian, 
because it has closed several TV programmes aimed at teaching Georgian and 
abolished the Chamber of Language (Sakartvelos respublika, 2006, 21 January). In 
reality, however, the current political élite have, in fact, taken a more assertive role 
in promoting and strengthening the status of Georgian throughout the country. The 
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measures undertaken by the government include changes in legislation and reforms 
in education.  
In terms of legislation, several important steps were made. Namely, the 
following laws relative to language use were passed: the Law on Higher Education 
(2004), the Law on Broadcasting (2004), the Law on General Education (2005) 
and the Law on Self-Government (2005). While article 4 of the Law on Higher 
Education states that ‘[t]he language of instruction in higher education institutions 
is Georgian, in Abkhazia – also Abkhazian’ and article 89 establishes national 
examinations in Georgian language and literature, foreign languages, general 
abilities and math, article 4.3 of the Law on General Education states that ‘citizens 
of Georgia whose native language is not Georgian have the right to receive 
complete general education in their native language.’ That said, articles 5 and 58 
stipulate that the minority schools must follow the new national curriculum, which 
requires that all social sciences be taught in Georgian by the academic year 2010-
2011 at the latest. These articles provoked unease among ethnic minorities, who 
felt that they would not master Georgian well enough by 2010. At the same time, 
they perceived this law as a threat to their ethnic identities, which are intertwined 
with language. While many representatives of ethnic minorities acknowledged that 
mastery of Georgian was an important tool for integration, the establishment of 
national examinations without special provisions for minority students has further 
exacerbated tensions (Bachmann 2006: 8). Some attempts were made to meet 
minority needs by offering exams in simplified Georgian for those who were 
applying to Russian-language faculties, but students still found them quite difficult 
(Crisis Group Report 2006: 26). Obviously the methods of examination were not 
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well thought out. Georgia had to choose between easing the integration process 
and education reform. Therefore, in the following year, students from non-
Georgian schools were allowed to choose Russian for exams in some subjects. 
In 2008, Saakashvili announced that poor knowledge of Georgian should not 
be an obstacle for anyone wishing to enter higher education in Georgia and 
minorities were granted the right to pass the unified national exams in Armenian 
and Azeri (Georgian Times, 2008, 25 February). Following this change, the overall 
results were much better: more ethnic minority students were able to enter 
universities, but they would graduate from Russian faculties and would face 
difficulties finding jobs. So, the best students of minority schools, not seeing any 
likelihood of employment in Georgia after graduation, have decided to study 
abroad, especially after the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments started giving 
scholarships to promising students to attend universities in Baku and Yerevan (the 
capitals of Azerbaijan and Armenia respectively). They are unlikely to return to 
Georgia, thus increasing the pace of the ‘brain drain’ (Tsipuria 2006: 21). 
Therefore, in 2010, in order to increase minority access to higher education and 
remove unintended discriminatory practice, the government decided to offer 
graduates of minority language schools a year of intensive Georgian at universities 
(Interview with the State Minister of Integration, Temur Iakobashhvili, 22 March, 
2010).  
Another important measure undertaken by the government in order to 
strengthen the status of Georgian was state language promotion, as one of the 
objectives of the action plan for tolerance and civic education is the promotion of 
the state language (Ministry of Integration 2009a: 12). The process of 
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implementing the plan was launched in 2010 and includes several activities: a 
programme to enhance the teaching and learning of Georgian as a second language 
in minority schools; the development and improvement of Georgian-language 
textbooks and other teaching resources (including Internet programmes, software 
and education games); professional training programmes for Georgian-language 
teachers in places mainly populated by Azeris and Armenians; the development of 
special projects focused on civic integration; and state language acquisition 
programmes for adult learners (Ministry of Integration 2009b: 7-9). 
Besides laws concerning education, two other new laws regulate language 
use: the Law on Self-Government and the Law on Broadcasting. The Law on Self-
Government (article 10) established Georgian as the working language of local 
self-government, while the 2005 amendments to the Unified Election Code (see 
section 6.1.1) stated that all candidates for all level election commissions must be 
fluent in the state language (article 27.4 and 33(B).5). However, the law does not 
specify how fluency will be tested, and this omission leaves room to abuse and 
violations of the law, and thus does not create a sufficient basis to challenge 
language-related discrimination. 
The Law on Broadcasting obliges public television to broadcast in minority 
languages as well as to produce programmes for the benefit of minorities. News 
report in Abkhazian, Ossetian, Armenian, Azeri and Russian are broadcast weekly 
on TV. In addition, a weekly show on public television supported by the UN, 
called Italian Courtyard, focuses on multicultural issues and the histories of ethnic 
groups in Georgia (Yana Fremer, producer of Italian Courtyard, personal 
communication, 31 March 2010). Commercial television stations also devote time 
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to minority issues. In 2009, the government launched the first Russian-language 
Channel Pervyi Kavkazskii (First Caucasian)
44
 mainly targeting audiences in 
Russia and the North Caucasus. Ten-minute-long radio news programmes in 
minority languages (including Kurdish) are broadcast daily (Ministry of 
Integration 2009b: 11).  
Along with legislative changes aimed at strengthening the status of the state 
language, the Ministry of Education has introduced several programmes for 
improving the overall education environment in both Georgian and non-Georgian 
schools. Not only did Georgian schools receive new textbooks, but non-Georgian 
schools did as well, replacing textbooks from neighbouring countries that were 
used before. While the Ministry of Culture started funding Armenian, Azeri and 
Russian newspapers, the Ministry of Education sent new qualified teachers to non-
Georgian schools to teach Georgian language, literature and history, as well as to 
train local teachers (Tsipuria 2006: 25).  
                                                          
44
 Pervyi Kavkazskii started broadcasting on Entel Satellite, a largely French-controlled company, 
but the company ceased broadcasting on Russia’s insistence (see www.1k-tv.com. Accessed 29 
June 2011). Russian officials have condemned the First Caucasian Channel as Georgia’s ‘anti-
Russian propaganda’ and an attempt ‘to plant ideology of extremism’ in the North Caucasus 
(http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22509; accessed 28 June 2011)). After its removal from the 
satellite, the First Caucasian Channel was available for viewers in Tbilisi only through cable 
networks and on the Internet. In early June the channel suspended broadcasting, although still 
keeping a presence on the Internet. It will be re-launched in January 2011 (Interview with Robert 




An important step in teaching Georgian to minorities was the adoption of new 
textbooks for five different class years, aimed at developing communicative skills. 
Previously, Georgian-language textbooks (including student books, exercise books 
and teachers’ manuals) were designed on the principle that students should have 
learnt grammar and literature in order to master the spoken language (Tsipuria 
2006: 23), which proved to be ineffective. The retraining of local teachers of 
Georgian language and literature was realised with the support of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (Gabunia 2006: 40) (see below regarding the 
OSCE High Commissioner’s role in language policy). At the same time, the 
authorities are exploring multilingual forms of education. The Ministry of 
Education started introducing pilot bilingual education programmes in twelve 
Azeri schools in Kvemo Kartli and Armenian schools in Samtskhe-Javakheti 
(http://www.diversity.ge/eng/resources.php?coi=0|11|12). Those who are just 
starting school as well as young adults will take advantage of these changes.  
In 2006, the School of Public Administration opened in Kutaisi. Its goal was 
to train civil servants of minority origin. The school was well received, but 
minorities were not able to master Georgian during the three months’ language 
instruction included in the six months’ curriculum. Sixty-four students from 
different regions attended it in the first year, among them eleven Azeris, but only 
four Azeris obtained jobs, because, according to State Minister of Integration T. 
Iakobashhvili (interviewed on 22 March 2010), there were no mechanisms to 
ensure their employment.  
With the initiative of the Ministry of Integration other activities were also 
launched in 2010 in cooperation with other ministries. They include translating 
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ballot papers into minority languages, regional infrastructure development, 
supporting ethnic cultural centres, assistance to regional libraries, etc. (Ministry of 
Integration 2009b).  
In addition to strengthening the status of Georgian, the government has taken 
measures to improve knowledge of English. The Rose Revolution was 
immediately followed by a fight against corruption and an orientation towards the 
West. Older public servants were replaced by a new generation and the process of 
forming a new élite started. Knowledge of English and computer proficiency 
became necessary for success. Foreign education became very valuable. Since 
2005, a presidential foundation has been funding scholarships for one thousand 
Georgian students (including minority representatives) to attend MA programmes 
at major Western universities 
(http://www.diversity.ge/eng/resources.php?coi=0|11|12). The government has also 
recruited three hundred US and European professors to teach on a part-time basis 
at major Georgian universities, while several universities and high schools teach 
primarily in English (Matthews 2008).
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In 2010, English became compulsory from the first grade in schools 
(‘Saakashvili speaks of linguistic, computer revolution’, Civil.ge, 6 April, 2010. 
Accessed 22 October 2010) while Russian is optional. This decision, opposed by 
many,
46
 appears pragmatic in a globalised world where English dominates and 
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Georgia’s investment-driven economy is seeking partners in the European Union; 
but it also fits with Saakashvili’s policy of dragging Georgia out from Russia’s 
orbit (Guardian, 2010, 12 October). Tbilisi municipality will launch free English 
and computer classes for adults from 2011, aimed at boosting career prospects 
(‘English ousts Russian in ex-Soviet Georgia’s schools’, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20100503-english-ousts-russian-ex-soviet-georgias-
schools. Accessed 1 March 2011). 
One thousand volunteer teachers from abroad are teaching in different regions 
(Guardian, 2010, 12 October). The first wave of teachers under the programme 
‘teach and learn’ arrived and started working in September 2010. Saakashvili 
stated that, as a part of a ‘linguistic revolution’, English will become every child’s 
second language. As a truly transformative programme it probably will have few 
direct short-term visible consequences, but, more importantly, enormous indirect 
long-term invisible consequences. The government correctly stresses that English 
is a ticket to engagement with the broader world. Fluency in English is no 
guarantee of a job, but in many cases it is a necessary first step towards 
understanding Western values and connecting Georgia to the wider world.  
During the next stage, English will be followed by Chinese, Arabic and 
Turkish (http://www.civil.ge, 2010, 16 August. Accessed 3 September 2010). 
Saakashvili did not mention Russian. Obviously the Government has no interest in 
helping its citizens to maintain or learn Russian. One of the most significant 
transformations related to language in Georgia has been the shift from Russian to 
English, although many households speak Russian at home not only in Kvemo 
Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti, but also in Tbilisi, not to mention in areas not 
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under Georgian government control. According to the 2002 census (Census 2002: 
79), only 43 136 Azeris (out of 284 761) and 84 076 (out of 248 929) Armenians 
speak Georgian. Since Russian is no longer commonly known among young 
Georgians, who prefer to study other foreign languages such as English, one can 
assume that the linguistic isolation of minorities is even stronger among the young. 
Russian is still the most common language in the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia, in Ukraine and Russia itself, and will maintain this status. However, it is 
being increasingly ousted from educational and scientific spheres as well as 
entertainment. The Parliament Committee of Education, Culture and Sport is 
working on amending the Law on Cinematography, according to which foreign 
movies, both in movie theatres and on TV, have to be shown in their original 
language (optionally with subtitles), rather than dubbed into Russian, as was the 
case before (Financial Times, 2010, 12 July). 
Since the Rose Revolution, the laws related to language use have been more 
strictly enforced and in many administrative bodies the working language has 
changed to Georgian mainly because ethnic Georgians have been appointed to 
senior positions (Crisis Group Report 2006: 24). This has had equivocal results: on 
the one hand, laws on language use are better adhered to and the status of Georgian 
has strengthened; on the other hand, new laws have limited the abilities of 
minorities to participate. The International Crisis Group found multiple cases when 
Azeris faced problems when dealing with administrative bodies and in the courts 
after strict application of the law (Crisis Group Report 2006: 25). 
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Georgia’s orientation towards the West, the firm decision in favour of 
closer integration with the European Union and impressive efforts to make 
economic and democratic changes have resulted in increased international support, 
especially in the areas of economic and legislative developments and the protection 
of human rights, including minority rights. The main international organisations 
involved in the promotion of peace and stability around the world, such as the 
United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe, link peaceful coexistence of linguistic groups 
with respect for minority rights, and acknowledge the need to promote and protect 
cultural and linguistic diversity (Koenig & Varennes 2001: 2). The OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities exercises an especially important role by 
supervision of minority treatment. After gaining independence, Georgia became a 
member of all these organisations and has tried to harmonise its legal system to 
adhere to their principles (Interview with Lali Papiashvili from the Ethnic 
Integration Committee in parliament, 6 January 2007). Therefore, in 2000 Georgia 
signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, but 
ratified it only in 2005 (Fact-Finding Mission 2005:6). However Georgia did not 
ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1992 and aimed at preserving linguistic heritage in 
multilingual states. The Charter cannot be enforced and any state can choose 
whether to ratify it or not, but the fact that Georgia has still to ratify it has not gone 
unnoticed by the EU-Georgia Enlargement Action Plan,
47
 which calls for the 
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ratification of the charter, the development of civic integration strategy and its 
implementation, with monitoring via appropriate instruments (see more about this 
issue below).  
Education is the principal sphere of the strategy for integration. Therefore, 
international organisations fund several projects aimed at teaching the state 
language to ethnic minorities. One such project, Civic Forum for Ethnic Azeris in 
Kvemo Kartli was funded by the European Commission and aimed at facilitating 
the social and political integration of the Azeri population. The process included 
developing Georgian-language skills among Azeris. Along with designing a 
special Georgian-language acquisition programme for Azeri speakers, this part of 
the project was developed and administered by the International Centre for the 
Georgian Language (http://www.icgl.org) and its director, Rusudan Amirejibi-
Mullen. 
6.1.3 Perceptions and Attitudes 
The consequences of the Soviet nationalities policy (discussed in chapter 5) are 
evident in today’s Georgia. Rather politicised, they are expressed in the 
perceptions and attitudes of Georgians and ethnic minorities towards each other 
and remain a substantial obstacle to civic integration. Ethnicity is still a primary 
focus of identity in Georgia; in other words, individuals tend to identify themselves 
not as members of a political unity, but as a member of an ethnic group. Georgia’s 
minorities tend to prefer politicians of their own ethnic origin whereas ethnic 
Georgians distrust their loyalty (Kviris palitra, 2005, 3 October). Although the new 
government has made efforts to overcome such attitudes, in practice little has 
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changed. Ethnic minorities continue to reject many initiatives aimed at integration, 
while xenophobia and discriminatory attitudes towards minorities are typical 
features of Georgian society (Ombudsman’s Report 2008). Rather than perceiving 
integration as something positive, ethnic minorities equate it with assimilation and 
therefore see it as a threat to their identity. In turn, Georgians view the minorities 
as a destabilising factor and threat to the Georgian state. Georgians feel betrayed 
by Abkhazians and Ossetians and fear that other minorities might do the same 
(‘javakheti da borchalo apkhazetisa da samkhret osetis beds gaiziareben’, 
Sakartvelos respublika, 2010, 25 September), especially since many of them live in 
the border areas next to their kin states (Matveeva 2004: 3). 
As an ironic result of Soviet policy, ethnic groups pay more attention to 
their differences than to their similarities. Both the majority and minorities find it 
difficult to regard each other as us, rather than them, and such categorisation of self 
and other is still embodied by language. Georgians view language as essential to 
their very existence, while minorities fear that learning Georgian and Georgia’s 
history from a Georgian point of view will somehow make them lose their identity 
and result in assimilation. They feel intimidated by the linguistic and cultural 
characteristics associated with the majority. On the other hand, many Georgians 
are not happy with expressing their identity merely in civic terms without reference 
to their ethnic genealogy. Therefore the resistance to integration is two-sided. The 
identities of both groups are largely based not only on myths, but also on 
confrontations and ancient hatreds, the stories of which filled history books in 
Soviet times. Conflicting ethno-territorial claims resulted in an enormous 
production of ethnocentric literature denying the presence of minority ethnic 
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groups in the distant past (see section 5.2.2). Although history was rewritten in 
post-Soviet textbooks, current-day equivalents still stress language when linking 
kartveloba to territory in their accounts of the history of modern Georgia, causing 
distrust among the Azeri and Armenian minorities (Mekhuzla & Roche 2009: 30). 
Besides common components, there are distinct elements in the perceptions 
and attitudes of Georgians towards Azeris and Armenians respectively. In the case 
of Azeris, Georgians are more concerned with demography; in the case of 
Armenians, however, their concern relates to claims of territory and cultural 
heritage. Compared to other ethnic groups, the Azeri population in Georgia has 
grown much faster, almost doubling in the second half of the twentieth century 
(Basilaia 2008: 25). In the late Soviet period, Georgian nationalists started 
expressing fears of the ‘life-threatening expansion’ of Muslims (see for example, 
Broers 2004: 220). Despite the fact that many Azeris emigrated in the early 1990s, 
they still constitute the biggest minority in the country and continue to trouble 
ethno-nationalists, but unlike regular anti-Armenian media publications 
(‘Georgian-based Armenian civil society blaming Georgian press for anti-
Armenian hysteria’. May 16, 2007. http://www.media.ge. Accessed 1 March 
2011), there is almost no anti-Azeri rhetoric in the Georgian media. 
Suspicions towards Armenians have deeper roots (see section 4.2.1), maybe 
because Armenians are more politically mobilised than Azeris. The tensions 
between the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Georgians somewhat 
intensified after the Rose Revolution as a result of the withdrawal of a Russian 
military base which was providing the local population with a source of 
employment (World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Georgia 
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overview. Online version: http://www.minorityrights.org/1909/georgia/georgia-
overview.html#current). Georgians do not take kindly to the activities of Armenian 
political organizations in Samtskhe-Javakheti, especially their claims relating to 
Georgian architectural monuments in the region, which Armenians claim as their 
own (Crisis Group Policy Briefing 2011: 10). The government of Armenia 
considers Georgia as an important neighbour and needs stability, since Armenia’s 
export and import trade passes through Georgia. Although nationalist circles in 
Yerevan voice some criticism of Georgian ethno-linguistic polices (‘Tbilisi needs 
to pay more attention to minority rights’, 2006, 4 December.  
http://www.djavakhk.com. Accessed 2 March 2011), the Armenian government 
has a positive influence on the attitudes of Armenians in Georgia (‘Lavrov hints at 
fomenting ethnic tensions inside Georgia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2010, 9 July. 
http://www.jamestown.org. Accessed 6 March 2011). For example, Armenia’s 
president Kocharian urges Armenians in Georgia to learn the state language and try 
to integrate (‘Kocharian urges Armenians in Georgia to learn Georgian’, 1 May 
2007, http://www.caucaz.com. Accessed 5 February 2011). A stable Georgia is 
also of vital national interest for Azerbaijan. The government in Baku, and also the 
Muslim hierarchy of Azerbaijan, have always encouraged Georgia’s Azeri 
minority to continue behaving as loyal citizens (24 saati, 2007, 28 June; ‘Lavrov 
hints at fomenting ethnic tensions inside Georgia, Eurasia Daily Monitor’, 2010, 9 
July, http://www.jamstown.org. Accessed 6 March 2011). Azeris have not been 
politically active since the early 1990s, when they demanded autonomy (Sanikidze 
& Walker 2004). 
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It must be noted that the number of anti-Armenian media publications has 
decreased in recent years (‘Armenian bishop Vazgen Mirtsakhaniyan: Armenians 
in Georgia are treated better than Azerbaijanis’, 9 February, 2008, 
http://www.today.az. Accessed 6 March 2011), but anti-Armenian rhetoric 
periodically appears on local internet forums (‘Georgian-based Armenian civil 
society blaming Georgian press for anti-Armenian hysteria’, May 16, 2007, 
http://www.media.ge. Accessed 1 March 2011.) and in political discourse, which 
outrages civil society. For example, in 2004, MP Gocha Pipia publicly demanded 
information about the ethnic origin and faith of each member of government when 
it became known that the mother of the Prime Minister at the time was Armenian. 
In 2007, an MP from the ruling party Beso Jugheli made a statement denigrating 
Armenians on TV and radio (‘MP denies plans to quit parliament over ‘ethnic 
slur’, 17 May, 2007, http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 6 March 2011). 
In Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, the local population enjoys the 
right to use the Armenian and Azeri languages respectively in daily life, but both 
communities have demanded measures to preserve these languages in the future. 
Even though Saakashvili  often emphasises in his speeches that the multi-ethnic 
make-up of Georgia is an asset, when promoting civic integration, government 
officials are quick to point out that integration does not mean assimilation, since 
part of the ethnic population remains suspicious of state language teaching and 
reacts negatively to efforts to spread the state language (Gabunia 2006: 39, 
Tsipuria 2006: 23). Another part of the ethnic minority population, however, 
openly demands improvement in the quality of teaching of the state language 
(Gabunia 2006: 38). If under Shevardnadze the minority population felt there were 
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too few incentives to learn Georgian, under Saakashvili many parents want their 
children to retain their own language, but at the same time to develop Georgian, so 
that they can participate in economic and political life. According to the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (Fonblanque 2006: 57), there is a clear need 
to acquire real fluency in at least two languages, namely the mother tongue and 
Georgian. 
Besides language, one reason for negative attitudes towards Georgians 
among minorities is the Georgian Orthodox Church’s deep involvement in 
ideological issues. After the signing of a special agreement between the state and 
the Orthodox Church in 2002 (see section 6.2.1), other religious groups found 
themselves marginalized. Sometimes they have showed an open hostility towards 
the activities of the Georgian church. When the Orthodox Church opened a 
convent in an Armenian populated region, Armenians perceived this as an 
intrusion into local society (Fact-Finding Mission 2005: 16). According to a fact-
finding mission, the real source of hostility lies not only in religious differences, 
but also in two different versions of regional history. For example, the Mission 
(2005: 16) heard hostile comments and expressions of anger from the local 
Armenian population regarding the religious celebration held in the Georgian 
church of Kumurdo (Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia 1983: 71), which Armenians 
consider their own, explaining the inscriptions in Georgian by the fact that when it 
was built (964) Armenians were using the Georgian language for political 
considerations. Recently, religious issues became even more sensitive when the 
Deputy Minister of State Integration, Elene Tevdoradze, announced that the 
Armenian Church would not be granted special status in Georgia (‘Armenian 
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Apostolic Church will not get status in Georgia’, 2010, 16 November. 
http://www.news.am. Accessed 4 February 2011). Many Georgian policy-makers 
fear granting status to minority religions and languages, arguing that such a move 
will weaken kartveloba as an identity and undermine the security of the state 
against Russia, the goal of which in Georgia has historically been domination 
through ‘divide and rule’ policies. After the de facto loss of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, Georgians think that Russia might play the Armenian and Azeri cards. 
However, Russia, seeking an instrument to destabilise Georgia, was able to play 
the ethnic card with Abkhazians and Ossetians because of Georgian ethnocentric 
nationalism at the time (see section 6.2.1). Imposing ethnic conflicts with Azeris 
and Armenians seems unlikely, especially if Georgia is implementing a reasonable 
ethnic policy that does not deprive minorities of their rights.  
Nevertheless, Georgian politicians remain cautious and, while slowly 
moving towards pluralism, are not rushing to ratify the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, which Georgia is obliged to ratify. There is an 
ongoing process of trying to ratify the Charter in consultation with public officials, 
foreign experts, academics and civil society. For example, on 13-14 September 
2010, these groups held a meeting with the State Minister of Integration Temur 
Iakobashvili (see for example, http://www.gfsis.org/index.php/ 
activities/view/event-calendar/dates/2010-09-14%202010-09-14). Representatives 
of the European Centre for Minority Issues stress that the Charter offers sixty-eight 
possible measures and the state must agree to undertake at least thirty-five. At the 
meeting mentioned above, Iakobashvili stated clearly that, in terms of the 
protection of small languages, the Charter would only apply only to the languages 
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that are unique to Georgia (such as Abkhazian and Kartvelian languages); 
Armenian and Azeri would not be considered. The extent to which the government 
is going to become involved in the preservation of unique languages is not clear. 
The issue of Kartvelian languages (Megrelian and Svan) is another topic of 
concern among policy-makers, since many in Georgia believe that their inclusion 
under the protection of the Charter may have negative effects on the consolidation 
of kartveloba. But besides Iakobashvili’s comment (see above), there is some other 
evidence that the government is not excluding the possibility of adopting special 
measures to protect these languages. For example, the Ministry of Education 
admitted that these languages need to be protected and promoted as part of 
Georgia’s cultural heritage, but all measures must be carefully considered in order 
not to stir up any tensions, and, at the same time, not yield to fears of jeopardising 
linguistic homogeneity. 
The fact is that in recent years, the status of Kartvelian languages, 
especially Megrelian, has become the subject of debate in academia and the media 
in the context of broader discussions of what constitutes a nation (see also section 
6.2). As with all other language questions, this issue is much politicised. A group 
of well-educated Megrelians actively promote their language,
48
 while some 
scholars associate the protection of Kartvelian languages with the Soviet policy of 
division (see for example, Putkaradze 2005), not realising that their own definition 
of nation, which emphasises one language, is the Soviet definition. With such an 
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 See for example Megrelian Wikipedia at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mingrelian_language 
(accessed 29 June 2011) and Megrelian groups and pages on Facebook. 
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approach, these scholars question the loyalty of Megrelians as a group, which the 
latter find insulting. These scholars fear that recognising small languages might 
promote separatism and encourage movements toward secession. Therefore, they 
oppose the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages. For example, Teimuraz Gvantseladze, professor of linguistics, noted 
that Megrelians and Svans might start campaigning for recognition if the charter is 
ratified (Minority language controversy in Georgia, IWPR report, 2010, 22 
October). 
The absolute majority of Megrelians refer to their language as ‘the 
language of the cradle’ or ‘our kitchen language’, while reserving the term ‘mother 
tongue’ for Georgian (see sections 2.4.1 and 3.1). Written Megrelian, spelt with the 
Georgian script, is limited to small-scale and sporadic publications of a linguistic 
or folkloristic nature (Wheatley 2009: 13). The relationship between Megrelian 
and Georgian is characterised by diglossia. The overwhelming majority of 
Megrelians prefer Georgian as the language of education and media (Paulston & 
Peckhem 1998: 106). The right to use Megrelian and Svan in the private sphere 
was never been challenged. But if the Charter is ratified, these languages will 
acquire the status of minority or regional languages. Not familiar with the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which cannot be used by 
those who pursue divisive political agendas to weaken Georgia (art. 5), some 
scholars argue that ratification will upset national cohesion. They therefore 
maintain that Megrelian and Svan are not languages, but rather dialects of 
Georgian (Amirejibi-Mullen 2006: 5-10). The arguments and anxieties regarding 
the revival of Kartvelian languages reveal fears associated with the Tsarist and 
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Soviet efforts to institutionalise Kartvelian languages as part of their respective 
‘divide and rule’ policies (see sections 4.1.3 and 5.2.2). These fears expose not 
only the confusion over the terms such as ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘minority’ (see 
section 5.2.3), but also the lack of knowledge about language policy theory and 
practice, which shows that embracing small languages can contribute to the culture 
of a sovereign state. Unfortunately, the Georgian Orthodox Church, which enjoys 
great authority among Georgians, plays a negative role in clarifying such issues as 
shown in section 6.2.1. 
6.2 Nationalism and national identity in contemporary Georgia 
As A. D. Smith explains (2002: 78), with the collapse of communism, national 
élites in some post-Soviet countries were driven back to their ethnic heritages and 
mythologies in the hope of realising the messianic mission of their respective 
communities. Long-suppressed nationalisms fuelled ethnic conflicts. When 
explaining such developments, instrumentalists tend to blame nationalist leaders 
who have manipulated ethnic symbols and myths. Primordialists, however, 
minimise the role of intellectuals and trace ethnic conflicts back to historic 
antagonism (A. D. Smith 2002: 79). Ethnosymbolists do not consider either of 
these approaches adequate and place the role of intellectuals in a larger historical 
and cultural context and try to analyse the complex relationships between élites 
and their communities. Intellectuals play an active role in the formation of a new 
identity, but they mislead their compatriots. Emotional and cultural pressure is 
two-sided. In this process the religious revival of a community is common, since 
old memories and myths are related to the religious mission of the group. Very 
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often nationalist leaders trace a myth of ethnic election from pre-modern times. If 
such myths were entirely religious in the past, today they are sometimes 
secularised, but have a deep religious content affecting the sense of value and 
exclusiveness of the community (A. D. Smith 2002: 98). In other words, both 
ethnic and civic nationalisms draw on myths and try to institutionalise them as an 
expression of identity. Intellectual élites and politicians try to direct their cultural 
policies to authenticate ethnic symbols on behalf of the community. During nation-
formation in newly independent states, we observe sometimes a symbiosis of 
ethnic and civic elements, sometimes competition between them. The latter is 
especially true for Georgia. 
Georgia is a good case study for exploring the interplay of the ethnic and 
civic elements of nationhood. As shown in this section, myths of ethnic election 
and ethno-cultural durability were initially used to demarcate exclusive boundaries 
for distinguishing members of the nation from non-members. This approach was 
later challenged by the alternative path offering a secular national destiny. 
Interestingly, ethnic and civic ideologies are still not entirely separated from each 
other. Despite offering and employing different ranges of identity markers while 
trying to reorganise collective memories, these projects feature certain similarities, 
as shown below. 
6.2.1 Kartveloba – two projects of nation-building: ethno-religious versus 
secular/civic 
By the late 1980s, kartveloba as an identity was a framework of perceptions about 
Georgian history, culture, language, religion and homeland embodied in formal 
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and informal discourse. Essentially the ideology behind it was the same as the 
ideology of the high medieval ages (see section 3.2), but now it was the ideology 
not only of the élite. The institutionalised system of education in the Soviet Union 
covered all Georgians and produced generations of well-educated people. This 
helped to complete the process of modern identity formation, which started in the 
nineteenth century largely thanks to the Society for the Spread of Literacy among 
Georgians (see section 4.2).  
In the nineteenth century, the leader of the nationalist movement, Ilia 
Chavchavadze, linked the nation to the secularisation of society (see chapter 4). In 
the twentieth century, generations of Georgians were atheists and, by the 1980s, 
the religious component of identity was subordinated to the national component. 
However, in the late 1980s, emphasising the formative importance of religion in 
the identity formation process often became part of informal education and 
nationalist discourse (Nodia 2009: 90), giving the Church the opportunity to come 
back on the scene. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the notion that only an 
orthodox Georgian could be a ‘true’ Georgian was frequently expressed, meaning 
that Muslim Georgians in Adjara (see section 4.1.3) felt increasing difficulty in 
identifying themselves simultaneously with Islam and the Georgian nation 
(Pelkmans 2006:122). Ironically, Ilia Chavchavadze was canonised by the 
Orthodox Church in 1987 (Rayfield 2000: 159) and his words ‘language, homeland 
and faith’ were adopted as a slogan of nationalism (see section 4.2.2). Since then, 
the church slowly, but steadily started gaining the upper hand, subordinating 
national identity. Gradually, two competing projects of kartveloba emerged: one 
civic/secular, the other ethno-religious.  
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As discussed in section 5.1.2, Gorbachev’s reforms brought about a 
dramatic politicisation of Soviet nationalisms. In Georgia, the cultural and 
linguistic nationalism of previous years was transformed into a national movement 
for political independence in the late 1980s. Georgia’s national movement showed 
extraordinary strength, integrative potential and mobilising capacity (Christophe 
2002: 149). Georgia was one of the first two countries (along with Lithuania) to 
replace the ruling communist nomenklatura with leaders of the national movement 
and demand the restoration of independence (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 244-
245). After almost two hundred years of Russian rule interrupted by only three 
years of independence (1918-1921), Georgians have had to redevelop and redefine 
kartveloba as a new political identity. However, the Soviet strategy of 
manipulating history and the concept of nation, on the one hand, and a feeling of 
pride in a glorious past deeply embedded in collective memory, on the other, pose 
a difficult challenge in the process of nation-building.  
In such challenging circumstances, religion as a historical and cultural 
marker has understandably become the most important source for identity (see 
section 2.2.2). This was helped by a political leader in 1990-1991, Gamsakhurdia, 
who did not see any means of mobilisation other than a revival of the messianic 
myths of Georgians. As A. D. Smith explains, modern nationalism draws much of 
its passion from the belief in a national mission and destiny. Such a belief owes 
much to a powerful myth of chosenness or ethnic election (see section 2.2.3): ‘We 
sometimes find examples of a symbiosis and even a fusion between the earlier 
religious myths and the national ideal. Here the old religious myths […] are more 
or less consciously fused with a modern ethno-political nationalism’ (A. D. Smith 
301 
 
1999b: 332). Myths of election are central to ensuring the persistence of the 
community through the centuries and national movements often concentrate on 
them in order to reproduce the meaning and purpose of the respective nation 
(Hutchinson 2000: 660). Revived and redeveloped, they are carried into the 
modern period when the nation faces difficult challenges. An ideological vacuum 
in post-Soviet Georgia was filled with religious symbols, memories and myths. Ilia 
Chavchavadze’s secular project directed towards the future was replaced by 
Gamsakhurdia’s ethno-religious project focused on the past. 
Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric was based on the fact that the Georgian Orthodox 
Church, together with its lingua sacra, Georgian, remained the only bearer of the 
unity of the Georgian people and lands and that it was a unifier of the Georgian 
state at the zenith of its existence (see section 3.2.2). Georgian historiography 
assumed that Orthodox Christianity played a major role in preserving kartveloba 
vis-à-vis Muslim enemies and was therefore a ‘guardian’ of national identity.49 
Gamsakhurdia frequently emphasised the importance of Orthodoxy and the holy 
mission of the Georgians (see section 5.2.3). Indeed the Orthodox Church 
contributed to the collective identity, especially to the preservation of language as 
shown in chapters 3 and 4. But when Georgia gained its independence, it became 
obvious that a substantial part of the population could not speak Georgian. 
Minorities were perceived as instruments of russification and an assault on 
Georgian language and culture. Gamsakhurdia’s intolerant ethnocentric discourse, 
with its potential for conflict, threatened minorities who were denounced as 
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 Even nowadays the mission of Orthodoxy is presented as a restoration of unity. 
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‘ungrateful guests’ and even ‘traitors’. His aggression provoked fear and led to the 
alienation of minorities. Media in the early 1990s were filled with xenophobic 
articles, often denouncing minorities as ‘traitors’ (see for example Sakartvelo, 
1992, 31 July: 1-2). The extreme position of the government is well illustrated by 
some slogans of the time, such as ‘Georgia for Georgians’ (see section 5.2.2). 
Gamsakhurdia and his party, Mrgvali magida (Round table), built their 
political programme on ethnically defined myths. After winning elections and 
securing a parliamentary majority, Mrgvali magida did not introduce purely 
secular values, despite representing a secular population, and did not try to create 
new state symbols, institutions and laws for an independent secular nation, but 
rather introduced religious symbols, redefined the messianic idea of kartveloba 
(see section 3.2) and declared religious holidays as national holidays. Communist 
internationalist discourse was replaced with national chauvinistic discourse. Soviet 
atheism was replaced with religious discourse. 
In his inaugural speech (cited in Matsaberidze 2007), Gamsakhurdia spoke 
about the historical relations between the Church and the state in Georgia. Towards 
the end of the speech, he made it clear that the national movement, in some sense, 
was a popular-religious movement to ensure the moral rebirth of the nation and 
reunification of the church and the state. Finally he said: ‘The Georgian nation is 
elect among its equals for its lifestyle, location and language. Georgia is destined 
to be the Theotokos’ (Alasania 2006: 117); in other words, God-bearing, coming 
under the auspices of Virgin Mary (see also section 3.2.1). 
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The fact was that Gamsakhurdia understood kartveloba, necessarily 
including Orthodox Christianity, as the identity of Georgian-speaking Orthodox 
Christians, i.e. of those who could fulfil the messianic mission voiced by Ioane 
Zosime in the tenth century (see section 3.2.2). The same year he was elected as 
Georgia’s president, Gamsakhurdia published ‘Letters and Essays’, with an essay 
about Ioane Zosime’s hymn ‘Praise and Glorification of the Georgian Language’, 
in which he tried to demonstrate that the hymn was a mythical foretelling of the 
special mission of Georgians among Christian nations, namely that the Georgian 
tongue is preserved until the day of the Second Coming (see section 3.2.2). 
Gamsakhurdia’s political discourse posited that the Georgian Church and language 
were necessary conditions for independence and state-building, deriving from the 
myth of superiority of the Georgian language. Thus, his outline for the nation-
building project was the moral, religious and linguistic regeneration of an old 
collective identity. 
Other leaders of the national movement thought in the same way. For 
example, Irakli Batiashvili announced: ‘I believe it is my duty as a Georgian to be 
Christian’ (Literaturuli sakartvelo, 1991, 4 June). In order to ‘restore justice’ and 
‘return Georgia to Georgians’, Guram Petriashvili, a nationalist ideologist, 
advocated printing only books written by Georgian authors (Tavisupali sakartvelo, 
1991, 19 August).  
Instead of addressing more pressing issues of identity or economic and 
political affairs, Gamsakhurdia evoked the unbroken continuity from Golden Age 
to the present. This idea easily flourished in the minds of those generations whose 
knowledge of history was marked by nationalist discourse (see, for example, 
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Ingoroqva’s thesis as an illustration of such patterns discussed in section 5.2.2.), 
and who were attempting to build an independent state from scratch. However, 
because of the lack of interest in solutions to economic problems and the disregard 
of the political situation by Gamsakhurdia’s government, Georgia missed a historic 
opportunity to start building a nation-state. 
By favouring religious fundamentalism, institutionalised religious 
extremism and ethnocentrism, Gamsakhurdia made worse what were already 
difficult tasks. Ethnic identities of both Georgians and minorities became stronger. 
Ethnocentric politics resulted in numerous clashes with minorities, while Russia 
was providing large-scale aid to minority fighters (Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 
245-246). Gamsakhurdia’s international image was seriously damaged. Domestic 
opponents of his chauvinism, who were declared ‘agents of Moscow’, also called 
him a ‘dictator’ and ‘fascist’ (Nodia 1995: 107). Gamsakhurdia responded by 
ordering their arrest and in December 1991 armed conflict broke out in front of the 
government building, leading Gamsakhurdia to flee the capital (Silogava & 
Shengelia 2007: 246).  
Following the ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, the former First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
under Gorbachev, returned to Tbilisi as a head of state. Largely because of his 
international reputation, he was able to escape Western criticism despite the fact 
that he came to power on the back of an illegal coup d’état. Besides the task of 
replacing a legitimately elected president, accommodating ethnic minorities and 
restoring the economy, Shevardnadze had to re-establish control over the whole 
territory of Georgia, since he had inherited a state engaged in two wars (with South 
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Ossetian secessionists and with supporters of Gamsakhurdia in western Georgia). 
In addition, Tbilisi had no control over Abkhazia or Adjara. 
Shevardnadze’s efforts had mixed results. The war with Abkhazian 
separatists broke out in 1992 and ended in Georgia’s defeat. Georgia accepted the 
establishment of Russian military bases on its territory. In spite of popular 
opposition, it also joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
(Silogava & Shengelia 2007: 247). Russia established a firm military presence in 
the country and started supporting separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (Gachechiladze 1997: 58). Russia’s peace plan paralysed talks between 
interested parties and created important incentives for the de facto states to pursue 
secession. For instance, Russia distributed passports to the residents of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (Asmus 2010: 73) and started paying pensions larger than those 
granted by the Georgian government to retired people within these territories. 
Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia were the target of an international embargo, 
Russia continued to trade with them.
50
 By the time Shevardnadze was elected 
president (1995), Abkhazia and South Ossetia had achieved de facto independence; 
their politics and economy were criminalised and Russia had established a military 
presence in Georgia (Demetriou 2002: 860). 
An experienced politician, Shevardnadze was more careful in playing the 
Orthodox card. Nevertheless, he was publicly baptised in late 1992 and received 
the name Giorgi (George), emphasising the importance of Saint George as a 
                                                          
50




protector of the Georgian nation. For his election as president, he took his oath in 
the main Orthodox cathedral (Andronikashvili & Maisuradze 2010: 5). With 
regards to national identity under Shevardnadze, although the ‘Georgian gene’ 
remained conspicuous in public discourse, it became less fashionable on a political 
level (Nodia 2009: 92). Instead of religious myths and a belief that the history of 
Georgia is a history of Christians fighting against Muslims, Shevardnadze 
promoted a secular myth, the idea of Georgian history as a history of the Silk 
Road. This is the so called ‘crossroads theory’, meaning that Georgian culture 
emerged from a fusion of eastern and western cultures. Philosopher Gigi Tevzadze 
(2009) argues that this myth has its origin in the beginning of the twentieth century 
and was revived in 1970s as a dominant theory of Georgian self-identification 
among Georgian scholars. It was also a theory that was used by foreign scholars in 
their definition of Georgian identity (see, for example, Magarotto et.al. 1982). 
The leaders of the Rose Revolution have kept this myth and continued to 
promote it. Indeed, Shevardnadze’s main idea proved to be useful. Georgia found 
its historical mission – to be a bridge between the East and West – and started 
reviving this mission by offering transit routes for Caspian oil. The West showed 
interest in the region and Georgia became more involved in global processes. 
Georgia started receiving financial and political support from Western countries, 
especially the USA, which became an important international player in the South 
Caucasus. This period coincided with the boom of globalisation, improved and 
modern communication technologies such as the Internet, email, etc. 
With Shevardnadze’s ideas, ethno-nationalist rhetoric declined and leading 
nationalist parties vanished from the political scene. Georgia grew more pro-
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western and civil society became stronger. But despite the US government 
spending over USD 700 million in aid including aid from the IMF, the World Bank 
and European Union, the level of ordinary people’s life did not improve because of 
widespread corruption in the government. Therefore, Georgia made no progress in 
state-building. Gradually, because of a series of disappointments in the West’s 
unsuccessful involvement, anti-western and anti-globalisation discourse appeared. 
Some politicians, blaming the West for its ‘bad’ influence on Georgia, started to 
appeal to ethno-religious values again and voiced hatred of non-native religious 
minorities, especially the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were frequently harassed 
(Kiknadze 2008: 330). Orthodox priests sometimes participated in violent activities 
against religious minorities (Helsinki Commission Hearing 2004). The Patriarch 
openly urged the suppression of those ‘sects’ which were not ‘historical’ to 
Georgia, claiming that they put Georgian identity at risk (Ilia II 1999).  
In October 2002, Shevardnadze and Ilia II signed a concordat guaranteeing 
a privileged position for the Orthodox Church within Georgia. A year later the 
president announced that he was going to sign an agreement between the Georgian 
government and the Vatican as a treaty between two sovereign states guaranteeing 
religious freedom and the legal rights of Catholics in Georgia. The Orthodox 
Church, believing in its right to oversee all church-state relations, was particularly 
critical of the treaty. It did everything in order to prevent the agreement being 
signed, and acted as a public whistleblower, causing mass protests in front of the 
parliament building. Some priests and high-ranking officials attended the protests. 
People held banners saying ‘Hands off Georgia’ and ‘Georgia without the Vatican’ 
(Brethren in Christ, divided, 2003, 29 September. http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 5 
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February 2011). Within two months, the Rose Revolution emerged and demanded 
Shevardnadze’s resignation. Ilia II offered no support to the president (Crego 2007: 
15). 
One important step towards building a civic nation under Shevardnadze, 
which was initiated by the future leader of the Rose Revolution, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, was the removal in 1999 of the ethnic category from official 
documents (Matveeva 2004: 3). The general public as well as some politicians 
opposed the move but the young reformists won. It was at this point that it became 
obvious that there were two different nation-building projects: those who opposed 
the removal of ethnicity from identity cards viewed nationality as ethnic 
belonging; others understood nationality in the Western sense, as synonymous with 
citizenship (see below for further discussion). 
Since the Soviet period, as a result of Marxist-Leninist elaborations, 
identification with an ethnic group has constituted a major sense of belonging. 
Many Georgians viewed the removal of ethnicity as the loss of identity, while 
minorities saw it as a move towards assimilation (Stepanian 2003: 20). Both the 
majority and minorities found it difficult to view the term Kartveli (a Georgian) as 
a term for citizenship. Therefore, instead of Kartveli, Georgian passports now read: 
‘Citizen of Georgia’.  
Even if all the residents of the former Soviet Republic of Georgia obtained 
Georgian citizenship, before the Rose Revolution citizenship was an almost 
meaningless concept. Minorities were not provided with full citizenship in the 
form of proper participation in state life. Instead they were regarded as an 
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untrustworthy fifth column. In Gamsakhurdia’s time, many believed that ethnic 
Georgians had a greater right to exercise citizenship than other groups, particularly 
those who had another state (Armenians and Azeris). The attitudes of ethnic 
groups towards each other did not improve under the next regime, although the 
constitution adopted in 1995 established the equality of rights and the principle of 
non-discrimination based on ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation.
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Shevardnadze’s benign neglect and inability to find a solution to the multi-ethnic 
problems only deepened mutual mistrust, although there were no reported 
explosive conflicts in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. Shevardnadze’s 
period is best characterised as an attempt to find a balance between different 
interests in order to keep stability in the country, but this meant delaying long-term 
solutions. Minority regions were governed by clans who were obliged to support 
the government during elections. The state institutions responsible for minority 
issues were often ineffective and purely nominal. Such an atmosphere forced many 
minority representatives to leave Georgia. For example, according to the 2002 
census, the number of ethnic Russians since 1989 decreased from 6.3% to 1.5 % 
(Census 2002: 55). 
After the Rose Revolution the concept of a Georgian nation acquired a more 
political dimension. Western-educated Saakashvili engaged in a nation-building 
process by favouring a common political project for all ethnic groups and began to 
refer to Georgia’s multi-ethnic make-up as a source of strength. In his 2004 
inaugural address, Saakashvili (2004a) claimed that: 
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Georgia must become a model where every citizen will be equal 
before the law, where every citizen has equal opportunity to 
achieve success […] Georgia is the home for all Georgians, as 
well as for representatives of ethnic groups that live in Georgia. 
All of Georgia’s citizens: whether Russian, Abkhaz, Ossetian, 
Azeri, Armenian, Jewish, Greek, Ukrainian, Kurdish for whom 
Georgia is their own homeland, are our nation’s greatest 
treasure and wealth.  
If Gamsakhurdia emphasised ethnic markers as constitutive elements of the 
nation, Saakashvili (2004b) focused on political dimensions and tried to 
distinguish the term ‘nation’ from ‘ethnicity’, asserting that: 
It is our responsibility to preserve the multiethnic and multi-
religious Georgia that our ancestors have left us, because many 
nationalities, many ethnic origins are only a source of wealth. 
These are bricks for a new state building's large construction 
plan. […] [A]lthough there are many ethnic groups, the nation 
and the nationality are only one — Georgian, and it consists of 
Georgians, Azeri-Georgians, Abkhaz-Georgians, Ossetian-
Georgians, Armenian-Georgians and so forth.  
In the interview given to the Wall Street Journal (‘It takes Cultural Revolution’, 
2005, 19 August), Saakashvili spoke about the difficulties involved in the process 
of overcoming an ethnic mentality: 
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For multi-ethnic societies like Georgia, cultural change is impossible 
without changes in the perception of ethnicity. In this case, politicians 
should take the lead by speaking out and acting to defeat hate speech 
and prejudices and taking a firm line when it comes to protecting 
human rights. In Georgia, we dared to take positions that were 
previously considered political suicide, eliminating the poisonous 
nationalistic slogans of the early 1990s such as ‘Georgia for Georgians’ 
and creating a new politics that declares Georgia the motherland of all 
its citizens. And we are going even further, establishing merit-based 
affirmative action programmes that give ethnic minorities, such as 
Azeris, Armenians and Ossetians living throughout the country, a 
chance to serve in government at all levels. This way, they will become 
both participants in and contributors to the new Georgia.  
Despite Saakashvili’s fine words, the reality is that ethnic myths remain 
important under his government. Such myths explain the fate and negative 
experiences of Georgia, deployed to some degree to disown responsibility for 
whatever goes wrong. This process goes hand in hand with the identification of an 
enemy who is attempting to destroy the nation. In general, a common enemy plays 
a key role in the construction of group identity: ‘There is no more effective way of 
bonding together the desperate sections of restless peoples than to unite them 
against outsiders’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 91). In Georgia, the most significant ‘other’ is 





 The rhetoric is that communism was never natural to Georgia; it 
was a foreign import from the Russian oppressors, despite the fact that many 
communist leaders were ethnic Georgians and a large part of the intellectual élite 
felt quite comfortable under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Georgia is presented as 
a victim of Russian policies since its annexation in 1801 (see chapter 4) and 
generations of Georgians believe it is because of Russia that Georgia lost territories 
controlled earlier in its history. The influential Georgian politician Zurab Zhvania 
(2006: 160) underlined that at any important crossroads during Georgia’s history, 
if given a choice, the country tried to get closer to the West. If in pre-modern times 
the Muslim world prevented this from happening by conquering Georgia (for 
example, when Ottomans occupied Tao-Klarjeti, the historic south-western 
principality in 1551), in modern times, Russia is responsible for the loss of some 
parts of Georgia’s historic homeland. 
Territorialisation is central to nationalism (A. D. Smith 2009: 44) and 
nations need to have political control over lands they perceive as their historical 
homeland. Abkhazia and South Ossetia gain even more importance for Georgians, 
because ethnic cleansing of Georgians occurred in both places. Therefore, these 
areas play an enduring role in Georgian politics. It is thus no surprise that the 
reintegration of Georgia’s territories was identified as one of the major goals of 
Saakashvili’s regime (see for example, 
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although virtually no other state does. 
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http://www.president.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=217&lang_id=GEO. Accessed 29 
June 2011). 
One of the key issues for Saakashvili’s government was the defence of 
religious freedom, which is declared in article 9 of the Georgian constitution.
53
 The 
same article acknowledges the ‘particular role’ of the Orthodox Church in 
Georgia’s history. In some ways, two years after his inauguration, Saakashvili’s 
rhetoric returned to ethnocentric nationalism. This could be the result of the 
ultranationalist and conservative discourse of some political parties which gained 
popularity demanding the preservation of ethnic kartveloba and frequently calling 
for Orthodoxy as the state religion. Perhaps Saakashvili’s government wants to 
show that they are more patriotic and more Orthodox Christians than the other 
parties. After Saakashvili came to power, Georgia adopted a new flag showing a 
large cross surrounded by four small crosses, as a reference to Georgia’s Christian 
identity. At his inauguration, Saakashvili took an oath in the Gelati Cathedral, on 
David the Builder’s grave (Andronikashvili, & Maisuradze 2010: 5). Arguably the 
government tries to profit from the authority of the Church and does not want to 
criticise it openly, avoiding a conflict. Practically, the government does little to 
ensure religious pluralism. In fact, Georgia’s government recognises the privileges 
of the Orthodox Church (see section 6.2.2). 
Meanwhile, extremist ultra-nationalist religious and fascist movements, 
such as the Union of Orthodox Parents and the National Orthodox Movement, 
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Muslim and 2.1% is Jewish (Census 2002: 80). 
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assault, often physically, representatives of other religions, atheists and people 
with liberal views. The Church does not condemn their actions. So far, there has 
only been one case of extremists being punished by the government (‘Eight jailed 
over Kavkasia TV fist-fight’, 2010, 13 August. http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 7 
September 2010). When in 2008, the ombudsman named 13 instances of violence, 
the patriarchate denied them. Moreover, Ilia II told a BBC correspondent that the 
goal of these organisations was to protect the Georgian Church which was a 
worthy goal (Chitanava 2010). Press issued by the Patriarch’s office (see the next 
section) contributes to the idea that ethnocentric and xenophobic policies can be 
legitimate, especially since the Patriarch’s office does not condemn religious 
extremism and xenophobic behaviour towards religious or sexual minorities 
(‘Church reacts on rumoured gay parade plan’, 2010, 21 August. 
http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 20 September 2010). 
Nevertheless, the abuse of religious minorities, including violence and their 
verbal harassment, decreased under the new government, according to the 2010 US 
State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148936.htm). The same report underlines 
that the problems remain because of the Georgian government’s fear of offending 
the Georgian Orthodox Church.  
 6.2.2 Language, homeland, faith: Nation-building and the Orthodox Church 
As mentioned in the previous section, the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in 
the development of kartveloba is acknowledged by the state. The Georgian Church 
was a guarantor of identity in pre-modern times (see chapter 3), but Orthodoxy 
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became more closely associated with modern Georgian identity in the Tsarist 
period when the Georgian Church became an exarchate of the Russian Church (see 
chapter 4). Autocephaly was regained in 1917, but it barely functioned and did not 
influence state affairs (Jones 1989: 177).
54
 In the Soviet period, the Church lost 
much of its property, and public religious observance was banned. It belonged to 
the private sphere, but after the collapse of the USSR religion became an important 
part of public life (Serrano 2010: 46). The Orthodox Church claimed a right to the 
historical heritage (such as old churches and monasteries), but new churches were 
also being built everywhere. This process intensified under Saakashvili. Many 
business people started financing the activities of the patriarch’s office. The 
Church has had its own television station since 2007 (Ertsulovneba available 
online at http://sstv.ge) and radio station since 2001 (Iveria at FM 105.4). Since 
1977, when Ilia II became the patriarch, the Church also has published several 
magazines (Jvari vazisa, Sapatriarkos utskebani, Sakartvelos sapatriarko, 
Saghvtismetkvelo krebuli, etc.) which often portray the contributions of the Church 
to Georgia’s history. 
   In addition to many other privileges, every year the state budget allocates 
twenty-five million lari (roughly US 14 million dollars) to the patriarch’s office. 
Interestingly, the government’s Chamber of Control, which audits state spending, 
has no authority to check on expenditure of money given to the Church (Chitanava 
2010). For Ilia II’s birthday in 2008, the office received another half a million lari 
(interview with Basil Kobakhidze, on radio Kviris palitra, 2009, 4 November). The 
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same year, the government gave the patriarch’s office nineteen Toyota Land 
Cruisers, each of which costs between forty thousand and sixty-five thousand US 
dollars (Alia, 2008, 24 January). Nevertheless, the Church demands even more 
funding (see for example, ‘krtamshi gadakrili milionebi’, 31 March, 2009. 
http://www.religion.ge/news_one.php?cat=1 &lan=1 &news=1539. Accessed 12 
November 2010). 
  All this draws criticism from the West and outrage from civil society as 
well as from former and current Western-educated priests, who, unable to cope 
with the corruption and ignorance predominating in the Church, have decided to 
return to civil life. They openly confront the patriarch’s office and priests, many of 
whom are former criminals (see, for example, interview with Basil Kobakhidze on 
radio Kviris palitra, 2009, 4 November; interview with Beka Mindiashvili, Versia, 
2009, 9 February; and interview with Kakhaber Kurtanidze on radio Liberty, 2010, 
5 November), and demand public discussions about transparency in the Church’s 
affairs. In turn, the Church accuses civil society of fighting against Orthodoxy, 
which as the patriarch said on several occasions, has been a basis for making the 
community of kartveloba and, therefore, must be the ideology of independent 
Georgia (see for example, interview with Basil Kobakhidze on radio Kviris palitra, 
2009, 4 November). Given the Patriarch’s great authority in shaping public 
opinion, it is not surprising that his words influence decisions by political parties 
seeking popular support. Although the Patriarch does condemn attempts by 
politicians to involve him in politics (‘Do not involve us in politics – Georgian 
Orthodox Church’, 3 January 2008, http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 13 November 
2010), he hints at his political choices. Before the 2008 presidential elections he 
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said: ‘The Georgian people should elect a person, who […] will take care of our 
holy places, our Orthodox religion and church’ (‘Orthodox Church wants president 
who respects religion’, 4 January 2008. http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 13 
November 2010). 
In addition, Ilia II attends important state occasions and makes comments 
about all kinds of issues, always reminding people that Georgia, situated at the 
crossroads of east and west, north and south, is tempted by the influence of other 
nations’ lifestyle, be that liberalisation, democratic reforms, modern technologies, 
etc. In his view, such phenomena threaten Georgian national identity (see for 
example, his ‘Christmas letter’, Sakartvelos respublika, 2004, 7 January). The 
Patriarch’s office even commented on Saakashvili’s initiative to teach English to 
all children in Georgia (see section 6.1.2), claiming that studying English will 
make Georgian children stupid (‘ratom dagvghupavs inglisuris stsavleba pirveli 
klasidan’, Tabula, 2010, 15 November). Ilia II also commented on the president’s 
initiative to send students to western universities: ‘Young people are not yet strong 
spiritually, culturally […] So we should refrain from sending young people abroad’ 
(Patriarch: ‘Refrain from sending kids abroad for education’, 2010, 3 October. 
http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 15 October 2010). 
In 2007, with the Patriarch’s support, Tbilisi hosted the International 
Symposium on Globalisation and Dialogue between Civilizations. While 
Saakashvili spoke at the symposium about the symbolic importance of holding 
such an event in Georgia as a historically multicultural and multireligious country 
and emphasised the unbroken relations between the Orthodox Church and the 
Georgian state, Ilia II underlined the tolerance by the Georgia’s peoples of other 
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religions (Ganatleba, 2007, 31 May), as demonstrated in the old district of Tbilisi, 
where an Orthodox Church, a synagogue, a mosque and an Armenian church stand 
side by side. However, many Georgians perceive themselves as ‘hosts’ in the 
country and demand that the tolerated ‘guests’ behave appropriately, namely stick 
to the stereotypical social roles ascribed to different ethnic minorities (Elbakidze 
2008: 39). For instance, Azeris are agricultural workers, Armenians are traders, 
Russians are servants, Kurds are street sweepers, etc. Schoolbooks for religion, 
history and literature as well as teachers of respective subjects often encourage 
ethnic stereotypes and negative attitudes towards religious and ethnic minorities. 
As a result, young Georgians often construct their relations with other ethnic 
groups accordingly. It is an established practice to invite Orthodox priests to 
consecrate schools (Elbakidze 2008: 42). Teachers regularly display positive 
attitudes towards Orthodoxy and negative attitudes towards other religions or 
atheism. For example, the third grade textbook for history of religion and culture, 
approved by the Ministry of Education, reads: ‘[T]here are people who do not 
believe in religion. They are called atheists. They are very pitiful’ (Tvaradze 2000: 
21). Ilia II himself does not show much tolerance towards other religions (see, for 
example, his comment about Buddha’s monument on 19 November 2010, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62405). 
Other topics the Church comments on are also related to national identity. 
For example, in 2007, Ilia II announced that the restoration of the monarchy and 
the divine dynasty of the Bagrationi would help the restoration of territorial 
integrity. A number of political parties supported this idea (Andronikashvili & 
Maisuradze 2010: 5). The Church views itself as the preserver of the past and 
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believes that participation in worship means participation in the preservation of the 
nation (Tevzadze 2010: 75). Territorial integrity claims are largely based on the 
arguments of the continuous use of language and the first-settlers principle of 
autochthonous groups (see section 5.2.1) which portray minorities as ‘recent 
additions’ to the Georgian space, therefore not deserving the same rights as ethnic 
Georgians. 
In his weekly sermons, Ilia II gives frequent consideration to those markers 
of national identity which might mobilize masses around the idea of an ethno-
religious nation. For example, on 10 October 2010 he spoke about several issues: 
the importance of Georgian literature, the greatness of Georgian as an old sacred 
language and the importance of three Georgian alphabets (see section 3.1.1). He 
called for Georgians to read Georgian literature every day and for the use of all 
three alphabets in street signs. He reminded the nation of Ioane Zosime’s hymn 
and claimed that the Lord will preach in Georgian at the Second Coming. Most 
importantly, he talked about Megrelian and Svan, saying that these are not 
languages but dialects of Georgian (Sapatriarkos utskebani, 2010, 14 October), 
reflecting ongoing academic polemics in recent years regarding the status of these 
languages (see section 6.1.3). It is internally logical for Ilia II’s ideology to ignore 
or even suppress other Kartvelian languages, since in his understanding kartveloba 
refers to the identity of Georgian-speaking Orthodox Christians, i.e. those who can 
fulfil the messianic mission voiced by Ioane Zosime (see section 3.2.2). This 
discourse is based on the idea that the Georgian Orthodox Church together with its 
lingua sacra – Georgian, has remained the only bearer of the unity of the Georgian 
people and lands and that it was a unifier of the Georgian state at the zenith of its 
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existence (see section 3.2.2). Nowadays its mission is presented as the restoration 
of unity. 
Moreover, Ilia II has revived the concept of ‘heavenly Georgia’. As shown 
in section 3.2.1, this concept is related to the myth of the Messiah coming to 
Georgia. In his Easter epistles, the Patriarch keeps repeating the formula: ‘Christ 
has risen, Georgia has risen!’ (see for example, his ‘Christmas letter’, Sakartvelos 
respublika, 2004, 7 January). With such discourse, the Church tries to nationalise 
itself and in this attempt it gets great support from the general public. Sacred unity 
is gradually replacing secular unity (Andronikashvili & Maisuradze 2009: 285). 
According to a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in 
October 2010, the Church is the most trusted institution in the country and 91% 
Georgians trust the Patriarch, while only 42% trust the ruling party (Messenger, 
2010, 29 October ).  
Civil society openly denounces the influence of the Orthodox Church, but 
the political leadership, as said above, is quiet. As for the opposition parties, many 
of them defend the Church and criticise the government for imposing Western 
values on Georgians. It can be argued that both the ruling party and opposition use 
the Church to gain popular support. According to a 2009 survey conducted by the 
Caucasus Research Resource centre, 83% of Georgians trust the Patriarch’s office, 
while according to the 2008 survey by the centre on Conflict and Negotiations, 
more than 90% have a favourable impression of Ilia II (Chitanava 2010). The same 
survey found that 40 % of Georgians are in favour of restricting other religions.  
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The two projects of nation-building (ethno-religious and secular/civic) 
display some similarities. First, they both link their ideology to Ilia Chavchavadze, 
who actually advocated the idea of a secular nation. Territory and language are 
important for both projects as shown above.  
A glorious past (which made us who we are) is part of the discourse of both 
projects. national sufferings in the hands of others are often embodied in both 
discourses, but the difference is that the secular project identifies Russia as the 
other, while the ethno-religious project sees Muslims as the main historical enemy 
and the West as the contemporary enemy. In general, the Georgian nation depends 
upon its enemies, actual or potential, to define it. The latter serve to define its 
nationhood, to excuse its limited current glory and to isolate responsibility and 
blame for its suffering and difficulties during the past, present or future (see 
section 6.2.1). 
Having two competing national projects is not unique to Georgia, and not 
even to post-communist states. Religion, which was considered a relic of the 
Middle Ages, reappeared on the political scene in different parts of the world and 
challenged the state (see for example, Kepel 1994). A. D. Smith (2009:106) points 
out that in the West, too, both models of the nation have been increasingly 
questioned. He concludes that for understanding nationalisms in the modern world, 
it is not enough to uncover their secular drive: the culture and history of the 
community must also be grasped, since a civic nation gathers its strength from old 
values and symbols, myths and memories (A. D. Smith 2002: 113). 
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The competition between two forces of nation-construction – secular and 
ethno-religious – is likely to continue and it is hard to tell what the outcome will 
be. Religious nationalism can become a threat as it may intensify conflicts and 
destabilize the state, or it can become reformist and pro-democratic.  
6.3 What future for Georgia? 
This chapter has argued that a colonial past has formed a central part of top-down 
and bottom-up ethno-linguistic policies in Georgia, pushing debates into historical 
claims rather than focusing on practical considerations of social justice and civic 
integration. Given the evidence, it is clear that the Soviet strategy of manipulating 
history and the concept of nation, on the one hand, and a feeling of pride in a 
glorious past deeply embedded in collective memory and forged by ethno-religious 
nationalists, on the other, pose a difficult challenge in the process of the nation-
building in Georgia. Historical memories tie myth to territories and their claims 
have a great potential for violence, especially in Georgia where ethnic minorities 
are marginalised, do not know the state language and do not share national identity 
with the majority of the population. Georgia’s current government understands the 
urgency of a better policy for integration – more so than the previous governments 
– and has formulated such a policy by adopting a National Concept for Tolerance 
and Civil Integration (www.diversity.ge. Accessed 20 May 2010) but its tangible 
outcomes are still to be seen. Since the language issue is a part of a wider issue of 
civic integration and national identity, it is important to evaluate existing policy 




6.3.1 Evaluation of policy 
The evaluation of language policy is not an easy task, because a wide range of 
different outcomes must be taken into account, including economic integration. 
There have been some positive changes following the Rose Revolution. First of all, 
the state has invested in rehabilitating the infrastructure in regions inhabited by 
minorities (see for example, ‘Mikheil Saakashvili opens Samtskhe-Javakheti 
highway’, 2010, 15 November. http://www.panarmenian.net), but unemployment 
is still high. Second, some steps forward were made in terms of legislation and the 
rule of law. Third, several economic and educational programmes were undertaken 
in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. Most importantly, the government has 
finally produced a formal policy for integration. However, judging by the level of 
state language competence among the minorities (especially the young) and their 
involvement in Georgia’s sociopolitical life, as well as the attitudes and 
perceptions towards each other among the minorities and the majority, it is obvious 
that Georgia still has significant deficiencies with regard to practical 
implementation of the policy. Problems, such as lack of competence in the state 
language, lack of qualified teachers and lack of information among ethnic 
minorities, remain. The participation of persons belonging to ethnic minorities in 
political, cultural and socio-economic life remains limited. The efforts of the 
authorities to offer minorities the opportunity to get involved is far from adequate 
(see for example, ‘Annual reports’ and ‘Evaluation Reports’ by the European 
Centre for Minority Issues). As a result, minorities seem less interested in 




In dealing with ethnic and linguistic diversity in the process of nation 
formation, Georgia has to find a balance between two goals: achieving national 
unity and ensuring minority rights. However, given the way in which some 
governmental decisions are received by different ethnic groups (see section 6.1.3), 
it is obvious that language issues are very difficult to solve and that explicitly 
declared progressive and democratic policies may fail in practice. The ratification 
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Georgia is 
committed to since joining the Council of Europe in 1999, is still largely seen as a 
threat and feared by all sides (see section 6.1.3). While minorities are pushing for 
formalising the use of their languages, there is hardly anyone in the government or 
opposition who supports the acknowledgement of Armenian or Azeri even as 
working languages (Interview with the State Minister of Integration, T. 
Iakobashhvili, 22 March 2010) for fear of strengthening their ethnic identities, 
given the strong correlation between linguistic and ethnic identity in Georgia. 
However, ethnic identities, like any other identities, are dynamic phenomena and, 
although they are still very strong in Georgia, they themselves cannot generate 
conflicts if the state has the will to solve cultural, linguistic, political and economic 
issues and maintain a balance between civic belonging and ethnic belonging. 
Conflicts and tensions in multi-ethnic societies occur where minority rights, 
including linguistic rights, have been denied (Koenig and Varennes 2001: 2). 
While a common language is a legitimate state objective, it should not be forgotten 
that a nation-state is a political group of all citizens and not a linguistic group.  
The government should make more effort to include minorities in state life. 
More sensitive and effective ethnic and linguistic policies will help overcome 
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mutual distrust and fear, and may even help build trust with Abkhazians and 
Ossetians. Successful policies will ensure that linguistic diversity will no longer 
serve to divide citizens into antagonistic communities. But the question is how 
language policy can help overcome the old mentality and gradually achieve the 
long-term goal of civic integration, so that all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, can 
participate in state life and identify themselves with its symbols and values.  
An important aspect of civic nation-building strategy is to make minorities 
feel they are genuine citizens and meet their demands, which include the 
following: 1) cultural/linguistic (the desire to preserve native tongues, faiths and 
identities, but also to learn the state language), 2) political (the desire to participate 
in state life; now they feel discriminated and perceive themselves as second class 
citizens), and 3) economic (the desire to have more opportunities for employment). 
While officials frequently make appeals for national integration, very little has 
been achieved in terms of the development of a national community based on civic 
values. The new policy gives priorities to a civic national identity and shared 
citizenship, but the state sometimes fails to distinguish ethnic and civic symbols 
and values. Therefore, mutual anxiety and mistrust between the majority and 
minorities remain.  
The successful realisation of the goals declared by the new policy depends 
on how effectively each step of its main directions is implemented. The main 
directions, according to the National Concept for Tolerance and Civil Integration 
(http://www.diversity.ge. Accessed 20 May 2010), are: rule of law; education and 
state language; media and access to information; political integration and civil 
participation; social and regional integration; and culture and preservation of 
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identity. The next section attempts to make suggestions for measures in the sphere 
of language planning and policy that the government of Georgia could undertake in 
order to accomplish its main goal: to build a civic nation in which national identity 
is defined not by ethnic origin but, primarily, through a shared political experience 
and common constitutional guaranties. Since policy choices have consequences, 
each step listed below has to be carefully considered. 
6.3.2 Why should, and how can, Georgia become a civic nation? 
Depoliticisation of language issues  
Language policy questions are over-politicised in Georgia and this postpones 
solving problems. It is necessary to depoliticise it and elaborate a unified approach 
to language issues. 
For Georgians, the Georgian language was the source of genuine 
community for many centuries; they therefore believe that it should also define the 
modern Georgian state. Ethnic minorities generally accept this prerogative of 
Georgian, but insist that language policy also preserves their languages and 
identities. Both sides view in each other’s demands a potential threat to their ethnic 
identities. Language and ethnic policies can offer a potential way out of the 
existing mistrust and help to depoliticise these issues. Minorities whose languages 
and identities are recognised by the state are less likely to challenge its authority or 





Collaboration with minorities 
Civic integration is a process where members of both the majority and minority 
groups are required to do something (Modood 2007: 48), and no one group can be 
solely blamed for failing to integrate. Thus it is a two-way social interaction and 
while the government deals with many policy issues, some responsibilities should 
be taken not only on a national level.  
It is essential to collaborate with minorities during the process of designing 
and implementing language policy. Since minority communities remain suspicious 
that the government is catering for its own interests and that policies have hidden 
agendas, blatant ethno-linguistic policies must be reworked in cooperation with 
minority representatives. The state should encourage them to express their interests 
and demands for the protection of their rights, as well as take some initiative in the 
decision-making processes of their communities. They should include clear 
definitions of all terms involved (such as nation, ethnicity, minority, 
autochthonous, linguistic rights, etc.). 
Equality and the rule of law 
The Georgian government needs to address the issues of legal equality of all 
citizens and the supremacy of law (including the right to be elected to public office 
and freedom of political activities). The state should take affirmative action to 
remove obstacles to political, economic and social participations of ethnic 
minorities and encourage minorities to participate in decision making bodies. 
Efforts have been made, as discussed above, but further reforms are needed.  
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The state should fight against any kind of discrimination and guarantee 
ethno-cultural and religious freedom. The concordat between the state and the 
Georgian Orthodox Church, signed in 2002, does not comply with Georgia’s 
constitution (article 19) and needs to be abolished. Although the Georgian 
government says that the concordat is ‘largely symbolic’ (‘Report on national 
minorities in Georgia’, 2009, 13 October. http://www.civil.ge. Accessed 14 
November 2010), as shown above, this is not the case.  
The state might consider offering better mass media provision in minority 
languages, since this could increase the participation of ethnic minorities in 
broader socio-political life, thus reducing the chances of a conflict of loyalty (see 
section 2.4.2). Non-Georgian speakers need to be better informed about the life of 
the state if they are to be expected to integrate into mainstream Georgian culture. 
Language policy must become part of state ethnic policy, which will give 
each ethnic group opportunities to preserve its identity, develop it, and preserve its 
culture, traditions, and language. Only in this way will it be able to integrate into 
Georgian society and contribute to the development of civic society, social stability 
and the strengthening of democracy. The state should encourage socio-economic 
development throughout the country and ensure equality of access to employment, 
healthcare, public services, etc. 
Legislation 
Unified policy and legislation on language issues is necessary. As is shown in 
section 6.1, issues related to language use are scattered in different laws. The 
absence of a unified law concerning languages makes the regulation and 
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implementation of laws difficult. As a fact, existing laws concerned with language 
use in education, administration and justice are not fully implemented or lead to de 
facto discrimination of ethnic minorities.  
Since one of the goals of language policy is the inclusion of all groups in 
state political life, it is necessary to include them also in the discussion of the 
language law. Results of the analysis of language problems make clear the need to 
have multiple sources of information. Elaborated in this way, the law must become 
a subject of public discussion and secure the support of the population. The 
government must assure the population of the bona fide intentions of a proposed 
law. The population may recognise, partly recognise or not recognise it, but 
according to the extent of popular support, it will be possible to judge the results of 
the appropriateness of its adoption. 
Culture and preservation of identity 
Language laws should regulate not only the use of the state language and minority 
languages but also so-called regional languages,
55
 especially with regarding the 
protection of those which exist only in Georgia (Megrelian, Svan, Bats) and may 
have difficulty surviving. UNESCO classified them as ‘definitely endangered’ 
languages (Moseley 2010) and they need active state support (Amirejibi-Mullen 
2006: 10). Concrete steps require changes in legislation and the ratification of the 
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 In the Georgian context, the term ‘minority languages’ refers to the languages of non-
autochthonous ethnic groups which do not identify themselves with the ethnic majority. Speakers of 
Megrelian, Svan and Bats consider themselves to be Georgians and their languages are referred to 
as ‘regional languages’ (Putkaradze 2005). 
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European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Although language 
survival cannot depend only on legislation as its main support, legal provisions 
may allow speakers to claim public space for their languages and cultures 
(Romaine 2002). 
The current policy towards these regional languages, which can be 
described as a policy of tolerance, must be replaced by a policy of preservation and 
promotion, of viewing these languages as a part of Georgian cultural heritage not 
only in respective regions but across the country. Linguistic diversity should be 
presented as a central element of the Georgian culture. The current policy of 
excluding small languages from public domain, under which young upwardly 
mobile people are likely to shift to Georgian completely, will lead to language loss 
over time (Holmes 2001: 59). Support should be given for academic research on 
these languages as well as their promotion. If Svans and Megrelians demand the 
use of their languages in state life and education, the government might wish to 
consider this seriously, since it would reduce the further polarisation of the 
language question (see section 6.1.3) as well as help to void potential conflicts (see 
section 2.4.3). 
The presence of a number of different languages is a national resource 
which can be used by a society in different spheres (such as foreign trade and 
educational advantage) (Ager 1996: 25). At the same time, keeping linguistic and 
cultural diversity is one of the basic conditions for the optimisation of interethnic 
relationships, because the right to publicly express one’s distinct linguo-cultural 
identity will help to reduce fears of assimilation (Preece 2005: 175). Recognising 
diversity is the optimal way of responding to the ‘problem’ of minorities not only 
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for the sake of stability but also out of respect for the minorities themselves 
(Preece 2005: 187). The best way to promote a common identity is sometimes to 
allow differences to flourish (Patten 2001: 705). 
Overcoming ethnic divisions 
When elaborating language policies and laws, Georgia’s European orientation and 
international obligations in the sphere of language functioning must be considered. 
An optimal language policy for multilingual societies is not one which assimilates 
into one culture but one which helps creating an inclusive national identity and 
leads everyone to redefine themselves (Modood 2007: 150). 
The Georgian government regularly says it wants to observe European 
standards (Minority language controversy in Georgia, IWPR report, 2010, 22 
October). Ratifying the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
which views linguistic diversity as a source of cultural richness, can become a 
symbolic step towards overcoming ethnic divisions (ethnic mentality) and help 
with the creation of an inclusive national identity. The multilingualism of Georgian 
society must therefore be emphasised and this fact must be considered valuable 
and evaluated as a positive fact.  
Instead of forbidding ethnic minorities to use their languages in official 
circumstances, the state first of all has to create appropriate conditions for learning 
Georgian. Before all citizens know the state language, local governments should 
have the right to use their respective minority or regional languages. In order to 
overcome short-term difficulties the use of respective minority languages could be 
allowed in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe Javakheti in local administration without 
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undermining the status of Georgian in the long term. This will not only constitute a 
pragmatic solution, but also a psychological one: by recognizing that these 
languages have a role to play within the state, the government will show that it 
values minorities and their cultures.  
Language education 
Teaching Georgian to ethnic minorities must be improved, but before insisting on 
compulsory language learning, handbooks, self-teaching books, phrase-books must 
be created to improve students’ cognitive skills and enable them to use language in 
multiple contexts. Language teachers need to be retrained and new qualified 
teachers must be prepared for children, as well as for adult learners. Bilingual 
education could provide the fastest solution to the existing problems and contribute 
to creating a multilingual society.  
Bringing minority students into Georgian universities is very important for 
their integration. After receiving education in Georgia they are likely to remain in 
the country. The opening of Zurab Zhvania’s School of Public Administration is a 
positive step towards adult education, but it needs to be improved.  
In order enable ethnic minorities to participate in state life, the government 
has a responsibility to provide all citizens with equal opportunities to learn the 
state language and intensify its effectiveness. Minorities need to understand that 
learning Georgian is in their interest as well as in the national interest and need to 
understand the benefits of integration. In order to ensure the protection of their 
languages and to ease tensions, the promotion of the state language must be 
accompanied by discussions with parents and teachers about how their children are 
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educated. In general, open discussions on language policies are vital for its 
successful implementation.  
Civic education 
The educational sphere is of crucial importance for the realisation of civic 
integration and the state should provide the teaching of subjects related to civic 
education, as well as promote public awareness of ethnic and religious tolerance. 
Young people need to be prepared for civic engagement and become aware that the 
richness lies in many different cultures. 
Inter-ethnic confrontations are largely caused by exclusive historical 
narratives cultivated during the Soviet times in order to legitimize territorial claims 
(see section 5.2.2) at the same time serving as an instrument of divisive ethnic 
ideologies. Since then, history school books have not changed significantly. When 
the Geneva-based organisation Cimera, which specialises in minority inclusion, 
examined Georgian history books in 2007, it found that Armenians and Azeris 
were either absent from books or were presented in a negative light (L. 
Gigineishvili 2007). In such an ethnically diverse country, teaching exclusive 
versions of history only exacerbate tensions and contribute to the historical and 
cultural isolation of minorities. History textbooks need to be replaced by inclusive 
ones, which demonstrate the participation of minorities in Georgia’s history and 
cultural life in a positive light. They must be free of ethnic myths and underline 
shared experiences and common elements which unite the different ethnic groups. 
Finally, the state must make sure that top-down and bottom-up language 
policies coincide. This is possible only if minorities feel that they can really benefit 
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from learning the state language and that it is necessary for their social mobility. 
New symbols should be created, but that does not mean discarding the old ones. 
Nations need ‘usable pasts’ and myths which link them to the past. However, 
Georgia’s political and intellectual élite must decide how the past is used. Some 
old symbols, referring to the historical and cultural traditions of Georgia, could 
become valuable while acquiring new meanings. 
The recent legislative reforms discussed above, as well as the adoption of 
the National Concept for Tolerance and Civil Integration and Action Plan, are 
promising steps towards the establishment of an inclusive nation-state which 
promotes cultural and linguistic pluralism. Implementing these recommendations 
may lead to the more effective political and cultural participation of minorities and 







This study investigates the role of language policy in the development of the 
community defined by the characteristic known as kartveloba (Georgianness). 
Based on a large corpus of primary and secondary sources, it examines language in 
relation to other ethno-national resources (such as territory, religion, myths and 
symbols) by means of an ethnosymbolist approach. It argues that the Georgian 
language has been the most important marker of kartveloba throughout 
documented history. 
The pre-modern history of kartveloba challenges the modernist 
understanding of nations and nationalisms, while helping to explain the nature of 
ethno-national ties and important political developments in modern times. 
Modernists are skeptical about referring to pre-modern history, the local culture 
and the social context of identity development, treating culture and old ethnic ties 
as secondary for the nation-building process. Georgia, however, is a case of where 
the culture of the pre-modern community possesses a symbol, the standard and 
sacred Georgian language, which has bound people throughout centuries and has 
become the foundation of the modern Georgian nation. A systematic analysis of 
kartveloba with the emphasis on language and the myth of election demonstrates 
that the modernist idea of ‘invented’ nations is mistaken, or at least is not 
universal. The present Georgian case study thus supports and contributes to the 
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ethnosymbolist paradigm for the study of nations and nationalism, according to 
which ethnic history, culture and symbols are essential for understanding modern 
national identities. Such an approach might usefully be used for the study of other 
contexts. Judgement passed on only recent history and actions of the last few 
decades can be rendered considerably more nuanced by taking into consideration a 
much longer historical period and the role played by ethnic myths and memories in 
their formation. 
While it is often pointed out that language was of no political significance 
before the French Revolution, this study has shown that in Georgia language was 
the prime expression of political identity in medieval times. Although an attempt to 
match the linguistic community to a political unit and find common cultural 
ground for the foundation of the political legitimacy was first expressed in the 
tenth century, it was during the Golden Age (the eleventh-thirteenth centuries) that 
Georgia welcomed ethnic and religious minorities, based on their competence in 
the standard Georgian language, into the highest levels of state power. Georgia was 
well served by focusing on language rather than other markers in allowing 
individuals into its élite. As the language of the dominant ethnic group and as the 
sacred and prestigious language, Georgian was put forward as the binding element 
of kartveloba as a political identity. As such, Georgia’s political, military and 
economic élite of the time consisted of representatives of the Armenian, Kurdish, 
Osetian, Abkhaz and other ethnic groups who integrated into the Georgian state 
through the standard Georgian language.  In this sense, Georgian in the Middle 
Ages can be compared to the national languages of modern time. This study 
suggests that, in Georgia, national consciousness, closely linked to the rise of a 
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strong state, appeared among the educated classes much earlier than in Western 
Europe and the ideology of political rulers and cultural figures in Georgia of that 
time might be the first example of culture manifested for political purposes.   
This is not to claim that in the High Middle Ages Georgians formed a 
nation in the modern understanding of the word, but that the roots for national 
identity had been established. Nation formation is a process and it is important to 
understand how the élite concept of the Golden Age turned into a mass 
phenomenon later on. Every case study of this type thus contributes to a better 
understanding of the question: ‘when is the nation’?  
Analysing ethno-cultural history over the long term opens the way, on the 
one hand, for a more nuanced approach towards studies of ethnic and national 
identities across different epochs, and, on the other hand, for the establishment of 
links between these two phenomena. In turn, this linking between the different 
levels of social identity past and present helps to identify the conditions under 
which nations emerge. It also helps to understand why nations possess a particular 
character and what determines the emergence of inclusive and exclusive nations 
and nationalisms. As this case study has tried to show, ethnic heritage explains the 
durability and character of kartveloba as an identity, and sets limits within which 
modern nationalist élites can operate, whether their goal is to build a secular/civic 
nation or an ethno-religious one. 
 In different contexts – ethnic, national and political – the Georgian 
language has served different purposes, uniting the community and distinguishing 
it from others. It was a distinctive marker of kartveloba which arguably formed the 
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basis of a pre-modern ‘aristocratic nation’. The boundaries of kartveloba varied in 
different epochs but, despite all those changes, kartveloba has always comprised a 
linguistic element. Following Georgia’s political fragmentation in the late Middle 
Ages, the Georgian language still served as a symbol of common identity. Faced 
with a domineering colonial regime, Georgian nationalists in the nineteenth 
century were thus able to use language in their attempts to mobilise the masses and 
create a modern national identity. 
Under Soviet rule, the Georgian language and bottom-up language policy 
once again became key elements of nationalism and the struggle for independence. 
However, the dissolution of the USSR posed a difficult challenge of redefining 
kartveloba for the newly independent Georgian state given the political culture 
inherited from colonial rule. Georgia started its existence torn by violence and 
territorial wars as a result of the inability of the state under the first two presidents 
to respond to the challenges it faced. Despite strong popular sentiment and beliefs 
together with the tendency to follow the familiar patterns of behaviour under 
Soviet rule, the country has made significant steps forward since 2004. However, 
the country still faces the problem of ethnic integration and the transformation of 
Georgian society into a political nation.  
Language policy debates are always about more than language. As such, 
this case study contributes by virtue of its multidisciplinary approach to various 
academic fields, such as sociolinguistics, political ideologies, history, colonial and 
postcolonial studies, policy studies and identity studies. It is especially important 
to the study of the relationship between language policy and national identity. But 
every case of language policy and its use for national identity formation is specific. 
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Why language policy evolves in a certain way and how it affects people within 
different communities can be understood only by studying the dynamics of identity 
formation and the complex relationship between top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives over time. It is impossible to generalise about the best practices in 
language policy since there are too many variables in different places. Nonetheless, 
this thesis has attempted to illustrate the importance of policy that favours the 
effective political and socioeconomic participation of minorities through the 




The recent attempt by the government to turn kartveloba into a political 
identity and establish an inclusive nation is promising. Civic integration is the only 
way to build a democratic nation-state. If Georgia is to remain independent, efforts 
must concentrate on creating a symbolism that transcends ethnic divisions and 
forges a common bond, at the same time as asserting minority rights. If national 
identity is perceived as beneficial, ethnic differences may not seem so important; 
they could instead become a new set of ‘deep resources’, ensuring the solidarity of 
all citizens irrespective of origin. The common Georgian language, with its 
symbolic and communicative functions, can become a major marker of a new civic 
national identity. Language policy served as an instrument of Georgia’s 
colonisation and appropriate language policy must become an instrument of its of 
decolonisation.  
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 This thesis was not able to address fully all aspects of language policy and national identity in 
Georgia. Aspects that are in need of further study include: the construction of national identity in 
the context of globalisation; gender and nation; education policy and school administration; social 
sciences and humanities and how they are taught; cultural awareness and tolerance; political 
discourse; as well as more detailed study of the linguistic situation and the ethno-linguistic 
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